Introduction
What is the meaning of the concept “beauty,” a concept, which can be considered as being abstract as it does not refer to a physical referent? Philosophers have tried to define the meaning of this concept for several centuries based on more or less complex considerations (e.g., Baumgarten,
1750–1758). Imagining a tour through the Museum of Modern Art in New York probably makes these considerations much simpler. Imagine standing in front of the Starry Night painted by post-impressionist Vincent van Gogh and admiring the wavelike forms and the color gradient of the nocturne painting. Intuitively, most people would speak of beauty here. This example illustrates that, similar to concrete concepts such as “painting,” the meaning of abstract concepts might be related to perception (e.g., vision) through their reference to situations as suggested by grounded (or embodied) cognition theories. Thinking about the abstract concept “fitness” illustrates another notion of grounded cognition theories that (abstract) concept meaning might not only be grounded through its relation to (visual) perception but also through actions, such as lifting weights, doing yoga or bicycling (for reviews see Barsalou,
2008,
2010; Kiefer & Barsalou,
2013; Kiefer & Pulvermüller,
2012; Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco,
2012; Pulvermüller,
2013).
Whereas it is generally accepted that concepts are the basic units of cognition that make up the meaning of words (Humphreys, Riddoch, & Quinlan,
1988; Kiefer & Pulvermüller,
2012; Tulving,
1972), their representational format and their organization at a neural and functional level are still a matter of debate. Traditional amodal approaches (Anderson,
1978; Collins & Loftus,
1975; Fodor,
2001; Mahon & Caramazza,
2009; Pylyshyn,
1980) would answer these questions by amodal semantic hubs, in which all forms of conceptual knowledge are represented (Rogers et al.,
2004). In amodal models, the representational format of concepts is considered abstract and independent of motor interactions or perceptual impressions during concept acquisition. Original modality-specific experiential information is transformed into a common symbolic code (Caramazza & Mahon,
2003). Concrete and abstract concepts like “painting,” “beauty” or “fitness” are seen to be similarly represented separated from the sensorimotor brain systems in the same amodal code. Considering “beauty” from the beginning of this article, traditional amodal theories would assume that experiences gathered by the visitor of the Museum of Modern Art do not contribute to its representation of the concept “beauty,” since the original experiential information is transformed into an abstract code and is therefore seen to be lost or at least extenuated (Anderson,
1978; Caramazza & Mahon,
2003; McClelland & Rogers,
2003). Anterior inferior-temporal (Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers,
2007; Visser, Jefferies, & Ralph,
2010), inferior-parietal (Binder & Desai,
2011), posterior middle temporal (Gold et al.,
2006; Hoffman, Pobric, Drakesmith, & Ralph,
2012; Price,
2000) and prefrontal cortex (Devlin, Matthews, & Rushworth,
2003) have been proposed as neural basis of these amodal hub regions, even though their exact number, function and location remain questionable (Meteyard et al.,
2012). Activation of modal brain areas during conceptual processing is not denied per se; however, their engagement is considered, if at all, as epiphenomenon, which is not causally involved in conceptual representation: Activation of modal brain areas may occur concomitantly through spreading activation (Mahon,
2015a,
2015b) or strategic imagery (Machery,
2007), after a putatively amodal concept had been accessed.
Grounded cognition theories, in contrast, consider modal brain systems and interconnected networks including regions associated with motor, sensory, emotional and introspective processes as essential for conceptual representation (Barca, Borghi, Dove, & Tummolini, this issue; Barsalou,
2008; Borghi et al.,
2017; Ghio, Vaghi, Perani, & Tettamanti,
2016; Kiefer & Barsalou,
2013; Pulvermüller & Fadiga,
2010). Concepts are seen as simulations of previous experiences and implemented in distributed brain networks, which arise from simultaneous activation of cell assemblies during concept acquisition (Pulvermüller & Fadiga,
2010), similarly as it already has been proposed by Hebbian theory (
1949). Considering the examples of the beginning of this article, grounded cognition approaches would assume that the representational format of “beauty” or “fitness” is essentially related to the original perceptual impressions during concept acquisition like specific visual (e.g., forms and colors in the Starry Night) and motor (e.g., motor sequence of weight lifting and bicycling) information. Note that mental simulations based on modal representations are not necessarily accompanied by conscious experiences such as imagery (Kiefer & Barsalou,
2013). Instead, grounded cognition theories assume that modal activations can occur in the absence of any vivid sensory or motor experience (Kemmerer,
2015; Kiefer, Sim, Herrnberger, Grothe, & Hoenig,
2008). In fact, activity in modal brain regions has also been observed for masked words, which were not consciously perceived (Trumpp, Traub, & Kiefer,
2013b; Trumpp, Traub, Pulvermüller, & Kiefer,
2014).
Another core assumption of recent grounded cognition theories is that conceptual representations are flexible (Kiefer & Pulvermüller,
2012; Kuhnke, Kiefer, & Hartwigsen,
2020) in the sense that the feature composition of concepts depends on the task or situation at hand (Barsalou,
1982). Pulvermüller (
2018) recently provided an explanation for task-related flexibility within modal brain areas based on a neurobiologically inspired model. At a mechanistic level, task-related conceptual flexibility is seen to be a result of cortical gain control processes. Depending on the specific task, gain control of cortical activation is realized through feedback loops regulating excitation or inhibition processes within modality-specific brain areas, respectively. It is assumed that task-related modulations of cortical activity result from attention shifts toward or away from sensorimotor meaning aspects.
Recently developed hybrid theories combine assumptions made by amodal and grounded cognition theories by proposing an interaction between modality-specific, multimodal and amodal conceptual hub areas for conceptual processing (Kiefer & Harpaintner,
2020; Kiefer & Pulvermüller,
2012; Kuhnke et al.,
2020; Patterson et al.,
2007). These so-called hub and spokes models propose hub regions to store unifying non-physical semantic information while still being connected with concrete-experiential regions (Patterson & Ralph,
2016; Ralph, Jefferies, Patterson, & Rogers,
2017).
While the representation of concrete concepts can be accommodated by grounded cognition theories, including hybrid theories, in a quite straightforward manner, the mere existence of abstract concepts is often interpreted as proof of amodal theories (Mahon & Caramazza,
2008) since abstract concepts do not refer to a physical referent. In a similar vein, Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory (
1986) claimed that concrete concepts are represented through both, a visual imagery and a verbal semantic system. Abstract concepts, in contrast, are assumed to be represented exclusively within the verbal semantic system.
In order to better account for the representation of abstract concepts, refined grounded cognition theories aimed to specify the relation between modality-specific brain systems and abstract concepts (see also Kiefer & Harpaintner,
2020; Pulvermüller & Henningsen, this issue). For instance, the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson,
1980) claims that the meaning of abstract concepts results from sensorimotor information originating from metaphoric relations to concrete concepts (see Desai, this issue). Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (
2005) emphasize the importance of situational perceptions and therefore of direct sensorimotor experience in the constitution of the meaning of abstract concepts. They assume that conceptual knowledge is instantiated by partly simulating sensorimotor experiences made in specific situations during concept acquisition. The grounding of abstract concepts is thus thought to be based on simulations in modal brain systems. Considering “beauty,” for example, might simulate the visual scene of the admiration of the Starry Night described in the beginning of this article (see also Vergallito, Guenther, Marelli, & Petilli, this issue).
Based on the empirical findings that the semantic content of abstract concepts is highly heterogeneous (see below; Barca, Mazzuca, & Borghi,
2017; Harpaintner, Trumpp, & Kiefer, 2018; Kiefer & Harpaintner,
2020; Muraki, Sidhu, & Pexman, this issue; Wiemer-Hastings, Krug, & Xu, 2001; Wiemer-Hastings & Xu,
2005), grounded cognition approaches extended their theoretical framework by emphasizing the importance of additional types of conceptual information besides sensorimotor information. Linguistic/verbal (Barca et al., this issue; Language And Situated Simulation Theory, Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson-Mendenhall,
2008; Words As Social Tools Approach, Borghi & Binkofski,
2014; Louwerse's Symbol Interdependency Hypothesis, Louwerse,
2011), social (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings,
2005; Borghi & Binkofski,
2014), affective (Affective Embodiment Account, Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, & Andrews,
2009) and introspective (Barca et al., this issue; Kiefer & Barsalou,
2013) experiential information is thought to be essential in the representation of abstract concepts.
Evidence favoring the grounded cognition framework mainly comes from studies on concrete concepts. Behavioral (e.g., Garcia & Ibanez,
2016), neuroimaging studies (e.g., Kiefer et al.,
2008) as well as transcranial magnetic stimulation studies (TMS; e.g., Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi,
2005a) or neuropsychological studies (e.g., Trumpp, Kliese, Hoenig, Haarmeier, & Kiefer,
2013a) demonstrated the involvement of modal brain systems in conceptual processing. Several electroencephalography (EEG) studies, which provide the time course of conceptual processing, found differential event-related potential (ERP) effects as a function of the modal information involved (e.g., Hauk & Pulvermüller,
2004; Trumpp et al.,
2014; Martin,
2006 #83).
In line with the notion of conceptual flexibility, previous studies furthermore showed a modulation of cortical activity during conceptual processing depending on the requested task (Hoenig, Sim, Bochev, Herrnberger, & Kiefer,
2008; Popp, Trumpp, & Kiefer,
2019; van Dam, van Dijk, Bekkering, & Rueschemeyer,
2012). Deep conceptual decision tasks, in which retrieval of feature-specific information is necessary, led to modality-specific effects in several studies (Papeo, Vallesi, Isaja, & Rumiati,
2009; Popp et al.,
2019; Sato, Mengarelli, Riggio, Gallese, & Buccino,
2008). In contrast, shallow lexical decision tasks, in which conceptual retrieval is not task-relevant but occurs through associative processes, led to a diminution or even a disappearance of differential effects (Papeo et al.,
2009; Popp et al.,
2019; Sato et al.,
2008) illustrating that conceptual processing is highly flexible in the sense that it is dependent on the task at hand.
While the involvement of the sensorimotor system for the processing of concrete concepts is well documented, corresponding evidence with regard to abstract concepts is limited (for a review see Kiefer & Harpaintner,
2020). One line of evidence indicating a foundation of abstract concepts in perception and action comes from rating studies (Binder et al.,
2016; Lynott & Connell,
2009,
2013; Troche, Crutch, & Reilly,
2014,
2017; van Dantzig, Cowell, Zeelenberg, & Pecher,
2011) and property generation studies (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings,
2005; Harpaintner et al.,
2018) examining the subjective semantic content of abstract concepts. Besides verbal, emotional and introspective information, information associated with sensory and motor experiences was found to be related to all kind of concepts, regardless of their concreteness/abstractness level (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings,
2005). For instance, a property generation study (Harpaintner et al.,
2018 321), which examined a large set of abstract concepts, yielded substantial proportions of generated verbal associations as well as social, emotional and introspective properties. However, sensorimotor properties were generated most frequently in response to abstract concepts in this study. Additional hierarchical cluster analyses indicated the existence of specific subgroups of abstract concepts characterized by the dominance of certain modal features, with one of those clusters showing a dominance of sensorimotor features. In terms of quantity, visual and motor properties played the most crucial role within the sensorimotor feature category. This indicates that abstract concepts are quite heterogeneous (see also Kiefer & Harpaintner,
2020; Muraki et al., this issue) with regard to their semantic content and cannot be contrasted as a uniform category with concrete concepts. Of course, rating and property generation studies do not indicate whether sensorimotor information related to abstract concepts is represented in corresponding modality-specific brain areas, as it is stated by grounded cognition theories (Kiefer & Pulvermüller,
2012). This information can only be provided by neuroimaging studies.
Several neuroimaging studies investigated the involvement of the modal cortex during the processing of abstract concepts (for a review see Kiefer & Harpaintner,
2020). In line with the suggested crucial role of mental states (Wilson-Mendenhall, Simmons, Martin, & Barsalou,
2013), social constellations (Wilson-Mendenhall et al.,
2013) and emotions (Vigliocco et al.,
2014) for the representation of abstract concepts, increased brain activity in corresponding neural networks has been found. Results of a few experiments furthermore suggest an association between sensorimotor cortex and abstract concepts: Processing of numerical concepts (e.g., "nine", see also Glenberg, Fischer, Shaki, & Doricchi, this issue; Tschentscher, Hauk, Fischer, & Pulvermüller,
2012), abstract concepts related to mental states (e.g., "thought", Dreyer & Pulvermüller,
2018) as well as abstract emotion words (Dreyer & Pulvermüller,
2018; Moseley, Carota, Hauk, Mohr, & Pulvermüller,
2012) was associated with enhanced activity in the motor cortex. A lesion study (Dreyer et al.,
2015) furthermore suggested the motor cortex to be causally involved in the processing of abstract emotion words. Processing the single abstract concept “observe” led to increased activity in auditory and visual cortices (Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, Simmons, & Barsalou,
2012) and even highly abstract physical concepts were associated with enhanced activity in widespread modality-specific brain areas (Mason & Just,
2016). Finally, a recent fMRI study (Harpaintner, Sim, Trumpp, Ulrich, & Kiefer,
2020) indicated that abstract concepts with either a strong motor or a strong visual feature dominance were processed in corresponding modal cortices, which were also activated by action and perception. While the processing of motor-related abstract concepts, similarly as the execution of real movements, was associated with an enhanced BOLD signal in frontal and parietal motor regions, the processing of vision-related abstract concepts specifically elicited enhanced activation in temporo-occipital visual brain areas, similarly as the observation of object pictures (see also Vergallito et al., this issue). Although a shallow lexical decision task was used in this earlier study, which did not encourage semantic elaboration or imagery, it cannot be ruled out that sensorimotor activity was driven by these kinds of strategic processes. Furthermore and most importantly, it cannot be ruled out that sensorimotor activity occurred relatively late during task performance through spreading activation, after a putatively amodal concept had been accessed (Mahon,
2015a,
2015b). However, due to the poor temporal resolution of the fMRI, the time course of feature-specific processing of abstract concepts could not be determined in this earlier study.
Due to their excellent time resolution in the range of milliseconds, event-related potentials (ERPs) are the ideal tool to track the time course of brain activity elicited by conceptual processing. As already indicated above, several ERP studies investigated the processing of some subgroups of concrete concepts (Barber, Kousta, Otten, & Vigliocco,
2010; Grisoni, Dreyer, & Pulvermüller,
2016; Hauk & Pulvermüller,
2004; Kiefer,
2001,
2005; Kiefer et al.,
2008; Martin, Hauk, & Pulvermüller,
2006; Popp, Trumpp, & Kiefer,
2016; Trumpp et al.,
2013a,
2014). Concrete concepts with a dominance of specific feature types elicited differential ERP effects with a distinct topography suggesting that they are generated in different brain areas. For instance, concepts with a dominance of motor features such as “hammer” were associated with more positive ERPs over the central and frontal scalp, whereas more positive occipito-parietal ERPs were found for concepts with a dominance of visual features such as “cat” (Kiefer,
2001,
2005; Proverbio, Del Zotto, & Zani,
2007). Furthermore, differential ERPs as a function of feature type started at about 150 ms after target onset (Hauk & Pulvermüller,
2004; Hoenig et al.,
2008; Kiefer, Sim, Helbig, & Graf,
2011; Proverbio et al.,
2007; Pulvermüller, Härle, & Hummel,
2000). The rapid onset of these ERP effects indicates that they reflect early lexico-semantic processes and not later semantic elaboration, imagery or spreading activation processes as predicted by amodal approaches (Mahon & Caramazza,
2008).
To the best of our knowledge, electrophysiological investigations of abstract concepts are predominantly limited to the comparison of concrete vs. abstract concepts (for an exception see Bechtold, Bellebaum, Egan, Tettamanti, & Ghio,
2019). In contrast to abstract concepts, concrete concepts elicited more negative scalp potentials between 300 and 500 ms after target onset (Adorni & Proverbio,
2012; Barber, Otten, Kousta, & Vigliocco,
2013). This so-called N400 concreteness effect, which has been interpreted to reflect greater integration of multimodal information for concrete than abstract concepts (Barber et al.,
2013), has been observed across a broad variety of tasks and stimuli (Bechtold, Ghio, & Bellebaum,
2018), even though differential ERPs of earlier (P1—N1; Wirth et al.,
2008) and later (N700; West & Holcomb,
2000) latencies have also been found (Adorni & Proverbio,
2012). However, as already indicated above, contrasting abstract concepts as an undifferentiated conceptual category with concrete concepts is questionable when taking into account the heterogeneity of abstract concepts. Also, note that the contrast abstract concepts vs. concrete concepts as a whole renders it difficult to compare the N400 concreteness effect with ERPs related to feature-specific effects described above, which are based on the comparison between different subgroups of concrete concepts (e.g., motor- vs. vision-related concrete concepts).
Abstractness does not only modulate the amplitude of particular ERP components, but also seems to affect latency of specific electrophysiological effects with later ERP effects for abstract concepts than for concrete concepts (Borghi et al.,
2017): Palazova, Sommer and Schacht (
2013) found a delayed emotion related early posterior negativity effect (EPN), an effect believed to reflect attention shifting to word meaning, for abstract than for concrete verbs of different valence in a lexical decision task. Bardolph and Coulson (
2014) presented their participants words literally or metaphorically associated with vertical space (literal: ascend, descend; metaphorical: victory, poverty) while moving marbles either up- or downwards. They found early (200–300 ms after word onset) ERP congruency effects for literal words, while metaphorically related words elicited ERP congruency effects only 500 ms after word onset indicating that participants integrated abstract concepts and spatial schemas but, compared to concrete concepts, not in a rapid manner (Borghi et al.,
2017). Some researchers considered the differential ERPs as an indication that abstract and concrete concepts are processed in different neural systems (Dove,
2011).
Furthermore, the later emergence of ERP effects in abstract than in concrete concepts has been interpreted to reflect mental imagery instead of lexico-semantic processes (Adorni & Proverbio,
2012; Barber et al.,
2013; Bechtold et al.,
2018; Borghi et al.,
2017). As outlined above, it has been argued that late effects, presumably indexing post-conceptual imagery processes (Machery,
2007), do not preclude the existence of amodal conceptual representations, which are accessed earlier. For that reason, only demonstration of early sensorimotor activity during a conceptual task, reflecting access to conceptual representations rather than post-conceptual processes, can be taken as unequivocal evidence for grounded cognition theories (Kiefer & Pulvermüller,
2012). Returning to the ERPs just mentioned, however, results are heterogeneous (Adorni & Proverbio,
2012) with some studies indicating early ERP effects in the time window of P1–N1 for abstract concepts, speaking against late mental imagery processes (Wirth et al.,
2008). Additionally, previous ERP studies simply contrasted abstract with concrete concepts and did not differentiate between possible conceptual subgroups of abstract concepts. As outlined above, rating (Binder et al.,
2016; Lynott & Connell,
2009,
2013; Troche et al.,
2014,
2017; van Dantzig et al.,
2011) and property generation (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings,
2005; Harpaintner et al.,
2018) studies suggest subgroups of abstract concepts with a differential conceptual feature composition. In line with this reasoning, our recent fMRI study showed that abstract concepts with an empirically defined dominance of visual vs. motor features activated corresponding modal cortex (Harpaintner et al.,
2020).
In the present ERP study, we therefore systematically investigated the time course of abstract noun processing. We adopted the theory-driven approach and the stimuli from our previous fMRI study (Harpaintner et al.,
2020) and compared electrophysiological responses to specific subgroups of abstract concepts with a known feature composition. Stimuli were motor- and vision-related abstract concepts as determined by a previous property listing study (Harpaintner et al.,
2018), in which motor and visual features were generated the most. Based on this property listing study, 32 abstract words highly related to motor properties (e.g., “fitness”) and 32 abstract words highly related to visual properties (e.g., “similarity”) were selected. Please note, that for better readability, these two word lists are called motor and visual abstract concepts from now on, respectively.
This study aimed to address three specific research questions: Firstly, we asked whether feature-specific ERP effects for motor and visual abstract concepts would be similarly observed as for concrete concepts. Secondly, as amodal theories attribute sensorimotor activation to later post-conceptual imagery, elaborative or spreading activation processes, we assessed whether possible differential ERP effects would emerge in early (between 150 and 300 ms) or in later time windows. Visual word recognition is completed at about 150 ms after word onset (Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Ilmoniemi,
2005b), and full access to a concept is assumed to be mandatory for imagery (Kosslyn,
1994). For that reason, ERP effects observed immediately after 150 ms most likely reflect semantic access and not imagery. Thirdly, we tested whether processing of abstract concepts is prone to conceptual flexibility and assessed whether a deep conceptual task leads to earlier feature-specific ERP effects compared to a shallow conceptual task, similar to observations in concrete concepts. In a deep conceptual task, retrieval of conceptual information is mandatory for task performance, for instance, when the semantic relatedness of two words has to be determined (Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Hu, & Barsalou,
2008). In contrast, in a shallow conceptual task, retrieval of conceptual knowledge is not necessary for task performance, but occurs through associative links. For instance, visual word recognition in a lexical decision task (word/pseudoword decision) primarily depends on retrieval of lexical information, whereas access to conceptual information is assumed to occur auxiliary (Dilkina, McClelland, & Plaut,
2010).
In the first experiment, motor and visual abstract concepts, besides pseudowords, were presented within a shallow lexical decision task with a go/no-go response mode, in which retrieval of conceptual knowledge is not necessary for task performance, but occurs through associative links (Simmons et al.,
2008). Furthermore, since the go/no-go response mode did not require an overt motor response in case of the critical word stimuli, interference with conceptual processing in the motor system was avoided (Schomers & Pulvermüller,
2016). In the second experiment, participants had to perform a deep conceptual decision task, in which the semantic relation between a context word and subsequent motor and visual abstract concepts had to be determined. Note that the tasks as realized in Experiments 1 and 2 do not only differ with regard to the mandatory requirement of semantic retrieval, but also with regard to the response mode (go/no-go response mode vs. two alternative forced choice) and relational processing (single word vs. relational word processing). Nevertheless, all these factors converge on the fact that deeper semantic processing is required in the conceptual decision task of Experiment 2 compared to the lexical decision task of Experiment 1. In both experiments, we expected different scalp potentials in response to motor and visual abstract concepts. Similar to previous observations on concrete concepts, motor abstract concepts should elicit more positive ERPs over the fronto-central scalp, whereas visual abstract concepts should be associated with more positive ERPs over the occipito-temporal scalp. Furthermore, the onset of feature-specific ERP effects should be modulated by task with earlier feature-specific ERP effects in the deep conceptual decision task as compared to the shallow lexical decision task, because this type of task demands retrieval of conceptual information (Papeo et al.,
2009; Popp et al.,
2019; Sato et al.,
2008). In line with the grounded cognition framework, early ERP effects within 150–300 ms after target onset in response to motor and visual abstract concepts would suggest that feature-specific brain activity reflects rapid access to sensorimotor features and not later post-conceptual processes.