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Gepubliceerd in: Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 2/2023

01-12-2021 | Letter to the Editor

Does the Neurotypical Human Have a ‘Theory of Mind’?

Auteur: Joe Gough

Gepubliceerd in: Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders | Uitgave 2/2023

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Excerpt

The notion of theory of mind, now commonly called ‘mindreading’ and ‘mentalizing’, was originally put forward in animal psychology (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Shortly after, it was used as a foundational concept in the first ‘cognitive’ version of the social theory of autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Happé & Frith, 2020). The concept is now used across various areas of cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience, including psychometrics, developmental psychology, and more (e.g., Apperly, 2012; Saxe, 2010; Schaafsma et al., 2015; Wellman & Liu, 2004). As time has gone on, subtly (and not-so-subtly) different conceptions of theory of mind have proliferated across different research areas. …
Voetnoten
1
For the sake of simplicity, I treat these as mutually exclusive, as they are generally understood in relevant debates (although for options with key elements of both, see Ereshefsky, 1992; Haueis, 2021).
 
2
I use the phrase ‘autistic people’, as is the preference of some autistic people, although I acknowledge that some people with autism prefer the phrase ‘people with autism’.
 
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Metagegevens
Titel
Does the Neurotypical Human Have a ‘Theory of Mind’?
Auteur
Joe Gough
Publicatiedatum
01-12-2021
Uitgeverij
Springer US
Gepubliceerd in
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders / Uitgave 2/2023
Print ISSN: 0162-3257
Elektronisch ISSN: 1573-3432
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-021-05381-2

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