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Gepubliceerd in: Psychological Research 3/2009

01-05-2009 | Original Article

Does unconscious thought improve complex decision making?

Auteurs: Arnaud Rey, Ryan M. Goldstein, Pierre Perruchet

Gepubliceerd in: Psychological Research | Uitgave 3/2009

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Abstract

In a recent study, Dijksterhuis et al. (Science 311:1005, 2006) reported that participants were better at solving complex decisions after a period of unconscious thought relative to a period of conscious thought. They interpreted their results as an existence proof of powerful unconscious deliberation mechanisms. In the present report, we used a similar experimental design with an additional control, immediate condition, and we observed that participants produced as good (and even descriptively better) decisions in this condition than in the “unconscious” one, hence challenging the initial interpretation of the authors. However, we still obtained lower performances in the “conscious” relative to the “immediate” condition, suggesting that the initial result of Dijksterhuis et al. was not due to the action of powerful unconscious thought processes, but to the apparent disadvantage of further conscious processing. We provide an explanation for this observation on the basis of current models of decision making. It is finally concluded that the benefit of unconscious thought in complex decision making is still a controversial issue that should be considered cautiously.
Voetnoten
1
Indeed, in Experiment 1 and 3 from Dijksterhuis (2004), the author only reported an analysis performed on the difference between the best candidate and the worst one and no information was given on the proportion of responses for each candidate in each experimental condition, making the comparison between the unconscious and the immediate conditions impossible. In Experiment 2, mixed results were reported. On the one hand, the proportion of responses for the best car tended to be higher for the unconscious condition relative to the immediate one (but there was no difference between the critical conditions, i.e., the unconscious and conscious conditions). On the other hand, the strategy adopted by participants appeared to be different between the unconscious and the conscious conditions (but this time, there was no difference between the unconscious and the immediate conditions).
 
2
After running the experiment, we noticed that one of the two medium cars described in the material section of Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) did not have precisely 50% of positive attributes, but 58% (i.e., 7 positive attributes out of 12; Ap Dijksterhuis indeed confirmed that for the Kaiwa, it was difficult, rather than easy, to shift gears). Since we used exactly the same material as the one published in this study, our experiment includes this discrepancy. However, we decided to avoid running again the complete experiment because this discrepancy does not change fundamentally the experimental design, the best car still having more positive attributes (9 out of 12) than the other cars. Hereafter, we label “medium 1”, the car with 58% of positive attributes and “medium 2”, the car with 50% of positive attributes.
 
3
Note that it only makes sense to calculate mean evaluation scores on at least two attributes because the most influential attribute (i.e., good gas mileage) is shared by both the best car and car medium 1.
 
4
Besides, in the marketing domain, it has been recently proposed that, under certain conditions, providing fewer attributes make choices easier (Fasolo, McClelland, & Todd, 2007).
 
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Metagegevens
Titel
Does unconscious thought improve complex decision making?
Auteurs
Arnaud Rey
Ryan M. Goldstein
Pierre Perruchet
Publicatiedatum
01-05-2009
Uitgeverij
Springer-Verlag
Gepubliceerd in
Psychological Research / Uitgave 3/2009
Print ISSN: 0340-0727
Elektronisch ISSN: 1430-2772
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-008-0156-4

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