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Gepubliceerd in: Psychological Research 6/2018

03-08-2017 | Original Article

Why free choices take longer than forced choices: evidence from response threshold manipulations

Auteurs: Christoph Naefgen, Michael Dambacher, Markus Janczyk

Gepubliceerd in: Psychological Research | Uitgave 6/2018

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Abstract

Response times (RTs) for free choice tasks are usually longer than those for forced choice tasks. We examined the cause for this difference in a study with intermixed free and forced choice trials, and adopted the rationale of sequential sampling frameworks to test two alternative accounts: Longer RTs in free choices are caused (1) by lower rates of information accumulation, or (2) by additional cognitive processes that delay the start of information accumulation. In three experiments, we made these accounts empirically discriminable by manipulating decision thresholds via the frequency of catch trials (Exp. 1) or via inducing time pressure (Exp. 2 and 3). Our results supported the second account, suggesting a temporal delay of information accumulation in free choice tasks, while the accumulation rate remains comparable. We propose that response choice in both tasks relies on information accumulation towards a specific goal. While in forced choice tasks, this goal is externally determined by the stimulus, in free choice tasks, it needs to be generated internally, which requires additional time.
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Voetnoten
1
It should be noted that this freedom of choice is often constrained to some degree by instructions such as “choose both response options about equally often”.
 
2
Mattler and Palmer (2012) also used a sequential sampling approach to investigate how priming affects performance and choices in both types of tasks. They observed that while masked primes always influence forced choice RTs, free choices are not influenced when the stimuli (prime and target) are of arbitrary shape. They also specified an accumulator model to explain the data, with the notable assumption of rapidly shrinking threshold separations after onset of a free choice stimulus. In their paper, they conclude that forced choice priming is a result of the integration of the automatic processing of primes and evidence from the stimulus while free choice priming is based on the integration of “external stimulation by the prime and internal response tendencies” (p.359).
 
3
A similar observation with PEs increasing descriptively with the amount of catch-trials can be seen in the condition with low intensity stimuli in the study by Seibold et al. (2011; see their Fig. 4).
 
4
To correct the effect size entered into GPower, we used the method described by Rasch, Friese, Hofmann, and Naumann (2010).
 
5
We thank one of the reviewers for this suggestion.
 
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Metagegevens
Titel
Why free choices take longer than forced choices: evidence from response threshold manipulations
Auteurs
Christoph Naefgen
Michael Dambacher
Markus Janczyk
Publicatiedatum
03-08-2017
Uitgeverij
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Gepubliceerd in
Psychological Research / Uitgave 6/2018
Print ISSN: 0340-0727
Elektronisch ISSN: 1430-2772
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-017-0887-1

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