Discussion
Establishing a collective sense of identification is vital for adolescents, as it plays a pivotal role in their well-being and nurtures a feeling of connection. Nevertheless, there is a lack of attention towards understanding the factors that impact national identification and the variations across diverse youth contexts. Two longitudinal studies examined the associations between values and national identification among two groups of adolescents: majority (Jewish Israelis) and minority (Arab citizens of Israel). The hypotheses were generally supported. In line with the first hypothesis, conservation values related to future national identification for the majority group in both studies. The second hypothesis was partially supported, in that openness-to-change values were negatively related to future national identification in the majority group but only in Study 2. The same relations appeared in Study 2 for the minority group. The third hypothesis on negative associations between universalism values and national identification was supported in both studies, with differences in directivity: there were significant negative associations between values and future national identification in Study 1; the same association appeared in Study 2, but the directivity was reversed, from national identification to future values. Finally, the fourth hypothesis was confirmed; power values were related to future national identification in the minority group (Study 2). As a result, our study has empirical evidence about the connection of two dimensions of identities: personal (i.e., values) and collective (i.e., national identification) (Eccles,
2009; Schwartz et al.,
2008) in both adolescent samples. Moreover, values played a role in motivating national identification over time.
Although values seem to be a significant force in adolescents’ national identification, national identification may derive from different motivations in different groups, because context-specific effects were found for conservation and power values. There were, however, also motivationally similar effects for others values, openness-to-change and universalism values showed similar associations to national identification across groups. These findings may set the stage to assess group- or culture-specific motivations to feel part of the majority group, along with common or universal motivations.
With respect to the context-specific motivations, among the majority Jewish adolescents, national identification was associated with the current status quo. Conservation values represent a focus on the conservation of existing conditions and structures and adherence to ingroup expectations and norms. Thus, national identification may serve as means to fulfill the need of majority adolescents to feel safe, honor the past, maintain continuity, and belong to a large collective. It is worth noting that results for majority youth were very similar in the two studies – even though the studies used independent samples, slightly different measures, and different time intervals. This built-in longitudinal replication underscores the robustness of the findings for majority adolescents.
In contrast to their majority comparators, minority Arab adolescents’ conservation values were not associated with their national identification. Those adolescents may not see national identification as providing safety; nor does it signify a tradition they identify with or offer them a sense of belonging. The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and discrimination and rejection by the majority group (Hammack,
2010) may challenge the feeling of safety and stability that group identification might enhance.
The results further suggested that the motivation for national identification relates to additional values dimensions among minority adolescents - the contrast between self-enhancement and self-transcendence. Specifically, as hypothesized, power values were positively associated with national identification over time among minority Arab adolescents. One approach to enhancing one’s social identity status involves pursuing individual mobility, which might entail trying to assimilate into the dominant group (Tajfel & Turner,
1986). This strategy was found in a previous qualitative study among Arab adolescent citizens of Israel (Hammack,
2010). In a dominant majority culture, minority adolescents may increase their national identification as they struggle to realize their ambitions for status, impact, and control over resources. These findings support the idea that identification as Israeli is a prerequisite for Arabs to succeed in Israeli society. This might be a reflection of the Israeli assimilative atmosphere, which pushes minorities to blend into the larger society (Sher-Censor et al.,
2018),although studies in other contexts have shown that an integration approach (i.e., combining the minority and majority cultures) often is more beneficial for minority adolescents’ psychosocial adaptation (Berry et al.,
2006).
In addition to finding culture-specific motivations for national identification, the research also found shared motivations. In Study 2, openness-to-change values were negatively related to future national identification among both majority Jewish and minority Arab adolescents. Adolescents who attribute importance to new experiences, and freedom of thought and behavior may find identification with a big social group such as a nation hinders their independence and individuality. This process might be more prominent during adolescence in general, when youth strive for self-reliance and independence from adult figures to build a unique identification (Koepke & Denissen,
2012). It is important to note that these associations were not found for the majority group in Study 1, indicating the need for future studies to examine these relations.
The hypothesis about longitudinal negative association between universalism values and national identification was supported for both majority Jewish and minority Arab adolescents. It is important to note, however, that although negative associations were found in both studies, the longitudinal direction of effects between universalism values and national identification differed between studies. In Study 1, there was a cross-lagged negative association from universalism values at T1 to national identification at T2, but in Study 2, national identification at T1 predicted a decrease in universalism values at T2.
The cross-lagged design of the studies allowed the examination of the mutual relations between these factors. It might be that a mutual process occurred in two directions. Adolescents who attributed importance to tolerance, equality, and social justice seemed less likely to increase their national identification. Nevertheless, there was also evidence that adolescents who expressed national identification developed patriotic values emphasizing ingroup benefits. Over time, they seemed likely to care less for outgroups, including minority groups, a result in line with findings that right-wing voters endorse power values and not universalism values (Sagiv & Schwartz,
2022). The directivity difference between the studies may also reflect the age of the participants. Participants in Study 1 were older (approximately 16 years at T1) than Study 2 participants (approximately 13 years at T1). Older adolescents may already have achieved much of their personal identity formation goals, formed social commitments, and be less affected by other social partners, such as peer groups. Therefore, their group identification has a weaker effect. Younger adolescents are in the midst of this process. Given these observations, a promising research direction would be to combine the values-group perspective with a perspective on developmental needs at specific ages. The present results require more research and have to be replicated in more studies, across more time points, and with varying time intervals.
Importantly, the cross-lagged results pointed to more consistent directions from values to later national identification, than from national identification to later values. In other words, it seems that once adolescents define what is important to their personal identity, they may look for groups that enable the manifestation of this identification and thus develop their group identification. Values are abstract constructs, rather stable over time, and they function as an integral part of identity (Sagiv et al.,
2017). Past studies found values were more likely to predict social behavior than vice versa (Benish-Weisman,
2015; Vecchione et al.,
2016). Similar to behavior, national identification (as a surface-level cultural facet) is a less stable structure than values (deep cultural facets), and for that reason, may be easier to change (Hall,
1976).
The present results raise the question of which values society wants to encourage in young people. Many societies see national identification as a coveted quality, providing unity, a sense of meaning in life, and guidance (Idris et al.,
2012; Johnston et al.,
2010) and therefore apply educational efforts to strengthen it. To this, the studies add the caveat that values education aimed at achieving this goal may have side effects. In particular, conservation values among majority youth were previously associated with factors such as increased intolerance (Ben-Nun Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky,
2015). The findings suggest that national identification relates to less emphasis on human rights and social justice. Moreover, strengthening the national identification of minority adolescents may alienate these adolescents from their ethnic communities and their families, resulting in long-term adjustment challenges (Nair et al.,
2018). In addition, if different values are associated with national identification in majority and minority youth, an increase in national identification in general may divide societies’ values structure, with iatrogenic effects on national unification. More research is needed on outcomes of values and national identification to gain a complete picture of the role of values in socialization and what side effects are to be expected.
The research has a number of notable strengths. The longitudinal design is a gold standard in developmental research (Baltes et al.,
2014). By following the same adolescents over time, the research provides information on developmental patterns and enables a focus on the direction of effects. Most results in the majority Jewish group were replicated across two samples, using different research methods, somewhat different age groups, and different time gaps. Thus, the results are likely to be robust. Moreover, the cross-cultural, comparative nature of Study 2 permitted the investigation of group-specific effects on the association between values and national identification.
At the same time, the work has some limitations. First, studies with only two time points limit the ability to assume causality. Longitudinal studies with at least three time points can provide more robust evidence by allowing the assessment of temporal relationships between variables over time (Gershoff et al.,
2009). Moreover, cross-lagged path analysis was recently criticized (Hamaker et al.,
2015), and extensions, such as random intercept models (Mulder & Hamaker,
2021), are increasingly popular. Unfortunately, the two-wave design did not permit this procedure, but the two-study design with replications and the moderate stability in the constructs suggest reliable findings. Nevertheless, future research may profit from more points of measurement allowing the differentiation of within-person processes from stable between-person differences through the inclusion of random intercepts (Hamaker et al.,
2015).
Second, the effect sizes (as shown by the betas) are rather small. Such effects are to be expected in a field study among adolescents who face numerous simultaneous socialization demands from parents, peers, and the larger society (Titzmann et al.,
2023). Moreover, research on effect sizes has shown that even small effects have practical relevance (McCartney & Rosenthal,
2000). For example, voting behavior may be affected, and in some instances, a few votes might suffice to cause major changes.
Third, there were relatively high levels of attrition in both studies, especially in Study 1, and there were several significant differences between the participants who completed both assessments and those who dropped out after the first assessment. Therefore, the results should be interpreted based on these findings. For example, in Study 2, participants who expressed a national identification with Israel and attributed importance to power values were more likely to drop out. Thus, there were fewer findings for them in the second assessment, thus possibly biasing or hindering the association between power values and national identification, especially among Jewish majority participants (who tended to have a stronger national identification with Israel, MJewish = 4.8 MArab = 3.5 t(529) = 13.79, p < 0.001).
Fourth, Israel is a very specific environment, featuring ongoing conflict. In less conflictual contexts, there may be no differences between majority and minority youth, or other values may be associated with national identification. One way to further our knowledge would be to conduct comparative studies in other contexts, compare other minority groups within the same context, or undertake qualitative research to gain deeper insight into what minority and majority adolescents associate with the national and/or cultural context. Such studies would provide a more nuanced view of the conditions, times, domains, and processes (Bornstein,
2017) that influence the association between values and national identification.