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Psychological Research

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01-06-2005 | Original Article

The consciousness continuum: from “qualia” to “free will”

Auteur: George Mandler

Gepubliceerd in: Psychological Research | Uitgave 5-6/2005

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Abstract

The consciousness continuum is seen as extending from simple sensory experiences to complex subjective constructions resulting in the apparent exercise of conscious will. The phenomena between these two extremes include spontaneously occurring mental contents, unintended perceptual experiences, memory retrievals, and problem solving including feedback of conscious contents. Two factors describe this continuum: The presence or absence of intention (psychologically defined) and the complexity of the cognitive construction involved. Among other benefits, such an analysis is intended to provide an alternative to metaphysical and vague concepts such as qualia, free will, and intentionality.

vorige artikel Statistical approaches to language acquisition and the self-organizing consciousness: a reversal of perspective

volgende artikel Measuring unconscious knowledge: distinguishing structural knowledge and judgment knowledge

This is not the place, nor does space permit, to discuss the relationship between these constructions and the variety of other distinctions available in the literature.

I will not deal with the possibility that intentions may sometimes be coextensive with the intended act.

See also Kahneman and Treisman (1984).

See also Pashler (1998)

For more extensive descriptions of these studies, see Mandler (1994).

For a review of relevant studies, see Kvavilashvili & Mandler (2004).

See Mandler (1980) for a discussion of the processes involved.

Amnesic patients show unimpaired performance on implicit memory of previous primed words, etc. (e.g., Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1971; Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1984). These patients are presumably accessing the material “unintentionally.”

Related to these more complex phenomena are the extensive demonstrations by Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel how unconscious (automated, uncontrolled) processes guide and control overt and conscious action, e.g., Bargh, et al. (2001) and Uleman & Bargh(1989).

The fact that conscious experience can affect subsequent action and experience should provide serious pause for defenders of an epiphenomenal position that speaks of an ineffective consciousness.

However, we have known for some time that spurious mental ascriptions such as false recall and recognition memories may be easily produced experimentally. By themselves they do not provide definitive proof of the mechanism(s) underlying the original phenomenon.

Granted that we do not know how conscious thought might cause some action, we are no wiser as to the processes whereby unconscious mechanisms do so.

The reader is directed to the original chapter for more elaborations of this and other aspects of apparent exercises of “free will.” I note that when we advocated a belief in free will as making more choices and alternatives possible, we were accused by some of our audience of being hypocritical by advocating something we did not believe in.

I thank Michael Mandler for suggesting this argument.

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Titel: The consciousness continuum: from “qualia” to “free will”
Auteur: George Mandler
Publicatiedatum: 01-06-2005
Uitgeverij: Springer-Verlag
Gepubliceerd in: Psychological Research / Uitgave 5-6/2005
Print ISSN: 0340-0727
Elektronisch ISSN: 1430-2772
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-004-0206-5

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