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16-04-2018 | Original Article

Spontaneous Theory of Mind is reduced for nonhuman-like agents as compared to human-like agents

Auteurs: Lara Bardi, Charlotte Desmet, Marcel Brass

Gepubliceerd in: Psychological Research | Uitgave 7/2019

Abstract

Theory of Mind research has shown that we spontaneously take into account other’s beliefs. In the current study, we investigate, with a spontaneous Theory of Mind (ToM) task, if this belief representation also applies to nonhuman-like agents. In a series of three experiments, we show here that we do not spontaneously take into account beliefs of nonhuman-like others, or at least we do it to a lesser extent than for human and human-like agents. Further, the experience we have with the other agent, in our case a dog, does not modulate spontaneous ToM: the same pattern of results was obtained when dog owners and no owners were compared. However, when more attention was attracted to the dog behavior, participants’ behavior was influenced by the beliefs of the dog. In sum, spontaneous belief representation seems to be primarily restricted to human and human-like agents, but can be facilitated when more attention is drawn to a nonhuman-like agent.

vorige artikel Cognitive control over unconscious cognition: flexibility and generalizability of task set influences on subsequent masked semantic priming

volgende artikel Judgements about double-embedded relative clauses differ between languages

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Titel: Spontaneous Theory of Mind is reduced for nonhuman-like agents as compared to human-like agents
Auteurs: Lara Bardi
Charlotte Desmet
Marcel Brass
Publicatiedatum: 16-04-2018
Uitgeverij: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Gepubliceerd in: Psychological Research / Uitgave 7/2019
Print ISSN: 0340-0727
Elektronisch ISSN: 1430-2772
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-018-1000-0

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