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Open Access 18-06-2024 | Original Article

Trait Neuroticism is Associated with how Often People Switch Between Emotion Regulation Strategies Used to Manage Negative Emotions in Daily Life

Auteurs: Katharine E. Daniel, Robert G. Moulder, Matthew W. Southward, Jennifer S. Cheavens, Steven M. Boker

Gepubliceerd in: Cognitive Therapy and Research | Uitgave 6/2024

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Abstract

Switching between different emotion regulation strategies may promote mental health by helping match strategy use to different situations. However, switching strategies very frequently might undermine any given regulation attempt. Individuals with high levels of self-reported neuroticism may have trouble finding the right balance of strategy switching versus persistence given increased negative emotionality and impulsivity; yet it is unclear whether this difficulty is characterized by too much switching, too little switching, or both. As such, we tested whether high or low rates of strategy switching within daily life was associated with trait neuroticism. We quantified how N = 89 college students switched between 20 strategies to regulate positive emotions and 20 strategies to regulate negative emotions when sampled three times daily for 10 days. We tested whether the linear or quadratic effects of strategy switching—when measured across all 20 positive emotion- or all 20 negative emotion-focused strategies, and within smaller classes of related strategies—were associated with neuroticism. We found that lower rates of switching amongst all strategies used to regulate negative emotions, and specifically amongst the adaptive engagement strategies, was associated with higher rates of neuroticism. Moderate switching amongst the aversive cognitive perseveration strategies, by contrast, was associated with higher neuroticism. Switching amongst strategies used to regulate positive emotions was not associated with neuroticism at the overall or class level. This pre-registered study suggests that neuroticism is associated with unique patterns of strategy switching in response to negative—but not necessarily positive—emotions in daily life.
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Emotions serve many functions in our lives (Gross, 2015a). For example, sadness might prompt us to seek social support from trusted others. However, sadness might also prompt us to return to bed, interfering with productivity when a deadline is fast approaching. When emotions are unhelpful—because they are overly aversive, are interfering with goal pursuit, and/or are not well matched to the situation—people can attempt to influence their type, intensity, or duration (Gross, 2015a). Emotion regulation, a process that can be implemented through different emotion regulation strategies, consists of attempts to influence the trajectory of emotions (Gross & Barrett, 2011).
People tend to use multiple strategies in response to emotional experiences (Heiy & Cheavens, 2014). Although it is possible to use some strategies simultaneously (e.g., reappraising the situation while actively doing things to solve the problem), strategies are also used sequentially, both throughout the regulation of a given stressor and across different stressors (e.g., accepting a situation after initially avoiding it; using reappraisal after an acquaintance’s criticism then using emotion suppression when annoyed with a colleague later that day). Such switching between strategies over time may be adaptive, especially if the initial strategy is not having the desired effect or if the situation changes in such a way that prompts a different response.
Importantly, the same strategy is not expected to work equally well across all of life’s circumstances (Bonanno & Burton, 2013). Switching emotion regulation strategies over time is therefore expected to promote mental health and well-being by facilitating adaptive matches between strategies and changing situations (Aldao et al., 2015; Haines et al., 2016). Moreover, persistent failures to change strategies in response to clear strategy shortcomings or relevant contextual changes is expected to predict adverse mental health outcomes (Bonanno & Burton, 2013). Relevant to this claim, variably choosing between different emotion regulation strategies within a given situation was associated with reduced negative affect across four independent experience sampling studies (Blanke et al., 2020) and greater switching between emotion regulation strategies throughout an in-lab partner conflict task predicted increased positive affect (Eldesouky & English, 2022). Taken together, skillfully navigating the emotional ups and downs of life seems to require that people switch between using different emotion regulation strategies over time.
Of course, repeatedly switching strategies very frequently and over short periods of time—before beneficial effects can be realized and/or before the situation is likely to have changed—may indicate severe internalizing psychopathology. Indeed, switching strategies more frequently throughout the regulation of a hypothetical stressor was associated with greater depression, borderline personality disorder features, and neuroticism (Southward et al., 2018). In the current study, however, we focus on strategy switching between reports that are collected hours apart and across days (up to 3 times a day for 10 days); as such, this sampling frequency is more likely to capture switching over longer periods of time and likely across different situations.

Trouble with Emotion Regulation Strategy Switching in Neuroticism

Neuroticism has been linked with multiple aspects of emotion dysregulation (Baránczuk, 2019; Hughes et al., 2020) and has characteristics that may be especially relevant to emotion regulation strategy switching in potentially competing ways. First, neuroticism is characterized by impulsivity (Fetterman et al., 2010), which may increase the likelihood for people high on this personality dimension to more frequently and impulsively change their strategies if they do not seem to be working right away—indeed, Southward and colleagues (2018) found that people higher in trait neuroticism more often changed which ER strategies they said they would use throughout the regulation of a given hypothetical stressor. Second, high levels of neuroticism may also be indicative of psychopathology more broadly, with researchers demonstrating correlations between neuroticism and general factors of psychopathology from 0.40 to 0.99 (Brandes et al., 2019; Caspi et al., 2014; Levin-Aspenson et al., 2019; Southward et al., 2023). Since psychopathology is associated with the tendency to rigidly apply the same few strategies across many different situations (Coifman & Summers, 2019), higher levels of neuroticism may also be associated with lower levels of strategy switching, especially along the longer time frames captured by the current study. That said, we are not aware of any work that has investigated the relation between strategy switching and neuroticism in daily life along any time scale. Given these potentially conflicting predictions and limited available literature, we were interested in examining whether high or low rates of strategy switching within daily life was associated with trait neuroticism.

Switching Strategies in Response to Positive and Negative Emotions

Most emotion regulation researchers have focused on how people down-regulate negative (or unpleasant) affect. However, how people respond to positive (or pleasant) emotional experiences also has implications for mental health and well-being (Raes et al., 2011). Indeed, regulating positive emotions through many emotion regulation strategies was more strongly associated with overall mood than using many strategies to regulate negative emotions (Heiy & Cheavens, 2014). Given that both negative and positive emotion-focused emotion regulation are associated with psychopathology (Carl et al., 2013), and yet are unique systems (Diener & Emmons, 1984) associated with unique motives (Tamir et al., 2020), our analyses separately examine the relations between neuroticism with strategy switching in negative emotion-focused regulation and neuroticism with strategy switching in positive emotion-focused regulation. Here we use negative emotion-focused regulation and positive emotion-focused regulation to refer to the valence of the target emotion being regulated without value judgment on the specific strategy being used.

Strategy Switching among Classes of Emotion Regulation Strategies

Alongside increased efforts to measure both negative and positive emotion-focused regulation strategies, researchers have also begun to investigate the relations among different emotion regulation strategies (e.g., Daros et al., 2019; McMahon & Naragon-Gainey, 2019; Naragon-Gainey et al., 2017; Southward & Cheavens, 2020). Researchers have found meaningful patterns of strategy covariation which they have used to organize specific strategies into higher-order classes of strategies. Across studies, there is relatively consistent evidence for adaptive classes, which are composed of strategies typically associated with lower psychopathology (e.g., cognitive reappraisal, problem solving); and maladaptive classes, which are composed of either cognitive (e.g., rumination and worry) or behavioral (avoidance and expressive suppression) strategies typically associated with greater psychopathology (Naragon-Gainey et al., 2017).
The majority of these classes have been identified between-persons and without respect to whether the strategies were aimed at regulating negative or positive emotions. Southward and Cheavens (2020), therefore, tested if these classes replicated at the within-person level and tested for classes of negative emotion-focused regulation strategies separately from classes of positive emotion-focused regulation strategies. In a sample of undergraduate participants who reported on their use of 20 negative emotion-focused regulation strategies and 20 positive emotion-focused regulation strategies three times per day for 10 days, they found evidence of three within-person classes of negative emotion-focused regulation strategies that replicated Naragon-Gainey et al.’s (2017) adaptive engagement, aversive cognitive perseveration, and disengagement strategy classes. Further, at both the between- and within-person levels, the researchers found evidence of three classes of positive emotion-focused regulation strategies, which they labeled enhancement, disengagement, and behavioral strategies (see Table 1 for a breakdown of the specific strategies in each class).
Table 1
Organization of emotion regulation strategies
Negative-emotion regulation strategies
Positive-emotion regulation strategies
Adaptive Engagement
Enhancement
 Acceptance
 Savoring
 Benefit Finding
 Consequences
 Perspective
 Self-credit
 Problem-solving
 Broadening
 Reappraisal
 Replaying
 Behavioral Activation
 Capitalizing
 Positive Refocusing
 Reminiscing
 Exercise
 Future Focus
 Social Support
 Social Sharing
Aversive Cognitive Perseveration
 Other-credit
 Consequences
 Stimulus Control
 Rumination
Disengagement
 Generalizing
 Expressive Suppression
 Self-blame
 Emotional Expression
Disengagement
 Minimizing
 Non-suicidal Self-Injury
 Denial
 Substance Use
 Reappraisal
 Denial
Behavioral
 Expressive Suppression
 Substance Use
 Emotional Suppression
 Reward
 Other-blame
 Behavioral Activation
 Sleep
 Entertainment
Note. This organization was determined empirically and originally presented in Southward and Cheavens (2020). Participants were presented with plain English descriptions for each of the above strategies rather than the conceptual labels presented here. Plain English wording for each strategy is provided in Supplemental Tables S1-S2
To illustrate why it may be important to consider class-specific associations in strategy switching with neuroticism, Heiy and Cheavens (2014) did not find a significant relation between participants’ overall number of strategies used and momentary changes in their mood. However, when the same data were broken down by class, Southward and Cheavens (2020) found that using more adaptive engagement and enhancement strategies led to momentary improvements in mood, whereas using more aversive cognitive perseveration, disengagement, and behavioral strategies led to momentary worsening of mood. Given that using a wider range of strategies implies some degree of switching between those strategies, these results might suggest that switching between a wider variety of putatively adaptive strategies may effectively address multiple aspects of stressors, whereas switching among putatively maladaptive strategies may amplify stressors and even create additional stressors (e.g., yelling at a spouse after a stressful day at work; Ford et al., 2019). Because class-specific associations may result in effects in opposite directions, distinguishing these strategies into conceptually related classes may uncover nuanced patterns of strategy switching that might otherwise be obscured by assessing all strategies together. Indeed, Wen and colleagues (2021) found that greater and more even-handed use of many putatively adaptive strategies was associated with a lower risk of having current or remitted major depressive disorder (MDD), whereas greater and more even-handed use of putatively maladaptive strategies was associated with increased risk of current or remitted MDD. As such, we also examined the association between strategy switching within specific classes of strategies and trait neuroticism.

Overview and Hypotheses

Studying how emotion regulation strategies are selected and updated throughout daily life is crucial for better understanding the dynamic nature of emotion regulation (English & Eldesouky, 2020). Towards this end, we conducted a secondary analysis of the data originally reported by Heiy and Cheavens (2014), who sampled 92 participants’ emotion regulation strategy use up to three times a day for 10 days. At each survey, if the participant indicated experiencing a negative emotion (i.e., anger, anxiety/fear, embarrassment/shame, guilt, disgust, sadness, loneliness) over the previous four hours, they were asked to indicate whether they had used each of 20 different emotion regulation strategies to manage that negative emotion. Similarly, if the participant indicated experiencing a positive emotion (i.e., joy, excitement, pride, love, amusement, interest, surprise) over that same time frame, they were asked to indicate whether they had responded with each of the strategies listed within a separate set of 20 positive emotion-focused regulation strategies.
To test whether neuroticism was associated with the extent to which participants switched between using different emotion regulation strategies over time (versus maintained use of the same strategy from one survey response to the next), we applied a recently developed time series metric called stability (Daniel et al., 2022) to the data. Specifically, stability measures the extent to which the same variable in a multivariate system is endorsed between back-to-back surveys out of all types of variable transitions (switches and repeats) that are observed. Conceptually, lower emotion regulation stability reflects a tendency to use different strategies at each survey (high switching; e.g., distraction ◊ reappraisal ◊ acceptance ◊ distraction across four successive surveys), whereas greater emotion regulation stability reflects a tendency to use the same strategy from one survey to the next (low switching; e.g., distraction ◊ distraction ◊ distraction ◊ distraction). This metric addressed a methodological gap that had previously made it difficult to quantify switching across many strategies. Thus, although prominent theories of emotion regulation agree that how people change their strategies from one moment to the next is important for well-being (Aldao et al., 2015; Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Gross, 2015b; Southward et al., 2018; Webb et al., 2012), the development of this metric offers an exciting opportunity to begin empirically testing and refining these theories, including in the case of neuroticism.
Across all analyses, in which we treated responses to negative emotions and positive emotions separately, we initially investigated the linear effects of emotion regulation stability (across all 20 strategies or within class-specific strategies) on neuroticism. Conceptually, the presence of a linear effect speaks to whether either too much or too little switching (depending on the direction of the effect) is associated with higher trait neuroticism scores. To explore whether quadratic effects of stability also emerged, we added the quadratic term to each model, in a stepwise fashion, and tested whether this additional parameter sufficiently improved model fit using model comparisons. The presence of a quadratic effect might, for example, suggest that both too much and too little switching are associated with higher or lower trait neuroticism.

Hypotheses

All hypotheses were preregistered on the Open Science Framework (OSF, https://​osf.​io/​d3tyn/​) and an overview of all hypotheses is provided in Table 2.
Table 2
Outline of pre-registered hypotheses
Test
Hypothesis
Regulating negative emotions
Overall
Linear: Higher levels of neuroticism will be associated with less strategy switching.
Quadratic: Higher levels of neuroticism will be associated with both higher and lower levels of overall strategy switching and lower levels of neuroticism will be associated with moderate levels of overall strategy switching.
Adaptive Engagement
Linear: Competing.
Quadratic: Lower levels of neuroticism will be associated with both higher and lower levels of adaptive engagement strategy switching and higher levels of neuroticism will be associated with moderate levels of adaptive engagement strategy switching.
Aversive Cognitive Perseveration
Linear: Competing.
Quadratic: Higher levels of neuroticism will be associated with both higher and lower levels of aversive cognitive perseveration strategy switching and lower levels of neuroticism will be associated with moderate levels of aversive cognitive perseveration strategy switching.
Disengagement
Linear: Competing.
Quadratic: Higher levels of neuroticism will be associated with both higher and lower levels of disengagement strategy switching and lower levels of neuroticism will be associated with moderate levels of disengagement strategy switching.
Regulating positive emotions
Overall
Linear: No a priori hypothesis.
Quadratic: No a priori hypothesis.
Enhancement
Linear: Competing.
Quadratic: Lower levels of neuroticism will be associated with both higher and lower levels of enhancement strategy switching and higher levels of neuroticism will be associated with moderate levels of enhancement strategy switching.
Disengagement
Linear: Competing.
Quadratic: Higher levels of neuroticism will be associated with both higher and lower levels of disengagement strategy switching and lower levels of neuroticism will be associated with moderate levels of disengagement strategy switching.
Behavioral
Linear: No a priori hypothesis.
Quadratic: No a priori hypothesis.
Note. Quadratic effects were considered exploratory. Justification for hypotheses is in text

Regulating Negative Emotions

Overall Emotion Regulation Stability. We hypothesized that there would be a positive linear association between emotion regulation stability and neuroticism, such that higher levels of neuroticism would be associated with less strategy switching across all 20 negative emotion-focused strategies. Although neuroticism is associated with impulsivity and, therefore, higher rates of strategy switching might be expected, we hypothesized less strategy switching among individuals higher in trait neuroticism due to our sampling frequency. Specifically, we measured emotion regulation strategy use three times each day, so each strategy report was likely tied to a different emotional event. Because results of some work suggests that changing strategies between different situations is associated with lower neuroticism whereas changing strategies within situations is associated with higher neuroticism (Southward et al., 2018), we expected that more frequent switching between different situations captured in our data would be associated with lower neuroticism.
Although the sampling frequency we used may be best positioned to test the linear effect described above, it is possible that both relatively higher and lower levels of emotion regulation stability are associated with higher levels of neuroticism, whereas moderate emotion regulation stability values may be associated with lower levels of neuroticism. This hypothesis follows from the idea that repeatedly changing strategies (low stability) might indicate “impulsive switching,” whereas repeatedly failing to change strategies (high stability) might indicate “ineffective rigidity,” both of which might be associated with higher neuroticism (Southward et al., 2018). We consider this quadratic effect—and all others—to be secondary, exploratory tests.
Emotion Regulation Stability of Adaptive Engagement Strategies. We acknowledge competing hypotheses regarding the direction of the linear association between adaptive engagement stability and neuroticism. On the one hand, a positive linear association might be observed if people with lower neuroticism switch more often (low stability) between different adaptive engagement strategies as contexts change. This pattern would align with a flexible regulation style characterized by broad use of putatively adaptive strategies. On the other hand, a negative linear association might be observed if people with lower neuroticism switch less often among these strategies (high stability), perhaps because they have a “go-to” adaptive engagement strategy that typically works for them across most contexts.
We expected that a significant quadratic effect of adaptive engagement emotion regulation stability on neuroticism might emerge, such that both relatively higher and lower levels of adaptive engagement emotion regulation stability (vs. moderate levels) are associated with lower levels of neuroticism. We might expect this quadratic effect if both reasons given in support of our competing linear hypotheses are borne out across the sample.
Emotion Regulation Stability of Aversive Cognitive Perseveration and Disengagement Strategies. We acknowledge competing hypotheses for the linear associations between aversive cognitive perseveration stability and neuroticism and between disengagement stability and neuroticism. On the one hand, negative linear associations might be observed if people with higher neuroticism switch more often between strategies (low stability) within either of these two classes, perhaps suggesting that they tend to move between using different putatively maladaptive strategies across time. On the other hand, positive linear associations might be observed if people with higher neuroticism switch less often between different aversive cognitive perseveration and/or disengagement strategies (high stability) as contexts change. This pattern would emerge if a person scoring high on trait neuroticism tended to repeatedly use a specific putatively maladaptive strategy.
We expected that a significant quadratic effect might emerge such that both relatively higher and lower levels of aversive cognitive perseveration/disengagement emotion regulation stability (vs. moderate levels) are associated with higher levels of neuroticism, for the reasons detailed above.

Regulating Positive Emotions

Overall Emotion Regulation Stability. Given less available emotion regulation flexibility literature around managing positive emotions, we did not have a priori hypotheses regarding the linear and quadratic effects of overall positive emotion-focused regulation stability on trait neuroticism. As such, we consider this analysis to be exploratory.
Emotion Regulation Stability of Enhancement Strategies. Our hypotheses for the linear and quadratic associations between stability of enhancement emotion regulation and neuroticism parallel those described between adaptive engagement and neuroticism (given these classes are both comprised of putatively adaptive strategies).
Emotion Regulation Stability of Disengagement Strategies. Our hypotheses for the linear and quadratic associations between stability of disengagement positive emotion-focused regulation and neuroticism parallel those described between aversive cognitive perseveration/disengagement negative emotion-focused regulation stability and neuroticism (given these classes are all predominantly comprised of putatively maladaptive strategies).
Emotion Regulation Stability with Behavioral Strategies. We did not have a priori hypotheses and so consider this analysis to be exploratory.

Method

Participants

Ninety-two undergraduate students at a large Midwestern university participated in the present study for class credit. Sample size for this secondary data analysis was constrained by the sample size of the parent data collection; however, given our available sample size and assuming 80% power, an alpha of 0.05, and one predictor, we are positioned to detect small-to-medium effect sizes (f2 = 0.09; Cohen, 1998). Study participation was open to undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology course. No exclusion criteria were used. Thirty-two participants were invited to participate due to elevated scores on the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO-PI-R-N; Costa & McCrae, 1992) which pertained to scores at or above 117 for females and at or above 107 for males. These cut scores reflect “High” and “Very High” reports of neuroticism on the measure. The remaining 60 participants were invited regardless of their trait neuroticism score. We used this recruitment approach to obtain a normally distributed sample with respect to trait neuroticism to better understand how emotion regulation functions along the full range of this dimension of personality. Neuroticism’s distribution in the present sample evidenced signs of normality: minimal skewness (-0.31), kurtosis close to 3 (2.16), and the mean and median values were approximately equal (105.74 and 109.5, respectively). There were no other differences in recruitment eligibility across participants and all participants could opt not to participate. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 31 years old (M = 19.73, SD = 2.25) and were predominantly female (54%) and White (81%).

Procedures

After providing informed consent to participate in this ethics board-approved study (protocol 2008B0320), participants completed a range of emotion regulation and psychopathology questionnaires at baseline. They were then trained on how to answer the ecological momentary assessment (EMA) survey using a study-provided personal digital assistant (PDA), also known as a handheld personal computer. The PDA-administered surveys asked participants to report on their experiences of emotion, emotion regulation attempts, and current mood three times a day for 10 days. Surveys occurred randomly within four-hour intervals throughout anticipated waking hours; assessments typically occurred around 1pm, 5pm, and 9pm and the PDA alerted participants whenever a survey was available to be answered. Participants submitted 1966 surveys out of a possible 2760 surveys (71.23% compliance).

Measures

Neuroticism

Prior to beginning the EMA portion of the study, participants completed the NEO-PI-R-N (Costa & McCrae, 1992), which is a 48-item self-report measure of neuroticism. Neuroticism is a personality trait that includes anxiety, hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness, and vulnerability to stress. The NEO-PI-R-N uses a 5-point Likert scale, with higher total scores reflecting higher levels of neuroticism. Cronbach’s alpha in the present sample was 0.95.

Negative Emotion-Focused Regulation Strategies

At each EMA survey where a negative emotion was reported, participants were asked, “Did you do any of these things to lessen or decrease the intensity of that emotion?” Participants were provided with a list of 20 different strategies, which were presented in random order at each prompt. Response options for each strategy were: “no”; “yes, but it did not change the intensity of the emotion”; and “yes, and it did change the intensity of the emotion.” For a list of the strategies and their further categorization, see the left column of Table 1. In the present study, we collapsed the two “yes” responses into one such that each strategy was either endorsed (yes = 1) or not endorsed (no = 0). If participants denied experiencing an emotion during that survey, they were not asked which emotion regulation strategies they used to manage that (lack of) emotion. We treated all emotion regulation strategies for those surveys as having not been endorsed (scored 0) because not having an emotion to regulate implies than no regulation would have been used.

Positive Emotion-Focused Regulation Strategies

The same procedure as above was separately enacted if a participant reported experiencing a positive emotion over the previous four hours. The 20 emotion regulation strategies that were sampled are provided in the right column of Table 1.

Analytic Approach

Transparency and Openness

Data were collected in 2009 and were leveraged for the present analysis due to their structure being ideally suited for the newly developed stability metric (i.e., binary time series data with high dimensionality; Daniel et al., 2022). All hypotheses and plans for analyses were preregistered on OSF prior to viewing the data (https://​osf.​io/​d3tyn/​ ).1 Deviations to preregistered plans, and justifications for those deviations, are detailed below. Analysis scripts are openly provided on OSF (https://​osf.​io/​d3tyn/​) and data are available upon reasonable request to AUTHOR. Data are not stored in an online repository because participants from this 2009 data collection did not consent to having their de-identified data shared publicly. We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, and all relevant measures.

Justification for Operationalizing Strategy Switching with Stability

We chose to measure strategy switching with stability rather than conceptually related transition metrics (e.g., Markov models, multidimensional recurrence quantification analysis, autocorrelation/inertia) because stability was specifically designed to analyze high-dimensional multivariate binary time series data. Stability can handle upwards of 30 variables whereas alternative methods tend to return unidentifiable parameters when transition states between more than four variables are investigated (see Daniel et al., 2022 for greater discussion; Tian & Anderson, 2000; Wallot, 2019).
Further, stability has been demonstrated through simulation to be robust to time interval misspecification (Daniel et al., 2023). Specifically, stability is unbiased and has approximately 95% coverage when it is applied to data that are collected with between-person random sampling (relative to fixed sampling), making it a trustworthy metric when applied to data with these unequal time spacing characteristics. This quality is important for the present application because these data were collected with a between-person random sampling schedule, so the amount of time between survey observations varies both within and between participants.

Calculating Overall Emotion Regulation Stability

First, we calculated stability within the 20 negative emotion-focused emotion regulation strategies according to the steps outlined in Daniel et al. (2022). Specifically, we used the ‘buildTransArray’ function in the TransitionMetrics package (Daniel & Moulder, 2020) to build a sliding series of transition matrices per participant with 20-by-20 dimensions. We set the window size (W) to nine and used a windowing lag of one.2 We set W to nine (a pre-registered decision) so that a minimum of three days’ worth of surveys—with each survey having been administered three times daily—would be included in each transition matrix. We made this decision to increase the likelihood that participants would be reporting emotion regulation attempts in response to multiple, distinct events that took place over multiple days, as opposed to switching their strategies throughout the regulation of a single stressor on a given day, which would likely be a qualitatively different experience. We elected not to set W higher than nine to retain as many participants as possible, as increasing W would increase the number of surveys needed by each participant to be included in analysis. Further, this decision is in line with guidelines offered by Daniel et al. (2022), which suggest that W should be at minimum five. We applied this procedure using all surveys submitted by each participant, including surveys where emotions were denied, which were scored as 0 for all strategies. Given multiple imputation may be less effective for handling missingness in non-linear daily life data (due to dependencies in the results based on the specific imputation model used; Boker et al., 2018), we only use complete cases. As such, the number of transition matrices built per participant varied based on how many total observations they submitted throughout the study. Participants who submitted fewer than nine surveys (n = 3) were excluded from analyses given insufficient observations upon which to build a minimum of one complete transition matrix.
To illustrate how the transition matrices are built from the data, imagine participant i rated whether they had used each of four different emotion regulation strategies (ER1, ER2, ER3, ER4) at seven surveys (T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7). With these data—which are given on the left side of Fig. 1—and assuming a window of six and a lag of one, two transition matrices are constructed (Xi1, Xi2).
To construct Xi1, a 4 × 4 matrix with all cells set to zero is created. The example data show that ER1 was endorsed at the first survey (T1) and no strategy was endorsed at the second survey (T2). In the present study, no strategies are endorsed on surveys when participants deny experiencing any positive or negative emotion, respectively, since the previous survey. Because this method defines a transition as a switch or a repeat between two endorsed variables in back-to-back surveys (Daniel et al., 2022), this means that a pairwise transition did not occur between the first two time points, so all cells in transition Xi1 remain zero. At the next survey (T3), ER1 was endorsed, but because no strategy was endorsed at T2, no pairwise transition is observed between T2 and T3 and all cells remain zero. At the next survey (T4), ER1 was endorsed again, indicating a pairwise transition from ER1 to ER1 between T3 and T4. To reflect this pairwise transition in the transition matrix, we add one to the (1,1) cell of Xi1. At the next survey (T5), ER2 was endorsed, indicating a pairwise transition from ER1 to ER2 between T4 and T5. Thus, we add one to the (2,1) cell of Xi1. At the next survey (T6), ER2 and ER4 were endorsed, indicating two pairwise transitions between T5 and T6: one from ER2 to ER2 and one from ER2 to ER4. To reflect these transitions, we add one to the (2,2) cell of Xi1 and add one to the (4,2) element of Xi1. At this point, all pairwise transitions between the four emotion regulation variables across the first six time points are exactly accounted for in Xi1 (see Fig. 1).
To construct Xi2, we would start with a second 4 × 4 matrix with all cells set to zero. Because we specified a lag of one, the window of observations being read into Xi2 would be shifted down the time series by one compared to what was read into Xi1. As such, the transitions between T1 and T2 would not be captured by Xi2. The transitions between T2 and T3, T3 and T4, T4 and T5, and T5 and T6, however, would be reflected in Xi2 just like in Xi1. Moreover, because the window of observations was shifted down by one, there would be one new survey to read into Xi2 (i.e., the transition between T6 and T7). At this final survey, ER2 was endorsed, indicating that two pairwise transitions occurred between T6 and T7: one from ER2 to ER2 and one from ER4 to ER2. To reflect these transitions, we add one to the (2,2) cell of Xi2 (such that the (2,2) cell now equals two) and add one to the (2,4) element of Xi2. With all transition matrices populated, the stability equation, which is described below, would then be applied to each completed transition matrix.
After constructing all transition matrices in the present data, we used the ‘transStats’ function in the TransitionMetrics package to calculate stability for each transition matrix. Notably, stability leverages one important characteristic of the transition matrix to measure the extent to which the multivariate system transitions from one variable of interest to the same variable of interest relative to all observed pairwise transitions. If the same variable is endorsed in two back-to-back surveys, then a cell along the on-diagonal of the matrix is incremented to reflect this “repeat.” Conversely, if one variable is endorsed prior to a different variable being endorsed at the next survey, then a cell along the off-diagonal of the matrix is incremented to reflect this “switch.” As such, stability is given by
$${St}_{ij}=\frac{tr\left({\mathbf{X}}_{ij}\right)}{\sum \sum {\mathbf{X}}_{ij}}$$
(1)
Where \(tr\left({\mathbf{X}}_{ij}\right)\) is the sum of the elements along the on-diagonal of a given 20-by-20 transition matrix Xij (i.e., the number of repeats); \(\sum \sum {\mathbf{X}}_{ij}\) is the sum of all elements of Xij (the number of both repeats and switches). As a ratio, stability is therefore bounded between 0 and 1 where values closer to 1 indicate a tendency to repeat the same variable between successive surveys and values closer to 0 indicate a tendency to switch between at least two different variables between successive surveys. Phrased differently, since \(tr\left({\mathbf{X}}_{ij}\right)\) is the number of times the person did not switch strategies and \(\sum \sum {\mathbf{X}}_{ij}\) is the number of times that person either switched or did not switch strategies, then stability (\({St}_{ij}\)) can be thought of as the proportion of times that a person did not switch strategies.
Finally, we averaged all stability scores at the person level to arrive at one stability score per participant. This average stability in negative-emotion regulation strategies was used in subsequent analyses. We then repeated these steps for the 20 positive emotion-focused emotion regulation strategies to arrive at a measure of average stability in positive emotion-focused regulation strategies.

Calculating Emotion Regulation Stability within Strategy Classes

We took identical steps as above, although the dimensions of the transition matrices varied depending on how many strategies composed each emotion regulation strategy class. For example, stability within the adaptive engagement strategies was calculated using a 9 × 9 transition matrix, whereas stability within the behavioral strategies was calculated using a 4 × 4 transition matrix.

Calculating Stability When Emotion Regulation Strategies Were Not Endorsed

Stability measures the extent of different types of transitions (e.g., repeat strategy vs. change to a different strategy) that occur between successive survey responses. By definition, a transition can only be observed when at least one strategy is endorsed at each of two successive surveys. If no strategy-to-strategy transitions are observed within a given transition matrix, then that transition matrix is assigned a “noUse” value because the denominator in its calculation would be zero, which results in an undefined term. “noUse” values could be observed in one of two ways: (1) each of the nine surveys contributing to a given transition matrix denied experiencing an emotion such that the entire segmented data frame was all 0 or (2) surveys that denied experiencing an emotion were inserted between active regulation attempts such that no two active regulation attempts were ever observed between back-to-back surveys within the nine-survey segment. If at least one strategy-to-strategy transition is observed within a transition matrix, then stability returns a meaningful numeric result. In line with our preregistration, we removed all “noUse” transition matrices prior to calculating each participant’s average stability value given that an average could not otherwise be computed.
We decided to retain all surveys and treat lack of emotion endorsement as 0 for all strategies, rather than either remove all surveys where no strategy was endorsed or add a binary timeseries that gives 1 if an emotion was denied or 0 if an emotion was endorsed, to aid interpretability. For example, although removing all surveys where an emotion was denied would have prevented the “noUse” case from occurring (because all rows of data would have had at least one 1), it also would have meant that we would be implying transitions in the timeseries that did not directly occur by removing meaningful rows of data. Similarly, adding a new variable that gives 1 during all surveys when an emotion was denied and therefore no strategies were endorsed would have equated repetition of no strategy with repetition of a strategy. Both alternative options seemed especially problematic for investigations into class-specific switching when lack of relevant strategy endorsements was likely to be higher (e.g., a person who never reported using an aversive cognitive perseveration strategy would be scored as equally stable in their use of this strategy class as someone who repeatedly used the same aversive cognitive perseveration strategy). For additional details regarding how the stability calculation manages lack of emotion regulation strategy use, see the online supplement.

Predicting Neuroticism

We conducted all analyses in R version 4.1.3 (R Core Team, 2022) using the “rq” function in quantreg package version 5.88 (Koenker et al., 2021). We regressed continuous neuroticism on centered average ER stability (linear effect). We then added centered average ER stability squared (quadratic effect) into the model and conducted model comparisons to test whether the quadratic effect should be retained in the final model. We interpreted the best-fit model.
Our pre-registration outlined a plan to use regression on the mean to conduct these analyses; however, once viewing the data, we observed that the residuals from these models did not conform to assumptions of linearity, normality, and homoscedasticity due to the presence of outliers. To better model these data, we deviated from our pre-registration in favor of using a robust method: quantile regression on the median.3 In total, we conducted eight sets of hierarchical quantile regression models, all predicting neuroticism but using the following emotion regulation stability predictors: (1) overall negative-focused; (2) adaptive engagement negative-focused; (3) aversive cognitive perseveration negative-focused; (4) disengagement negative-focused; (5) overall positive-focused; (6) enhancement positive-focused; (7) disengagement positive-focused; (8) behavioral positive-focused.

Sensitivity Analyses

To investigate how the relationship between neuroticism and strategy switching changes as a function of W, we conducted sensitivity analyses that systematically varied W but otherwise used identical procedures. Specifically, W was iteratively set to: {6, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27}. Given our design of three surveys per day, these Ws resulted in stability values calculated across a minimum of 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 study days, respectively. Sensitivity analyses were only conducted at the overall level, resulting in 14 additional sets of analyses (7 for overall negative-focused strategy switching and 7 for overall positive-focused strategy switching).

Results

As reported by Heiy and Cheavens (2014), participants used an average of 15 different regulation strategies in response to negative emotions throughout the study and 16 different regulation strategies in response to positive emotions. Across the full sample, average stability in overall negative emotion-focused regulation strategies was 0.08 (SD = 0.04; range = 0.02-0.25) and average stability in overall positive emotion-focused regulation strategies was 0.08 (SD = 0.04; range = 0-0.24). An average stability value of 0.08 indicates that the average person chose to repeat the same strategy between two surveys only 8 times out of 100 opportunities to either repeat or switch strategies. These low values suggest that, when considering all 20 different emotion regulation strategies, participants tended to switch between strategies far more often than repeat the same strategy across many successive surveys.
In response to negative emotions, average stability ranged from 0.16 (SD = 0.09; range: 0-0.50) for adaptive engagement strategies, to 0.30 (SD = 0.25, range: 0–1) for disengagement strategies, and 0.31 (SD = 0.19; range: 0–1) for aversive cognitive perseveration strategies. In response to positive emotions, average stability ranged from 0.12 (SD = 0.09, range: 0-0.83) for enhancement strategies, to 0.29 (SD = 0.28, range: 0–1) for behavioral strategies, and 0.36 (SD = 0.18, range: 0–1) for disengagement strategies. This suggests that, when considering smaller groupings of conceptually related strategies, slightly lower rates of strategy switching were observed (which we would expect probabilistically—if there are fewer strategies to switch between, your odds of switching strategies is lower). However, average values still tended to indicate more switching relative to less switching (i.e., average values were closer to 0 than to 1). Descriptive information regarding how frequently the “noUse” designation was given in each of the datasets is available in Table 3. Higher rates of “noUse” indicate that fewer strategy-to-strategy transitions were observed within the related dataset.
Table 3
Descriptive information about datasets
Model
Strategies included in transition matrices
Number of returned “noUse” transition matrices
Participants included in analyses
Regulating negative emotions
 Overall
20
527 (41.93%)
72
 Adaptive Engagement
9
571 (45.43%)
70
 Aversive Cognitive Perseveration
4
698 (55.53%)
60
 Disengagement
7
701 (55.77%)
63
Regulating positive emotions
   
 Overall
20
411 (32.70%)
76
 Enhancement
11
431 (34.29%)
76
 Disengagement
5
624 (49.64%)
65
 Behavioral
4
1015 (80.75%)
37
Note. Overall, 1257 surveys were collected from 89 participants. When calculating stability, “noUse” values are returned if participants did not endorse at least one strategy from the respective group of strategies above across any two successive survey responses within a sub-series of nine responses. “noUse” values were removed prior to calculating person-level average stability values

Regulating Negative Emotions

Overall Emotion Regulation Stability. The linear model demonstrated the best fit to these data, F(1, 68) = 1.40, p = .24 (here a non-significant p-value indicates that adding the quadratic term did not significantly improve the model fit, so the linear model is preferred). A scatter plot depicting the linear and quadratic best fit lines to these data is available in supplement for this and all other models (Figure S1). As hypothesized, participants with relatively greater neuroticism tended to demonstrate greater emotion regulation stability (less switching) in response to negative emotions than those with relatively lower neuroticism, β = 0.39, 95% CI [0.08, 0.62].4
Emotion Regulation Stability of Adaptive Engagement Strategies. The linear model demonstrated the best fit to these data, F(1, 67) = 0.11, p = .75. As hypothesized, participants with greater neuroticism tended to demonstrate higher adaptive engagement emotion regulation stability (less switching) in response to negative emotions than those with relatively lower neuroticism, β = 0.31, 95% CI [0.16, 0.59].
Emotion Regulation Stability of Aversive Cognitive Perseveration Strategies. Adding the quadratic effect of average stability significantly improved model fit, F(1, 57) = 17.10, p < .001, above and beyond only including the linear effect of average stability. Investigating the plot of best fit lines suggested that, contrary to hypothesis, moderate stability values within the aversive cognitive perseveration strategies were associated with higher neuroticism whereas both lower and higher stability was associated with lower neuroticism, β = –0.72, 95% CI [–1.09, –0.45]. However, most participants demonstrated relatively low stability within the aversive cognitive perseveration strategies, so the inverted U of the best fit curve had fewer data points on the higher end of the stability spectrum with which to inform its fit.
Emotion Regulation Stability of Disengagement Strategies. The linear model demonstrated the best fit to these data, F(1, 60) = 0.74, p = .39. We did not observe a significant association between average disengagement negative emotion-focused regulation stability and neuroticism, β = 0.19, 95% CI [–0.43, 0.61].

Regulating Positive Emotions

Overall Emotion Regulation Stability. The linear model demonstrated the best fit to these data, F(1, 73) = 0.01, p = .93. We did not observe a significant association between average positive emotion-focused regulation stability and neuroticism, β = 0.25, 95% CI [–0.36, 0.43].
Emotion Regulation Stability of Enhancement Strategies. The linear model demonstrated the best fit to these data, F(1, 73) = 1 × 10− 4, p = .99. We did not observe a significant association between average enhancement positive emotion-focused regulation stability and neuroticism, β = 0.17, 95% CI [–0.50, 0.95].
Emotion Regulation Stability of Disengagement Strategies. The linear model demonstrated the best fit to these data, F(1, 62) = 0.87, p = .36. We did not observe a significant association between average disengagement positive emotion-focused regulation stability and neuroticism, β = –0.11, 95% CI [–0.30, 0.23].
Emotion Regulation Stability of Behavioral Strategies. The linear model demonstrated the best fit to these data, F(1, 34) = 1.64, p = .21. We did not observe a significant association between average behavioral positive emotion-focused regulation stability and neuroticism, β = 0.23, 95% CI [–0.82, 0.43].

Sensitivity Analyses with Varying W Size

Results are detailed here in brief; full information is provided in the online supplement. The linear model always demonstrated the best fit to the data, regardless of W and whether negative or positive emotion-focused strategies were being investigated. Consistent with primary analysis results (W = 9), participants with relatively greater neuroticism scores demonstrated significantly greater emotion regulation stability (less switching) in response to negative emotions than those with relatively lower neuroticism scores when W was set to 6 and 12. No significant association was observed for the remaining W values tested; however, increasingly fewer participants were eligible to be included in analyses as W increased (ranging from N = 72 when W = 6 to N = 16 when W = 27). Also consistent with primary analysis results, no significant association between neuroticism and overall switching in positive emotion-focused regulation strategies was observed for any W tested.

Discussion

In the present study, we applied a switching-based metric called stability to measure the extent to which 89 college students switched between 20 different positive (or pleasant) and 20 different negative (or unpleasant) emotion-focused regulation strategies throughout a 10-day EMA study. All participants endorsed relatively high rates of strategy switching for both positive- (Mstability = 0.08 on a 0-to-1 scale) and negative emotion-focused (Mstability = 0.08) strategy use, which suggests that switching between emotion regulation strategies across situations in daily life is normative. However, in response to negative emotions, participants higher in neuroticism tended to switch less often among all 20 negative-emotion regulation strategies (a medium-sized effect). Similarly, in response to negative emotions, participants higher in neuroticism tended to switch less often among adaptive engagement strategies and be relatively more moderate in their switching among aversive cognitive perseveration strategies than participants lower in trait neuroticism. Switching rates among the positive emotion-focused strategies were not associated with neuroticism.
Because we sampled emotion regulation strategy use approximately four hours apart and up to three times a day for 10 days, it is unlikely that all surveys reported on the regulation of a single stressor. Given this assumption, our finding aligns with results reported by Southward and colleagues (2018): Participants scoring higher in trait neuroticism tended to be less adaptive in their initial emotion regulation strategy choice in response to a range of hypothetical stressors, whereas participants lower in trait neuroticism tended to switch between strategies more adaptively across stressors. Although the effect size reported by Southward and colleagues (2018) was small, the pattern of results suggests that participants with lower levels of neuroticism may be better able to flexibly deploy different strategies throughout daily life as stressors change. Although our data cannot speak to how well matched any given strategy was to any given stressor, this finding supports theories of regulatory flexibility (Aldao et al., 2015; Bonanno & Burton, 2013) which posit that mental health is associated with variability in strategy use across situations.
Within classes of strategies, greater neuroticism was associated with less switching among adaptive engagement strategies (a medium-sized effect) but with moderate switching among aversive cognitive perseveration strategies (a large-sized effect). Further, neuroticism was not associated with switching among disengagement strategies. The variability in the relations between stability and neuroticism by strategy class suggests that it may be important to attend not only to variability and switching dynamics in general, but also to which strategies are being switched between. Specifically, these findings lend further support to the value of demonstrating flexibility between situations in adaptive engagement strategy use. Findings from previous studies sampling strategy use at similarly slow or slower rates as the present study show that greater diversity and higher usage rates in putatively adaptive strategies is associated with better mental health outcomes (McMahon & Naragon-Gainey, 2018; Wen et al., 2021).5 These results, taken together with our findings, speak to the potential utility of helping people develop broad repertoires of putatively adaptive strategies that they can use in response to different contextual demands. That said, these studies are all observational, so future intervention work would be needed to test whether this might function as a causal pathway for improving mental health.
That participants lower in neuroticism demonstrated both lower and higher rates of switching within the aversive cognitive perseveration strategies was unexpected and may suggest that being high in trait neuroticism is associated with neither receiving the potential benefits of staying the course with a particular strategy nor of switching between strategies across situations. For such strategies, switching infrequently might suggest a narrow repertoire of putatively maladaptive strategies, which is typically seen as beneficial (Wen et al., 2021), whereas switching frequently—especially when coupled with the more frequent adaptive engagement switching also observed in participants with lower neuroticism—might exemplify flexible poly-regulation patterns that do not fall into the mistaken assumption that maladaptive strategies are always ineffective (Bonanno & Burton, 2013). If we were to speculate based off neuroticism’s association with frequent and intense negative emotionality (Barlow et al., 2014), the “middle of the road” approach demonstrated by the participants scoring highest in neuroticism may offer the worst of both worlds: amplification of stress caused by moderate perseveration in different putatively maladaptive strategies without the benefits that might come from co-occurring greater rates of switching within the adaptive engagement strategies. However, because this result is counter to what we expected and is based on observational data analyzed in aggregate, replication is especially warranted prior to further interpretation.
Unlike in the two negative emotion-focused regulation classes with significant effects, the disengagement class is composed of strategies that are not as obviously categorized as either putatively adaptive nor maladaptive. For example, sleeping might be an appropriate way to leverage the link between physical and mental wellness despite excessive sleeping being likely to interfere with problem-solving. If we were to speculate, the null result observed within this class of strategies might suggest that the association between switching and neuroticism depends on the extent to which the strategies being switched between typically function advantageously or not. However, the present null results cannot directly speak to this claim and could instead be explained by potentially insufficient power to detect the effect. As such, future research in larger sample sizes that tests the importance of an adaptive/maladaptive distinction is needed to probe this speculation. Moreover, other features beyond the adaptive/maladaptive distinction may warrant attention, like whether the strategy functions as interpersonal or intrapersonal regulation (Hofmann, 2014). Further, McKone and colleagues (2022) recently found differential patterns in results when considering switching between emotion regulation strategy classes of primary control, secondary control, disengagement, and involuntary engagement.
By contrast, neuroticism was not associated with switching in positive emotion-focused regulation strategies. Neuroticism, with its focus on high negative emotionality, may not be the ideal dimension with which to explain between-person differences in positive emotion-focused strategy switching. Other personality dimensions that are more strongly associated with positive emotionality, like extraversion (Wacker, 2018), or mental illnesses that are characterized by deficits maintaining positive emotions, like depression (Vanderlind et al., 2022), may be better suited to uncover any potential links between positive emotion-focused regulation switching and mental health indicators. Alternatively, larger sample sizes may have been needed to uncover what still may be potentially meaningful associations between positive emotion-focused regulation switching and trait neuroticism.

Clinical Implications

Neuroticism is thought to be indicative of psychopathology, especially of internalizing disorders that are characterized by frequent and intense negative emotions and emotion dysregulation (Barlow et al., 2014; Southward et al., 2023). Our findings are consistent with existing clinical recommendations to help patients with internalizing symptoms switch more flexibly between emotion regulation strategies—especially between those that are putatively adaptive—in response to different stressors. For example, dialectical behavior therapy teaches many different emotion regulation skills because no strategy is expected to be uniformly effective across all situations, and therapists often use “toolbox” metaphors with clients to underscore the importance of having access to many different regulation strategy “tools” for different “jobs” (Linehan, 2015). As the emotion regulation switching literature continues to grow, uncovering potential barrier(s) that contribute to ineffective strategy switching decisions (e.g., skill or knowledge deficits: Daniel et al., in production; cognitive deficits: Growney & English, 2023; motivational/belief deficits: McKone et al., 2022) may inform the development of more nuanced, personalized interventions to improve strategy switching.

Limitations

We assumed that, because our within-day sampling rate was every few hours, emotion regulation strategy reports likely referenced the regulation of unique stressors throughout the day. As such, we based our interpretations around this assumption (namely that switching more frequently between strategies across situations is likely adaptive and characteristic of a flexible regulation style, despite it remaining plausible that switching frequently throughout the regulation of a given stressor might be disadvantageous). Although we feel this assumption is reasonable—the sample level average amount of time spanning nine surveys was 83.43 h, or roughly 3.5 days—and places our results in line with prior work that explicitly separated within- from between-situation strategy switching in neuroticism (Southward et al., 2018), it is possible that the emotion regulation strategies participants reported using at different surveys referenced a shared situation. For example, many situations are regulated across longer timeframes (e.g., a big fight with a friend, an upcoming and high-stakes exam). Future work that tracks whether reported regulation attempts targeted a prior or a new emotional event would help to strengthen this interpretation.
Relatedly, we likely did not observe every emotion regulation strategy that a participant used throughout the study, so we may have missed meaningful periods of strategy switching or sustained strategy use. Although it would be fascinating to have a complete log of all strategies used, this level of reporting would likely be infeasible. Instead, recent data simulations and related analyses (Daniel et al., 2023) helped to demonstrate that stability does not return biased values if it is applied to randomly sampled emotion regulation strategy reports (i.e., data that does not capture all emotion regulation strategies used). That said, increasing the sampling rate in future data collections might increase the amount of repeated strategy reports observed in the data, which would improve variability in stability and potentially help uncover additional associations. A higher number of repeated samples might also increase the likelihood that more of the participants be retained in analyses conducted on the smaller groupings of strategies, which would increase the power to detect effects in these targeted analyses. For example, only 37 participants were retained in the positive emotion-focused behavioral strategies analysis, suggesting that this model was especially underpowered.
Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility that the observed high rates of emotion regulation switching could be accounted for by careless response patterns and/or a tendency to report using the strategies that were displayed at the top of the strategy list, which were presented in random order across surveys. Indeed, participants were more likely to deny experiencing any positive and negative emotions as the study progressed, potentially to minimize survey length because they were not asked about regulation strategies in the absence of a reported emotion. That said, previous analyses in the present data reported theoretically expected findings, which increases our confidence that participants were attentive to their emotion regulation strategy reports when regulation reports were made (e.g., greater use of aversive cognitive perseveration strategies was associated with worsening of momentary mood whereas greater use of adaptive engagement strategies was associated with improvement of momentary mood; Southward & Cheavens, 2020). Moreover, our a priori decisions to use an average stability value in our models that removed “noUse” results would have helped to absorb any deterioration in survey quality over time.
Stability is a repeated-measures metric that is performed on segments, or windows, of the overall data. The length of each window is determined by the researcher through setting the hyperparameter W. Although we pre-registered our decision to set W to 9 for conceptual reasons (i.e., to increase the likelihood that regulation attempts referenced unique stressors by forcing surveys to span a minimum of 3 days while still retaining as many participants as possible), it is possible that our findings might have changed if we had selected a very different W. Indeed, sensitivity analyses found that while the association between neuroticism and overall strategy switching in response to negative emotions was preserved when W was 6 and 12, this relationship no longer remained significant when W was 15 or higher. This may point to a boundary condition wherein the relationship between neuroticism and negative emotion-focused regulation strategy switching fluctuates rapidly enough that the relationship becomes attenuated when switching is calculated over longer time windows (e.g., when 5 or more days’ worth of surveys are included). This may alternatively be explained by a reduction in statistical power given that fewer participants were eligible for analysis as W increased. In support of this latter possibility, the mean stability values for overall negative-focused strategy switching were very consistent across all Ws tested (ranging from 0.082 to 0.077 to when W was 6 and 27, respectively, whereas the number of participants included in analyses decreased from 72 to 16 for those same Ws). Despite introducing some researcher degrees of freedom, stability’s overlapping windowing approach is likely part of what helps to make this method robust to time interval misspecification (see Daniel et al., 2023 for greater discussion).
Moreover, these are secondary analyses conducted in data originally collected to answer separate research questions. As such, a priori power analyses were not conducted for the present tests, so any null results may be due to insufficient power. Finally, our sample is largely non-Hispanic White, young, and highly educated. As such, our findings may not generalize to individuals holding other identities. For example, recent work suggests that developmental and cognitive differences across the lifespan my differently predict the propensity to switch between emotion regulation strategies (see McKone et al., 2022 for a consideration of switching in the context of adolescence; see English & Springstein, 2023 for a consideration of switching in the context of mild cognitive impairment vs. healthy aging). An interesting area of future research could be to investigate whether these associations operate similarly or differently across other dimensions of identity. In addition to replicating these analyses in a more representative and diverse transdiagnostic sample, it would also be interesting to investigate whether these associations would differ between distinct internalizing disorders that are associated with neuroticism.

Conclusions

This study applied the stability metric to investigate the association between emotion regulation strategy switching throughout daily life and trait neuroticism. Findings suggest that people demonstrating more frequent between-situation switching in negative emotion-focused regulation strategies in daily life—especially strategies that are classified as “adaptive engagement”—have lower scores on a self-reported measure of neuroticism. Given that neuroticism is associated with many forms of internalizing psychopathology, these results provide further support to the idea that helping people learn how to flexibly deploy different emotion regulation strategies to meet the many demands of daily life, with an emphasis on leveraging a broad repertoire of putatively adaptive strategies, may be an important area for intervention.

Acknowledgements

KED’s time was supported by a John S. Lillard Jefferson Fellowship, a P.E.O. Scholars Award, and a University of Virginia Dissertation Completion Fellowship; SMB’s time was supported by a fellowship from the Max Planck Institute for Human Development; MWS’s efforts on this project were partially supported by the National Institute of Mental Health under award number K23MH126211. The funding source had no involvement in the conduct or preparation of the research, and the content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health.

Declarations

Conflict of Interest

The authors report no conflicts of interest.
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Voetnoten
1
Authors MWS and JSC had viewed portions of the parent data during the analysis of separate projects, but never with respect to stability values. To date, three papers have been published using these data (Heiy & Cheavens, 2014; Southward & Cheavens, 2020; Southward et al., 2019). The current study differs both conceptually and methodologically from all three previously published works by being the sole investigation into dynamic patterns of emotion regulation strategy switching.
 
2
Stability is a repeated-measures method that calculates stability within segments of each participant’s overall data using a sliding window approach—where W determines how many EMA survey responses contribute to each stability calculation (see Daniel et al., 2022). This sliding window procedure is fundamental to establishing stability’s robustness to time interval misspecification (Boker et al., 2018; Daniel et al., 2023). See “Justification for Operationalizing Strategy Switching with Stability” section above for more details.
 
3
A comparison of results from this quantile regression estimation procedure against our pre-registered regression on the mean procedure showed complete consistency in interpretation of effects. Model estimates for both estimation procedures are provided in supplement (Table S3).
 
4
Adding the quadratic effect of average stability initially significantly improved model fit, F(1, 69) = 9.23, p < .01, above and beyond only including the linear effect of average stability. However, investigating the quadratic model revealed that the quadratic effect was not itself significant; instead, the model comparison appeared to favor the quadratic model because the best fit curve was overfitting to a single data point with 2.74 times more leverage than the data point with the next-highest leverage value. As such, we decided to remove this high leverage data point and re-run our analyses. With this outlier removed, adding the quadratic effect no longer significantly improved model fit. The results of the linear-only model with the outlier removed are consistent with what was observed when including the quadratic effect on the full data set.
 
5
McMahon and Naragon-Gainey (2018) used two different sampling schedules: one for a student sample and one for a clinical sample. The student sample received nightly surveys and the clinical sample received surveys three times daily. Wen and colleagues (2021) used trait-level questionnaire data.
 
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Metagegevens
Titel
Trait Neuroticism is Associated with how Often People Switch Between Emotion Regulation Strategies Used to Manage Negative Emotions in Daily Life
Auteurs
Katharine E. Daniel
Robert G. Moulder
Matthew W. Southward
Jennifer S. Cheavens
Steven M. Boker
Publicatiedatum
18-06-2024
Uitgeverij
Springer US
Gepubliceerd in
Cognitive Therapy and Research / Uitgave 6/2024
Print ISSN: 0147-5916
Elektronisch ISSN: 1573-2819
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10608-024-10493-x