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Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders

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01-01-2021 | Original Paper

Naïve Theories of Biology, Physics, and Psychology in Children with ASD

Auteurs: Diane Poulin-Dubois, Elizabeth Dutemple, Kimberly Burnside

Gepubliceerd in: Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders | Uitgave 10/2021

Abstract

Theory of mind is defined as the understanding that mental states predict and explain people’s behaviors. It develops around the age of 4 but seems to remain deficient in people with ASD, whereas other forms of naïve understanding remain intact. This study compares children with ASD to neurotypical children on tasks measuring naïve psychology, physics, and biology (biological parts). Results suggest that children with ASD only underperform on an implicit false belief task. Performances in naïve biology and physics were equivalent across the two groups and uncorrelated to performance on the false belief task. This confirms that naïve physics and biological reasoning are intact in children with ASD but that tracking false beliefs is challenging for this population.

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Titel: Naïve Theories of Biology, Physics, and Psychology in Children with ASD
Auteurs: Diane Poulin-Dubois
Elizabeth Dutemple
Kimberly Burnside
Publicatiedatum: 01-01-2021
Uitgeverij: Springer US
Gepubliceerd in: Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders / Uitgave 10/2021
Print ISSN: 0162-3257
Elektronisch ISSN: 1573-3432
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-020-04813-9

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