Introduction
Negation is a unique feature of human language, universally present in all natural languages and with no equal in any animal communication system (Speranza & Horn,
2010). Negation allows us to reverse the truth value of a sentence (Horn,
1989), i.e., the property of a sentence to be true or false, determining a semantic opposition between a negated expression and its positive counterparts. Many of our distinctive human practices, such as dealing with mathematical reasoning, arguing about philosophical hypotheses, or developing counterfactual reasoning (i.e., the tendency to imagine scenarios that could have taken place but did not occur), would not be possible without the use of negation. Even ethics and law would not be possible without negation since following moral and juridical rules implies the capacity to discern between what we ought to do and what we ought not. For these reasons, negation is a central topic in several fields. Within the sciences of language, negation has been the object of investigation at all linguistic levels. Indeed, morphosyntactic, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects of negation have been widely investigated (Horn,
2001). Within these studies, pragmatics certainly offers a privileged perspective for the understanding of the mechanisms underlying this logic operator since it focuses on the use of negation in context. In other words, a usage-based pragmatic approach allows us to ground the use of this operator in the dimension of human communication processes, thus relating the functioning of negation to the socio-cognitive mechanisms underlying it (Cuccio,
2011,
2012). Furthermore, a pragmatic investigation of negation also allows us to advance and deepen our knowledge of how negation works at all the other language levels. For example, based on a pragmatic perspective, the definition of negation as a semantic opposition (see above) has been reconsidered since negative statements are communicatively much more than inverted assertions and imply a different inferential impact, for example, on quantifiers or scalar words with respect to affirmative sentences.
In the last decades, the cognitive processes underlying negation and its neural underpinnings have also been object of investigation. As for the former, it has been shown that the processing of negation is cognitively more demanding compared to the processing of affirmative sentences, as reflected in higher error rates and longer reaction times (RTs). The cognitive load associated with the processing of sentential negation has been explained by cognitive effects such as reduced accessibility of the negated concept (Kaup,
2001; Kaup & Zwaan,
2003; MacDonald & Just,
1989), the elicitation of a complementary scenario (Kaup et al.,
2005; Orenes et al.,
2014) and the increase in cognitive effort (Carpenter & Just,
1975; Chase & Clark,
1972; Kaup et al.,
2006). There is evidence that processing of polarity (i.e., defining whether a sentence is in the affirmative or negative form) in hand action-related sentences modulates the hand motor-related areas (Alemanno et al.,
2012; Aravena et al.,
2012; Bartoli et al.,
2013; Foroni & Semin,
2013; Liuzza et al.,
2011; Tettamanti et al.,
2008; Tomasino et al.,
2010). More recently, it has been proposed that processing linguistic negation might recruit the neural mechanisms underlying motor response inhibition (Beltrán et al.,
2018,
2019; De Vega et al.,
2016; Foroni & Semin,
2013; García-Marco et al.,
2019; Liu et al.,
2019,
2020; Montalti et al.,
2021; Papeo et al.,
2016; Vitale et al.,
2022). This hypothesis is coherent with an embodied account of language, which posits that the comprehension of language is grounded in our sensory-motor system (Cuccio & Gallese,
2018; Di Cesare et al.,
2017; Gallese,
2008; Gallese & Cuccio,
2018). Indeed, the functional links between language and motor activity have been widely investigated in recent years, and a vast amount of experimental data has corroborated the hypothesis that the same mechanisms that integrate action and perception may also play a crucial role in the processing of different types of linguistic information (Barsalou,
2010; Cuccio et al.,
2014; Fischer & Zwaan,
2008; Gallese & Lakoff,
2005; Glenberg and Gallese, 2012; Glenberg et al.,
2013; Jirak et al.,
2010; Spadacenta et al.,
2014; Mirabella et al.,
2012/
2017; Pulvermüller et al.,
2014). In this framework, findings in support of the hypothesis that the processing of linguistic negation shares resources with motor inhibition have also been provided. For example, de Vega and colleagues (
2016) carried out an electroencephalographic (EEG) study in which participants were asked to read negative and affirmative action-related sentences while performing a Go/No-Go task. This study showed that negative sentences modulate theta bands, a marker of motor inhibition, over the frontal cortex. In another EEG study, Beltrán et al. (
2018) presented participants with negative and affirmative action-related sentences while they were performing a Stop-Signal Task (SST; Logan et al.,
1984), which is used to evaluate reactive inhibition. Results showed that two event-related potentials (ERPs; N1 and P3) were enhanced by successful inhibition. Furthermore, these findings also showed that N1 amplitude was higher for negative sentences compared to affirmative ones in successful stop trials. Via source analysis, the authors suggested that N1 modulation depended on the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), an area known to play a key role in inhibitory control (Aron et al.,
2014).
Notably, experimental research on the cognitive and neural underpinnings of linguistic negation processing is mainly focused on sentential negation, i.e., forms of negation explicitly lexicalized at the sentence level using morpho-syntactic expressions, such as “not”, “no” or “don’t” which overtly convey a negative meaning. Few studies have been conducted on other forms of negation that rely more heavily on the pragmatic dimension (e.g., Xiang et al.,
2016; Marrero et al.,
2020). Particularly interesting in this regard is the distinction proposed by Clark (
1976; but see also Horn,
1996) between explicit and implicit negation. While the latter represents a non-asserted negative meaning, explicit negation is present at the level of the asserted meaning of a sentence. Examples of explicit negation include not only words such as “no”, “not” or “don’t”, but also expressions like “few” and “little”, as well as prefixes such as im-moral or a-symmetry. In other words, explicit forms of negation encompass both morphosyntactic elements that directly convey a negative meaning, and expressions that, through entailments, result in the representation of a negative meaning in the minimal sentence. By contrast, implicit negation conveys a negative meaning that is not explicitly present in the minimal sentence, but rather in its intended meaning, relying on presuppositions or implicatures. According to Clark (
1976), example of implicit negation are verbs such as “forget”, “prevent”, “avoid”, etc. As Clark states (1976, 1313) “[…] words as absent, forget, except, and without [.] are approximately synonymous with expressions that are considered negative, i.e., not present, not remember, but not, and not with respectively”. To clearly distinguish between explicit and implicit negation, Clark further explains that “in short, explicit negatives actually deny positive suppositions on the part of the speaker or listener (No, it isn’t true. Few men left.), while implicit negatives merely affirm the already negative suppositions of the speaker or listener (Yes, it’s true. A few men left.). In this sense, the explicit negatives really do deny, while the implicit negatives actually affirm” Clark,
1976, 1314). Thus, from a pragmatic perspective, explicit and implicit negation primarily differ in terms of the presuppositions they refer to. Explicit negation denies an affirmative presupposition whereas implicit negation confirms a negative presupposition. To clarify this point, we might recall the classic distinction between explicit and implicit meaning of a sentence, which dates to Grice (
1989). According to Grice (
1989), within each sentence, we can identify the level of what is literally said and the level of what is intended or implicated by that sentence. The construction of the sentence meaning i.e., its explicit meaning, relies on inferences known as entailments, which are directly derived from the literal meaning of the sentence components. On the other hand, the construction of the intended meaning relies on presuppositions, i.e., assumptions implicitly assumed by the speakers, as well as contextually based inferences known as implicatures. We will not delve into the debate on the inferential processes underlying both levels of sentences representation (for a discussion, see Carapezza & Cuccio,
2018). It suffices to say that there is no agreement on the nature of such processes. However, the distinction between explicit and implicit meaning can be considered one of the defining features of any pragmatic account of language.
The present study addresses the issue of the grounding of linguistic implicit negation in the mechanisms of motor inhibition. The study aims to determine whether the processing of sentences formulated in the affirmative form but containing implicit negation (e.g., the Italian verbs
digiunare,
tacere,
vietare,
ignorare,
rifiutare - to fast, to shut up, to forbid, to ignore, and to refuse-) recruits the mechanisms of motor response inhibition, as it is the case for explicit negative sentences. While some studies have been carried out on the processing of implicit negation (Jones,
1968; Clark,
1976), this is the first study focusing on implicit negation under the hypothesis of the reuse of inhibitory resources. To accomplish this aim, we chose to employ the Go/No-go paradigm, for main two reasons. The first one is theoretical, as the Go/No-go task is undoubtedly one of the most widespread paradigms used to study motor control, and also to investigate the involvement of inhibitory mechanisms in sentence negation processing. The second one is practical, as the Go/No-go was more suitable for the online administration comparing to other more complex paradigms (e.g., the SST; Logan et al.,
1984). Thus, the Go/No-go paradigm has been widely used in studies examining inhibitory mechanisms in the processing of sentence negation and it aligned well with the brevity and ease of completion required for an online study.
We predict an involvement of resources for motor inhibition during the processing of both explicit and implicit negative sentences compared to affirmative ones. Regarding the involvement of the motor inhibitory system in the two different types of negation, several scenarios could be expected. One possibility is that, since both explicit and implicit negative sentences contain negation, they recruit the motor inhibitory system similarly. Alternatively, a gradient effect might be observed, structured in two different ways. In the first case, explicit negation, being explicitly lexicalized in the sentence, might lead to a higher involvement of the motor inhibitory mechanisms compared to implicit negation. In the second case, implicit negation might lead to a higher activation of inhibitory resources, likely due to its inferential nature. Since implicit negation confirms a negative presupposition, the negation is not lexicalized in the minimal sentence but only presupposed. This may result in a deeper processing of the negative meaning compared to a potentially shallow processing of explicit negation. Indeed, implicit negation might be processed at a pragmatic level compared to the semantic processing of the negative meaning which takes place in explicit negative sentences. If this is the case, implicit negation would result in greater activation of the sensory-motor system (see Egorova et al.,
2013 for ERP data on semantic and pragmatic processing; see Kuberberg et al.,
2000 for fMRI results on the neural correlates of semantic and pragmatic processing). Due to the limited literature on this topic, we decided to adopt an exploratory approach. Therefore, another alternative scenario should be also considered. Since implicit negative sentences do not have an explicit syntactic marker for negation, they might be processed in a similar way to affirmatives sentences and thus they may not involve the motor inhibitory mechanisms. However, given our pragmatic and inferential view of language, we consider this scenario to be the less likely.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine the role of motor inhibitory mechanisms in the processing of linguistic implicit negation. Implicit negation refers to a form of negation that is not asserted through morphosyntactic elements or other expressions, which, through entailments, determine the representation of negative meaning in the minimal sentence. Thus, implicit negation is only present in the intended meaning of a sentence, and it relies on presuppositions or implicatures. So far, previous studies that have dealt with sentence negation under the Neural Reuse Hypothesis (Beltrán et al.,
2021) have only investigated explicit forms of negation (Beltrán et al.,
2018,
2019; De Vega et al.,
2016; Foroni & Semin,
2013; García-Marco et al.,
2019; Liu et al.,
2019,
2020; Montalti et al.,
2021; Papeo et al.,
2016; Vitale et al.,
2022). Hence, this study aimed to fill this gap. Two online experiments were conducted using a Go/No-Go paradigm.
Results from the ANOVA from both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 revealed a significant difference between RTs in Affirmative and Implicit Negative conditions, with faster RTs for the Affirmative condition. However, no significant difference was found between Explicit Negation and the other two conditions. This lack of significant difference between Affirmative and Explicit Negative sentences aligns with previous Go/No-Go studies carried out by Beltran and colleagues, where a significant difference has not been found (Beltrán et al.,
2019; De Vega et al.,
2016; Liu et al.,
2019,
2020). In addition, considering that the two experiments were carried out online, we decided to also control the variability given by participants and stimuli using a linear mixed model. In both studies (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2), such model confirmed a difference between Affirmative and Implicit Negative sentences and allowed to reveal other interesting results. Specifically, in Experiment 1 (longer time window for the response), we also found a significant difference between Affirmative and Explicit negative sentences, while the two negative conditions (Explicit negation and Implicit negation) did not differ. Differently, in Experiment 2 (shorter time window for the response) we found a significant difference between Explicit and Implicit Negative sentences, but not between Affirmative and Explicit Negative sentences. The output of mixed model analysis, together with the ANOVA, seems to suggest that the processing of Implicit Negation determines a stronger modulation of the mechanism for motor response inhibition compared to both Affirmative and Explicit Negative sentences.
Valence and arousal ratings assessed in the follow-up validation study on whole sentences (“I know”, “I don’t know”; “I ignore”) revealed significant results only for valence, with Implicit Negative sentences considered more negative than the other two experimental conditions, while no differences were found for arousal ratings.
Overall, based on our findings, we might assume that there is a gradient in the processing of linguistic negation, where Implicit Negation recruits the inhibitory mechanisms to a greater extent compared to its Explicit forms. Implicit Negation, having an inferential nature, may determine a deeper processing of the negative meaning compared to a likely shallow processing of explicit negation, thus leading to greater activation of the sensory-motor system (Egorova et al.,
2013; Kuberberg et al.,
2000).
We believe that incorporating Implicit Negation in our experimental design led us to unveil differences never appreciated in the literature. However, our pattern of results, although promising, is still partly unclear and many aspects need to be further investigated. In fact, in the mixed model analysis of Experiment 1, showed that Explicit Negation differed from Affirmative sentences, but not from the Implicit Negation. The opposite pattern was found in Experiment 2 (i.e., Explicit Negation differed from the Implicit one, but not from Affirmative sentences). The reason might be found in the time-window given to participants to respond (longer in Experiment 1, and shorter in Experiment 2). In this regard, a comparison with previous Go/No-go studies is difficult, as they never clearly reported the duration of the response time-window. Yet, little is known about the temporal activation of the inhibitory system when the latter is modulated by the processing of linguistic materials.
Notably, we must also acknowledge that in these kinds of experimental designs the recruitment of motor inhibitory resources is doubly modulated. On the one hand, by the No-Go trials as the motor inhibitory system is strongly activated by a successful response inhibition. On the other, by the processing of linguistic negation that according to the Neural Reuse Hypothesis (Beltran et al., 2021) recruits motor inhibitory resources. In the latter case, a weaker involvement of motor inhibitory mechanisms could be expected since it is activated only by linguistic materials. This double modulation might have contributed to determine this pattern of results.
Several aspects allow us to conclude that Implicit Negative sentences recruits motor inhibitory resources and that they do so stronger compared to Explicit Negative ones, ruling out other alternative explanations: 1) stimuli were balanced for frequency of use, and number of syllables and characters; 2) sentences were very easy to comprehend, excluding a difference in cognitive load. In fact, the selected verbs were identified as implicit negation verbs by 80% of the participants in the validation study; 3) the experimental task was simple, as suggested by the low amount of commission errors found in all experimental conditions; 4) valence ratings differed across the three experimental conditions, but these differences cannot explain our findings by themselves. Despite no behavioural difference has ever been found between Affirmative and Explicit Negative sentences, we might reasonably suppose that the former ones are always more positively valenced compared to the latter ones, as it was in our study. Conversely, whether the effect was driven by the stimuli’ valence, a difference between Affirmative and Explicit Negative sentences should have been found; 5) the experimental conditions did not differ for arousal. Thus, differences in our experimental condition likely depends solely on the level at which negation is processed.
The main limitation of our study is that it was done online, and therefore, in the future, it will be worthwhile to verify the reproducibility of the results in the laboratory. Moreover, the use of just five verbs for each condition might have influenced our findings, given that repetition can impact semantic comprehension. However, our rigorous initial validation guided us to include only five verbs. Expanding the variety of stimuli in future studies could help address this limitation.
Furthermore, future studies should implement experimental designs which allow to take into account the double modulation of the inhibitory mechanisms, and explore the link between such inhibitory resources and the implicit negation processing at a more functional level. As demonstrated in previous studies (Beltrán et al.,
2019; De Vega et al.,
2016; Liu et al.,
2019,
2020), the EEG technique is a great tool to address this issue, allowing a deep assessment of the amplitude modulation of ERP components of interest. These limitations notwithstanding, our findings allow us to provide two main theoretical implications. Firstly, they provide further evidence that even abstract aspects of language, such as linguistic negation, have a bodily grounding in the sensory-motor system. Secondly, and most importantly, they support the idea that implicit and inferential meaning (i.e., pragmatic information) are grounded too in the same mechanisms that integrate action with perception. The latter point is particularly relevant since it expands our knowledge of the embodied grounding of the pragmatic account of language. Studying the involvement of the sensory-motor system in the processing of implicit, inferential and usage-based linguistic meaning represents frontline research for any embodied account of language. The study of the embodiment of the pragmatic aspects of language is certainly one of the most intriguing and cutting-edge line of research in the embodied cognition framework.
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