In this study, we explored the processes contributing to the false recognition of novel abstract shapes versus pictures of real objects. In five experiments, we used the conjoint recognition paradigm to assess whether gist trace retrieval contributes only to false acceptances of semantically related pictures or if it also underlies false recognition of non-semantically related abstract shapes, the latter being inconsistent with FTT’s formulation of gist representation as meaning based. The second, related aim of our experiments was to investigate the role of adding a surface feature to members of a category for false recognition, and to explore which processes in the conjoint recognition model are responsible for this effect, depending on the type of material used. In this section, we will first consider the issue of the processes underlying abstract shape recognition, then, we will discuss the effect of adding colour to targets and distractors belonging to one category. Next, we will provide some examples of alternative interpretations of our results from perspectives other than FTT and dual-recollection theory. Finally, we will discuss the possible consequences of using different versions of the CR model and paradigm for the effects observed in our experiments.
The nature of gist representation underlying recognition of non-semantically related pictures
Fuzzy trace theory provides a well-documented and established opponent-process explanation of false memory for semantically related materials (e.g. Reyna et al.,
2016). It assumes that the false acceptance of semantically related distractors is supported by the retrieval of gist memories, while it is suppressed by the retrieval of verbatim memories. The closer in meaning the targets and related distractors are, the more probable it is that distractor presentation will elicit gist memory. In DRM-like paradigms, manipulations that increase gist strength increase the incidence of false recognition of semantically related distractors, even if their associative strength is held constant (Brainerd et al.,
2020). Extending this approach to account for the false memory of non-semantically related distractors implies that false acceptance can be attributed to the failure of verbatim suppression process but not to gist retrieval (Chang & Brainerd,
2021).
In the five experiments presented in the current article, we found a significant contribution of processes interpreted as gist-based to false recognition of semantically (and perceptually) related concrete distractors and perceptually (but not semantically) related abstract distractors. In particular, in Experiment 1, the gist trace retrieval parameter of the simplified CR model, was significantly higher than zero for the recognition of abstract shapes. In a similar vein, using the same abstract materials, in Experiments 3 and 5, the familiarity parameters of the full CR model also indicated a significant contribution of gist memory to the false recognition of non-semantically related distractors. At the same time, the contribution of the recollection rejection parameter to memory performance was found to be negligible (Experiments 1 and 5) or significantly higher than zero but relatively small (Experiment 3).
These results appear to be inconsistent with the FTT assumption that gist traces encode semantic relations, but instead they support the view that gist can be represented at both perceptual and conceptual levels (Naspi et al.,
2021). This view is present implicitly or explicitly is some studies on false memory. For example, Arndt (
2010), in his research on the effects of testing critical distractors in a font matching the font of their studied associates, explicitly assumed that fonts can produce gist representations of their commonalities when they are repeatedly presented during a study phase. In similar vein, Koustaal et al. (
1999) used novel shapes without pre-existing semantic representations in their studies on false memory in amnesiacs or older adults, and assumed that false memory is based on “perceptual gist”. Oliva (
2005) also used the term perceptual gist and argued that it encompasses all levels of visual information, including low-level features (such as colour). Moreover, studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging have suggested that false recognitions can be elicited by perceptual relations, since the erroneous acceptance of visually similar distractors is accompanied by enhanced activity in early visual processing regions (e.g. Bowman et al.,
2019). Old-hits and old-misses evoked similar levels of activity within early visual processing regions also in studies that used novel objects or patterns without pre-existing semantic representations, as those applied in our experiments (Slotnick & Schacter,
2004; cf. Naspi et al.,
2021). Moreover, it seems that the neural underpinnings of conceptual and perceptual false recognition are at least partially distinct (Garoff-Eaton et al.,
2007).
In view of the aforementioned, we advocate for a reconsideration of the nature of representation underlying gist in FTT. The results of the current study and our previous research with orthographically related words (Nieznański et al.,
2019; cf. Holliday & Weekes,
2006) suggest that the informational content of the relations shared by sets of items that is encoded in the gist trace is probably not limited to semantic content but also represents perceptual patterns. This concept is not consistent with the current version of the FTT (Chang & Brainerd,
2021), but it seems congruent with a description of gist traces that can be found in early FTT formulations (Brainerd & Reyna,
1990), where both senses and patterns (presumably also perceptual patterns) were included as the basis of gist representation.
Moreover, it is worth considering whether it is better to favour the view that there is a general gist representation that encompasses both perceptual patterns and semantic content, or to distinguish separate perceptual-gist and semantic-gist. The rationale for the latter account can be derived from the results of Experiment 1, in which blocked presentation did not support perceptual-gist encoding, while this form of presentation usually supports semantic-gist encoding. Arguments for separate representations may also be derived from the fact that phonological and semantic relatedness often produce dissociative effects of experimental manipulations on false memories (see: Chang & Brainerd,
2021; Tse et al.,
2011). For example, evidence for the relative independence of processes underlying semantic and phonological false memories can be found in studies manipulating the presentation rate of DRM lists (Ballardini et al.,
2008) or studies indicating over-additive false memory effects for hybrid lists of semantically and phonologically related words (e.g. Finley et al.,
2017; Nieznański et al.,
2019; Watson et al.,
2001,
2003). The differences in underlying representations for the phonologic versus semantic DRM-illusions are also supported by the individual-differences study by Ballou and Sommers (
2008), which found no significant correlations between false recall and recognition of critical lures across phonologically and semantically related lists.
Our interpretation of the contribution of perceptual gist to the recognition of abstract shapes is hinged on the assumption that the novel abstract objects are not processed semantically. However, it is possible that participants tried to code these non-linguistic materials in a linguistic manner. Although the abstract categories were designed to be novel and not conceptually meaningful, participants were likely able to assign conceptual labels (cf. Koutstaal et al.,
2003; Pidgeon & Morcom,
2014). Thus, the role of semantic processing in the formation of gist representations for novel abstract shapes cannot be ruled out, but we consider it unlikely that semantic processing could be responsible for the entire contribution of gist to the false memory of these shapes. This issue needs further investigation.
Representation of surface information shared by semantic or perceptual category and its contribution to false memory
The key experimental manipulation in our experiments was adding a specific colour to items in each category. We expected that related distractors that have this additional feature in common with targets would be falsely recognised more often (cf. Nieznański & Obidziński,
2022). Following Chen et al.’s (
2018) suggestion that the surface details connected to a category are stored with traces of semantic information, we predicted that adding such a feature will help subjects to extract semantic information connected with the category and will increase false recognition based on gist-trace retrieval for semantically related distractors. It can be assumed that for real objects such as the door scenes, colour may be used to interpret the meaning of a scene (e.g. the brown colour of the door may somehow help identify it as a church door). However, when properties such as colour are unrelated to the meaning or pattern of an abstract shape, gist-related processes may not be used (cf. Oliva,
2005). Therefore, we tentatively expected that an increase in false recognition is more likely to occur when targets and distractors belong to a common semantic category than when the category is built on surface resemblance.
Consistent with these expectations, in the experiments using door scenes (Experiments 2 and 4), we found a significant increase in the contribution of gist-based processes to the false recognition of related distractors in the colour condition. However, in experiments using abstract shapes, the results suggested a lack of effect. More specifically, in Experiment 1, we only found an increase in phantom recollection in the colour condition, and this effect was not confirmed in follow-up Experiments 3 and 5.
The phenomenon of binding contextual (surface) features with gist representation manifests in the observation of false attributions of critical distractors to their corresponding-list’s context in studies using the DRM paradigm (Chen et al.,
2018; cf. Brainerd et al.,
2014). For example, in Hicks and Hancook (
2002), DRM lists were presented by male and female speakers, where one speaker presented a list half of higher backward associative strength (BAS) to the critical distractor, whereas another source read half of the weak BAS. Critical lures were more often attributed to speakers who read items of a strong BAS, that is, items that were more likely to form a gist shared by the critical distractor (see also: Franks et al.,
2016; Hicks & Starns,
2006; Nieznański et al.,
2018). Similarly, Arndt and Reder (
2003) observed that false recognition levels increased when all studied words from a given theme (gist) were presented in the same font style than when each word was associated with a single font. The surface details of the font style seemed to be connected with the stored representation of gist, which is consistent with the interpretation we proposed for our results.
An alternative possibility, derived from the recent concept of a contextual trace separate from the verbatim and gist traces (Brainerd et al.,
2022a), is that the context recollection process contributes to an increase in false recognition for distractors that have an additional contextual feature (colour) in common with the targets. This explanation is only supported by our experiments using the simplified CR model, as they demonstrated a higher contribution of phantom recollection (which is the process corresponding to context recollection) in the colour condition than in the grey-scale condition. However, all three experiments using the full CR model found no differences between conditions in the parameters based on context trace retrieval (i.e. the erroneous recollection rejection or phantom recollection parameters). These inconsistencies in results between experiments depending on the model used are discussed in the next section.
Finally, let us consider the connections between the main questions raised in this article, namely, the hypotheses regarding the role of gist in the recognition of perceptually similar items and the consequences of adding a perceptual feature for false recognition of similar items. On the one hand, our finding that adding a surface feature increases the contribution of gist retrieval challenges the FTT assumption that gist is solely semantic in nature. On the other hand, this observation applied only to meaningful but not abstract objects, which seems somewhat problematic for the view that perceptual patterns are represented in the gist trace. If we assume that shared features are encoded in the gist (or perceptual gist) trace, there is no reason why adding one more common feature should not affect the gist contribution and require the mediation of semantic content. One explanation could be that our study did not reject the null hypothesis of no effect on gist contribution due to insufficient statistical power.
Alternative theoretical perspectives
Our results showing that false memory for perceptually similar abstract shapes is driven by retrieval of representations of shared features, could be interpreted from perspectives other than fuzzy-trace theory. For example, Johnson et al. (
1993) in source-monitoring theory postulated that memory accuracy (e.g. distinguishing memories of real and imagined events) depends on the availability and quality of memory characteristics in combination with the correctness of judgement processes. Both perceptual and semantic details are among the memory characteristics involved in source monitoring, therefore, both perceptual and semantic similarity can increase source misattribution (e.g. Johnson et al.,
1988; cf. Bayen et al.,
1996). Consistent with our approach, the effects of characteristics similarity on false recognition will be interpreted in source-monitoring theory as resulting from the availability or quality of memory records, rather than the efficiency of judgement processes. When testing perceptually or semantically related distractors, information from the target representation sometimes becomes activated and is misattributed to the distractor, leading to false acceptance (Henkel & Franklin,
1998; Henkel et al.,
1998; Lyle & Johnson,
2006).
Regarding the effect of adding a feature to the studied items on the false recognition of a related distractor that shares that added feature, models of recognition would generally predict an increase in false acceptances but not necessarily different for abstract and concrete materials. Take, for example, global matching models (cf. Arndt,
2010,
2015; Hicks & Starns,
2006) which assume that memories are encoded as collections of features, including both item and context information. In these models, false recognition is a function of the match between the related distractor used as a "memory probe" during retrieval and the memory traces of all studied items. The comparison of the memory probe with all encoded items generates the stronger the activation, the higher the summed similarity of the features. For related distractors that are similar to multiple targets, recognition errors arise from summing many relatively small matches (Arndt,
2010,
2015; Arndt & Hirshman,
1998; Hicks & Starns,
2006). This approach does not differentiate between perceptual and semantic features, both can contribute to the memory probe’s global match to encoded traces. Adding any feature that is common to the memory probe and a subset of memory traces should increase global similarity and acceptance probability. Consistent with this prediction, we found a higher false acceptance rate when a perceptual feature was added to concrete pictures, but adversely we did not find this effect for abstract shapes. One could try to explain the different results for these two types of stimuli following Kinnell and Dennis (
2012) by the difference in the ease with which the stimuli can be uniquely represented. In their experiments, Kinnell and Dennis (
2012) found that pairs of words and scene pictures did not show a list length effect but fractals and unfamiliar faces did (as reflected in increased false alarms with long lists). The longer the list of these unfamiliar stimuli was presented at the study, the more difficult it was for participants to create unique representations for them. As predicted by global-matching theories, the amount of interference depends on the degree of overlap between item representations, therefore, overlapping representations generate an increase in false alarms rates. Such an interpretation could be applied to our results if we agree that adding a feature to concrete pictures (door scenes) leads to greater overlap of representations than in the case of abstract shapes.
A potentially more fruitful approach for interpreting our results can be found in the neurocognitive literature. For example, Cowell et al. (
2019) point out that concepts of memory processes, such as recollection and familiarity, conflate neuro-computational operations (such as pattern completion or memory strength signal generation) with neural representations (which vary in properties such as dimensionality). Understanding memory mechanisms requires separating memory processes into their operations and representations. According to the representational-hierarchical account (Cowell et al.,
2019), a key property of a memory is dimensionality of representations, which change along a continuum, from simple visual features to objects and scenes. As dimensionality increases, the involvement of successive brain regions changes but the operations that can act on representations in these regions are the same at all levels of the hierarchy. Sadil et al. (
2019) demonstrated that associative learning occurs not only as top-down processing at the highest levels of representational dimensionality but also at lower levels, as lateral processing of associations between perceptual elements. In other words, a particular brain region may house only one class of representation, but there may be many nonspecific operations occurring in it (Cowell et al.,
2019). With respect to our research, it seems reasonable to consider memories of abstract shapes as lower-dimensional representations compared to high-dimensional representations of door scenes. Operations leading to false recognitions (presumably pattern-completion retrieval) can occur for both abstract shapes and pictures of real objects, as the same operations can occur at different levels of dimensionality. One can speculate that differences in the effects of adding a feature to a category between abstract and concrete materials may depend on how this manipulation modified the properties of the representation, since representational content determines the contribution of a particular brain region to memory retrieval (Ross et al.,
2018).
Consequences of using different paradigms
Our experiments revealed that the results based on the simplified CR model (Stahl & Klauer,
2009) differ from those based on the full CR model (Brainerd et al.,
2022a) with the same manipulation of adding a surface feature. Specifically, for door scenes, according to the simplified CR model, the increase in false recognition of related distractors was due to a significant increase in both phantom recollection and gist retrieval (Experiment 2), but in Experiment 4 using the full CR model, results only show a significant increase in the semantic familiarity parameter for related distractors, with no difference in phantom recollection. For abstract shapes, a significant difference in the role of phantom recollection in the false recognition of related distractors was found using the simplified CR model in Experiment 1 but not in Experiments 3 and 5 that used the full CR model. For abstract shapes, not only did the results of the modelling analyses differ between experiments, but also the findings based on descriptive measures were not consistent. In particular, in Experiment 1, the proportion of “target” responses to related distractors was higher in the colour condition than in the grey-scale condition, but in Experiments 3 and 5, the proportion of acceptance of related distractors (“yes” responses) in Target? probes did not differ between conditions. This suggests that changing the response format from a multiple-choice test that requires participants to classify each item as a target, related distractor, or unrelated distractor (in the simplified CR paradigm) to a “yes–no” format with three types of probes (in the full CR paradigm) leads to different memory performance. An even more compelling difference in performance due to subtle difference in response formats was recently demonstrated by Brainerd et al., (
2022b), who found differences in participants’ performance between the Old? and Not-New? probes and between the New? and Not-Old? probes, even though these probes are logically equivalent.