Development of Moral Judgments in Impersonal and Personal Dilemmas in Autistic Spectrum Disorders from Childhood to Late Adolescence

Individuals with Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are characterized by restricted interests, repetitive rigid behavior, and differences in communication and social interaction (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Difficulties in interpersonal interactions and friendships are among the areas that most affect these individuals' daily functioning and quality of life (Deschamps et al., 2014). These difficulties may arise in part from differences in moral development and subsequent moral reasoning compared with individuals with typical development (TD) (e.g., see Bellesi et al., 2018; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2012; Schaller et al., 2019; Ros & Stokes, 2018). Indeed, it has been suggested that individuals with ASD exhibit more rational decision-making than TD individuals, including moral judgments in emotional scenarios (“enhanced rationality” hypothesis in ASD; see Rozenkrantz et al., 2021, for a recent review). The scarce literature on this issue has focused on adults with ASD; little is known about the development of moral reasoning from childhood to adolescence in ASD (see Dempsey et al., 2020, for a review). The present study aims to fill this gap by analyzing the influence of emotion on moral decision-making in individuals with ASD from childhood to late adolescence, thus providing valuable insights into their moral reasoning development.

The most studied dilemmas that examine the influence of emotion on moral decision-making are the trolley dilemma's impersonal and personal scenarios (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976). In the impersonal scenario (“switch dilemma”), the participant has to deal with a runaway trolley that cannot be stopped. The trolley would undoubtedly kill five people on the track unless a lever that diverts the trolley to another track is pulled. Critically, if diverted to the other track, only one person would be killed by the trolley. In the personal scenario (“footbridge dilemma”), the participant has to decide whether to push a large man off a footbridge to stop a train from killing five people on the track. In the personal and impersonal scenarios, the decision is the same: would you decide to sacrifice one person to save five others (i.e., utilitarian decision), or would you let the trolley hit the group of five people (i.e., deontological decision)? However, the two scenarios differ in emotional engagement: switching a lever conveys a low emotional charge (impersonal scenario), whereas pushing a person to her/his death implies a substantial emotional charge (personal scenario) (Greene et al., 2001). In the impersonal scenario, most children and adults with TD choose to pull the switch (i.e., the utilitarian decision). However, in the personal scenario, the majority of individuals with TD would not push the person onto the tracks, adopting a deontological decision instead (e.g., Greene et al., 2001; Moore et al., 2008; Pellizzoni et al., 2010). Indeed, most TD adults feel a strong emotional aversion to the utilitarian decision in personal dilemmas (e.g., Petrinovich et al., 1993; Skulmowski et al., 2014).

Rationalist theories posit that moral decision-making relies on cognitive reasoning to engage in both a cost–benefit analysis (Kohlberg, 1969) and an emotional reaction to others’ distress (Damasio, 1994; Turiel, 1983). Dual-process theories (Greene, 2009; Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Moll & de Oliveira-Souza, 2007) combined these concepts to understand moral judgments in impersonal and personal scenarios. On the one hand, controlled cognitive processes are usually involved in low emotionally charged moral dilemmas (i.e., impersonal scenarios). Therefore, they promote utilitarian judgments, which means deciding to approve a harmful action when it serves a greater good. On the other hand, intuitive, emotional processes are usually involved in high emotionally salient moral dilemmas (i.e., personal scenarios), promoting deontological judgments (i.e., the decision to favor a person's rights) even though they do not lead to a greater good.

Clearly, the development of moral maturity requires cognitive and emotional abilities. An important issue is whether this development is delayed or atypical in ASD. Indeed, differences in empathy (i.e., a response to another individual based on their psychological or contextual circumstances; Hoffman, 2001) among individuals with ASD may reflect delayed or atypical moral development (see Dempsey et al., 2020; Mathersul et al., 2013). Empathy can be distinguished into the cognitive empathy system (i.e., the ability to infer the internal mental state of another individual) and the affective empathy system (i.e., the capacity to automatically experience an appropriate emotional response to another individual's emotional state) (Blair, 2005, 2008). While individuals with ASD may have a lower cognitive empathy system than their TD peers, their affective empathy system appears to be preserved (Dziobek et al., 2008; Rueda et al., 2015) or even heightened (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Smith, 2009a)—this has been named the "empathy imbalance hypothesis" (Smith, 2009a). This is particularly problematic, as differences in empathy levels have been found to hurt the personal well-being of individuals with ASC (Ros & Stokes, 2018).

Regarding prior research on personal and impersonal dilemmas in ASD, three studies have examined the moral decisions in adults with ASD (e.g., Gleichgerrcht et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2016; Schaller et al., 2019). These studies showed that, in the impersonal switch dilemma, the percentage of utilitarian responses was similar for adults with ASD and adults with TD (e.g., 78% of adults with ASD and 72% of TD adults decided to pull the switch in the Gleichgerrcht et al., 2012, study; see also Patil et al., 2016, and Schaller et al., 2019, for converging evidence). The evidence of across-group differences in personal dilemmas in adults with ASD is not entirely conclusive. For instance, Gleichgerrcht et al. (2012) found that 36% of adults with ASD decided to push the person from the bridge, and this figure was reduced to 14% for TD adults. While Schaller et al. (2019) found, numerically, a similar pattern as Gleichgerrcht et al. (2012), Patil et al. (2016) found a non-significant difference in the opposite direction.

Importantly, Schaller et al. (2019) also examined the switch and footbridge dilemmas with a group of 16 adolescents with ASD and 22 with TD (14–18 years old). In the impersonal switch dilemma, adolescents with and without ASD showed a similar percentage of utilitarian responses (60% of adolescents with ASD, 57% of TD adolescents). In the personal footbridge dilemma, adolescents with ASD chose the utilitarian response more often (20%) than TD adolescents (9%). However, this difference did not reach significance, probably due to the small sample size. To explain their findings, Schaller et al. (2019) suggested that the differences in utilitarian decisions in moral dilemmas for individuals with ASD could reflect a delay in developing social skills that could extend to adulthood. Consistent with this view, Gleichgerrcht et al. (2012) reported an association between utilitarian decisions in moral dilemmas and difficulties in social skills for adult individuals with ASD.

Clearly, to fully understand the development of moral judgments in ASD, it is necessary to study a wide range of ages from childhood to late adolescence. Previous research on moral development in TD children has shown that children between 9 and 10 years old typically choose the utilitarian decision in moral dilemmas regardless of their emotional engagement (Bucciarelli, 2015). As children grow up, deontological judgments increase gradually because of an upturn in their cognitive and emotional resources and the capacity to represent and keep in mind the models of alternative options (see Bara et al., 2001; Bucciarelli, 2015; Bucciarelli et al., 2008). As adults and adolescents with ASD appear to show a different pattern of moral decisions in personal moral dilemmas than TD individuals (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2012; Schaller et al., 2019), the roots of this effect would presumably originate at a younger age.

Besides age, the underlying emotional and cognitive processes for the development of moral decision-making in ASD should be considered. To shed some light on these processes, previous research has assessed individuals’ ratings of the appropriateness of their decisions (i.e., a measure of cognitive reasoning) and how they felt about their decisions (i.e., a measure of emotional reaction). Gleichgerrcht et al. (2012) found that adults with ASD expressed that their utilitarian responses to the personal dilemma were inappropriate but felt less emotional arousal than TD participants. However, whereas Schaller et al. (2019) reported that the two groups did not differ in the personal dilemma, individuals with ASD rated their utilitarian decisions more permissible and felt less emotional arousal in the impersonal dilemma. Conversely, Patil et al. (2016) asked how emotionally arousing participants found the scenarios (not their decisions) and found that, regardless of the dilemma type, adults with ASD reported more emotional arousal than TD participants. These conflicting findings may be because individuals with ASD show constricted emotional functioning characterized by a difficulty in identifying and reporting their feeling states (i.e., alexithymia; see Griffin et al., 2016; Hill et al., 2004; Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013). Prior research has shown that especially expressing their own emotions was particularly difficult for children with ASD relative to TD children (Costa et al., 2017; Lartseva et al., 2015). To minimize these interpretive issues, we chose pictograms to measure the individuals' emotional arousal and appropriateness in the present experiment. The reason is that pictograms have been considered more appropriate than verbal self-reports in ASD individuals (see Bird & Cook, 2013; Frith & Happé, 1999; Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013) (see Appendix 1, for a depiction of the pictograms).

In sum, the present experiment applied two well-studied dilemmas (i.e., the impersonal switch dilemma and the personal footbridge moral dilemma) to children and adolescents with ASD. Thus, this research fills the gaps in knowledge about moral judgments because: (1) it includes young individuals with ASD ranging from childhood to late adolescence; (2) it includes assessing the individuals’ emotional arousal and the rating of acceptability of their moral decision employing pictograms; and (3) it includes a full assessment of ASD symptomatology (i.e., social interaction, language, communication, restrictive interests, and repetitive behavior), and their association with moral decisions. The predictions are as follows. First, taking as reference the model on moral development in TD children (e.g., Bucchiarelli, 2015) and the “enhanced rationality” hypothesis in ASD (Rozenkrantz et al., 2021), we expected a less steep decrease in utilitarian decisions as a function of age for ASD children than TD children, especially in the personal moral dilemma. Second, based on the empathy imbalance hypothesis in individuals with ASD (Smith, 2009a), we expected children and adolescents with ASD to feel more emotional arousal due to a heightened affective empathy (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Smith, 2009a) but, at the same time, to rate their utilitarian decision as more appropriate than TD children and adolescents due to a reduced cognitive empathy (Blair, 2008; Smith, 2009a). Third, based on the importance of social cognition for moral reasoning (see Bellesi et al., 2018; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2012; Schaller et al., 2019), we expect to find a positive correlation between social interaction difficulties and utilitarian judgments in personal moral dilemmas.

Descriptive data showing the percentage of utilitarian responses and their assessment in terms of appropriateness and calmness for each dilemma in each group are displayed in Table 2.

The present study examined the response to moral dilemmas (impersonal vs. personal) in a relatively large sample of children and adolescents with ASD vs. TD matched controls. As expected, we found that the probability of a utilitarian response decreased with age. Critically, this effect was modulated by group and type of dilemma (personal vs. impersonal). The probability of a utilitarian response decreased steeply with age for personal dilemmas for TD children. Conversely, the probability of a utilitarian response to the dilemmas barely decreased with age for children with ASD. Another notable finding is that, after making a utilitarian decision in a personal dilemma, the individuals with ASD not only rated their decisions as more appropriate than the TD controls but also felt less calm about their decisions. Finally, we found that choosing the utilitarian response in the personal dilemma in ASD individuals was associated with more difficulties in social interaction.

Regarding the moral development in ASD, we found more utilitarian decisions in the personal footbridge dilemma than in the impersonal switch dilemma, thus extending previous findings with adults (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2016) and adolescents (Schaller et al., 2019) to a children population. Critically, the inclusion of children and adolescents between the ages of 6 to 18 allows us to make inferences on moral reasoning development in individuals with ASD. First, the probability of a utilitarian response for 6-year-old children was nearly 100% for TD and ASD children. Second, in the range of 8 to 12 years of age, the probability of a utilitarian decision in a personal dilemma sharply decreased as age increased for TD children (see Bucchiarelli, 2015, for a model); however, this was not the case for ASD children. Indeed, for children with ASD, a decrease in the probability of a utilitarian decision in a personal dilemma only became visible from 14 years onwards. At the age of 18, although the probability of a utilitarian decision decreased with age in both groups, individuals with ASD showed a higher probability of a utilitarian response in a personal moral dilemma than TD individuals. Thus, the moral judgment of children with ASD develops atypically from 8 years of age onwards, in the way that it is delayed from the one of TD children. This delay relative to TD individuals remains at least up to young adulthood. These differences in moral judgments fit well with the “enhanced rationality” hypothesis (Rozenkrantz et al., 2021), which proposes that individuals with ASD use more rational and bias-free decision-making processes than TD individuals. Although one might argue that moral judgments could be hard to categorize in terms of rationality, utilitarian choices most often represent the option in which the greater good is maximized (i.e., most people are saved, despite the ethical consequences of the decision). Thus, an enhanced rational way of thinking in the development of ASD children may account for the increasing differences in moral decisions between young individuals with ASD and TD individuals in the present study.

Another novel feature of the present study was the individuals' evaluation of their choice (cognitive: appropriateness; emotional: calmness) after making a utilitarian judgment in the personal dilemma (i.e., pushing a person to death to save five others). While children with ASD rated their utilitarian decisions as more appropriate than the TD children, they also felt less calm about these judgments. The fact that individuals with ASD showed an incongruent assessment in these two domains favors those theories on ASD that posit that individuals with ASD have a decreased cognitive empathy system (Blair, 2008) but a heightened affective empathy system (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Smith, 2009a). Of note, previous studies showed conflicting findings on the rating of appropriateness and calmness in individuals with ASD, possibly due to difficulties in expressing the felt emotions (Costa et al., 2017; Lartseva et al., 2015). To assist the children with ASD, we chose pictograms to measure the individual level of calmness and appropriateness of the answers, so that possible difficulties in the expression of emotions merely have a minimal effect on our data.

Further evidence for a heightened emotional reaction to others’distress among individuals with ASD is coming from neuroimaging studies. During affective empathy tasks, a hyper-functioning of the amygdala occurs in individuals with ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000), which, in turn, prompts individuals with ASD to act in a hyper-reactive way in social and emotional contexts (Intense World Hypothesis; Markram, Rinaldi, & Markram, 2007). This overstimulation would be reflected as less calmness after making a utilitarian response in ASD individuals than in TD controls. Consequently, when confronted with an emotionally charged moral decision (especially the case in personal moral dilemmas), a hyper-functioning affective empathy system would lead to overwhelmingly intense processing of the situation (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). Following the Intense World Theory, a defective bottom-up modulation also has paradoxical cognitive consequences (Markram & Markram, 2010). Due to the excessive distress in potentially overwhelming situations, individuals with ASD may tend to withdraw from them by seeking less emotionally charged reasoning (Markram et al., 2007; Smith, 2009a, 2009b). In this way, individuals with ASD may manage to avoid overwhelming emotional processes by choosing a utilitarian decision that is interpreted as more “appropriate” (i.e., it saves the most lives). The current findings lead to new insights into empathy processing in individuals with ASD. Following the idea of the “double empathy problem” (Milton, 2012), the current findings help to reshape the view that a different empathy processing in ASD individuals is seen as a “deficit”, but rather as a different way of perceiving empathy and social interactions (Milton, 2012).

The present study also revealed that more reported social interaction difficulties in children/adolescents with ASD were associated with a higher probability of a utilitarian response in the personal moral dilemma. Thus, the high choice of utilitarian judgments in emotional scenarios may be related to the abnormal behavior in situations such as emotional sharing, offering and seeking comfort, social smiling, and responding to other children, which is often observed in individuals with ASD (Lord et al., 1994). In sum, the correlation between social interaction difficulties and utilitarian responses in children and adolescents with ASD extends previous evidence with adults. For instance, Gleichgerrcht et al. (2012) reported that, in personal moral dilemmas, a higher probability of utilitarian decisions was associated with more difficulties in social cognition in adults with ASD.

To our knowledge, the present study is the first that examined the development of moral judgments in individuals with ASD ranging from childhood to late adolescence, thus filling the gaps in knowledge about young individuals with ASD. Another novel element is that we measured the participants' emotional and cognitive states after making a utilitarian decision. Despite the strengths of our study, certain limitations have to be taken into consideration. First, we investigated moral judgments in children and adolescents using a cross-sectional rather than a longitudinal design. We chose this option because a longitudinal study from early childhood to late adolescence would have interpretive issues (e.g., same dilemmas at multiple times) and potential methodological problems (e.g., participants' dropping out of the study). Second, our study only employed two moral dilemmas: the personal “footbridge” dilemma and the impersonal “switch” dilemma. Although these are by far the two most studied moral dilemmas and serve as the basis for leading theories of moral judgments (e.g., Greene et al., 2001, 2004), including a wider variety of moral dilemmas in future research would have led to greater generalizability (e.g., see Patil et al., 2016).

Altogether, the present study revealed that emotion-based decision-making in ASD individuals does not develop similarly to TD individuals (i.e., probability of a utilitarian response in a moral dilemma decreased much more shallowly with age for children with ASD). Moreover, ASD individuals also show differences in the underlying cognitive beliefs and emotional responses to their behavioral decision. This difference was particularly manifest in an emotionally charged scenario (i.e., pushing a person from the bridge to save five lives). Notably, individuals with ASD felt less calm than their TD peers (exaggerated affective empathy system) after choosing a utilitarian decision, but they rated their utilitarian decisions as more appropriate (less developed cognitive empathy system). This finding suggests that by deciding on a utilitarian course of action 'for the greater good', those with ASD would place themselves in a position that caused them greater distress due to their awareness of the affective consequences of their decision. Furthermore, utilitarian judgments in personal dilemmas were related to more social interaction difficulties. Thus, therapeutic interventions that aim to improve the social skills of children with ASD should focus on both the development of their cognitive empathy system and the design of efficient coping strategies for emotionally charged situations.