Introduction
Problematic Smartphone use (PSU) can be described as an escalating, excessive, and unregulated use of the Smartphone that can cause personal, social, educational, and working impairment in a person’s life (Billieux et al.,
2015). Regarding the prevalence estimation of PSU, recent meta-analyses on the global prevalence characteristic of digital addiction (Meng et al.,
2022) found that the worldwide prevalence estimate was 26.9% (95% CI, 22.73–31.73) for PSU and that problematic smartphone use is increasing worldwide (Olson et al.,
2022). Concerning PSU conceptualization, although the scientific debate about the possibility of considering PSU as an addictive behavior is still open (Billieux et al.,
2015; Kardefelt-Winther et al.,
2017; Panova & Carbonell,
2018), some evidence about the fact that PSU shows similarities with substance and behavioral addictions emerged. For example, craving, withdrawal symptoms (when the Smartphone is not available), tolerance (the need to use the Smartphone more frequently), continuing to use the Smartphone despite the negative consequences, trying unsuccessfully to control Smartphone use, and impaired functioning in social life have been evidenced (Billieux et al.,
2015; Clayton et al.,
2015). Many researchers have explored the psychological and psychopathological correlates of PSU. As evidenced by recent meta-analyses, personality factors related to PSU encompass neuroticism, conscientiousness (Marengo et al.,
2020), impulsivity (Carvalho et al.,
2018), and low self-esteem (Casale et al.,
2022). Furthermore, a predictive role was found for boredom proneness (Casale et al.,
2021; Elhai et al.,
2018; Lepp et al.,
2017; Wolniewicz et al.,
2020). Individuals inclined to experience boredom get into PSU to alleviate their boredom and overcome attention deficits and the negative affect associated with boredom (Elhai et al.,
2018). Concerning psychopathology, positive associations were found between PSU and depressive symptoms with a medium effect size (Elhai et al.,
2017), anxiety with a slight to moderate effect size (Elhai et al.,
2019; Vahedi & Saiphoo,
2018), and psychological distress (Casale et al.,
2021; Chen et al.,
2020).
Among the theoretical models proposed to explain addictive behaviors, cognitive models have emphasized the predominant role of desire in activating craving and sustaining addictive behaviors (May et al.,
2004). The Elaborated Intrusion (EI) theory of desire (Kavanagh et al.,
2004,
2005,
2009; May et al.,
2004) suggests that the conjunction of automatic and voluntary cognitive processes are responsible for the frequency, duration, and intensity of craving. The EI theory of desire postulates that internal (e.g., stress) or external (e.g., viewing a specific image/stimulus related to the desired target) triggers activate the individual thoughts about a desired target or activity (e.g., its positive consequences or sense of deprivation). When the pleasure associated with the desired target/activity or the feeling of deprivation becomes very strong, these associations become conscious, are cognitively elaborated, and provoke the craving experience (Bywaters et al.,
2004). The intensification and persistence of craving depend on a cognitive process termed desire thinking (DT; Green et al.,
2000; Kavanagh et al.,
2009; Tiffany & Drobes,
1990). DT is a voluntary and conscious cognitive process oriented to prefigure images, information, and memories about the positive target-related experience (Caselli & Spada,
2010). According to Caselli and Spada (
2010), DT comprises two dimensions: (i) imaginal prefiguration, which refers to the allocation of attentional resources to the information concerning the desired target/activity, and the multi-sensorial elaboration of positive anticipatory imagery or memories related to the desired target/activity (e.g., the individual imagines themself doing the desired activity); and (ii) verbal perseveration, which concerns the extended self-talk about the good reasons for engaging and achieving target-related activities (e.g., the individual mentally repeats to themself that they need to practice the desired activity) (Caselli & Spada,
2011). DT implies a voluntary engagement in elaborating the positive consequences of the desired target/activity, the prolonged self-talk on the good reasons for achieving it, and the mental planning of actions necessary to reach the desired target/activity (Caselli & Spada,
2010,
2015).
Although in the short-term DT may help to cope with negative emotional states (like the sense of deprivation) by shifting the attention to the positive sensations related to the desired target/activity or by generating a virtual sense of pleasure and relief, in the medium to longer term it drives the experience of craving an intensely subjective experience that prompts individuals to seek out and achieve a craved target, or practice a dreamed activity, to reach its desired effects (Marlatt,
1987) as the target is perseveratively thought about, but not achieved. At this point, the desired target begins to be perceived as the only urgent means to relieve the rising sense of deprivation and craving (Caselli & Spada,
2011). Negative consequences of DT include increased craving levels, perception of lack of control, and amplified availability of target-related information (Caselli & Spada,
2015).
The role of desire thinking in eliciting craving has been extensively studied for substance-related addictive behaviors, especially for Alcohol Use Disorder (Caselli et al.,
2021) and smoking behavior (Caselli et al.,
2012). More recently, research has enlightened the role of desire thinking in behavioral addictions such as gambling (Fernie et al.,
2014), problematic Internet use (Spada et al.,
2013b), problematic social media use (Sharifi Bastan et al.,
2022), problematic Facebook use (Marino et al.,
2019), and problematic mobile phone use (Gao et al.,
2023). A meta-analysis exploring DT across different addictive behaviors (Mansueto et al.,
2019) found that: (a) both dimensions of desire thinking are significantly associated with addictive behaviors (i.e., alcohol use, nicotine use, gambling, and Internet use) in both clinical and community samples; (b) the type of addictive behavior moderates the strength of the relationship between verbal perseveration and addictive behaviors, being more strong for nicotine and alcohol use than Internet use; and (c) the strength of the relationship between imaginal prefiguration and addictive behaviors does not change among different addictive behaviors.
According to the metacognitive model of desire thinking (Caselli & Spada,
2011,
2015; Spada et al.,
2012,
2013a), the imaginal prefiguration component predicts verbal perseveration, which, in turn, induces the craving experience. This theoretical tenet has been confirmed among clinical samples presenting with alcohol and tobacco use disorders, problematic Internet use, and gambling disorder and also in a community sample. In the latter, different from what was observed in clinical samples, a direct effect of the imaginal prefiguration component on craving was observed (Caselli & Spada,
2015). This finding revealed that in the community sample, imaginal prefiguration also drives craving without the verbal perseveration component. In contrast, in clinical samples, the activation of verbal perseveration is necessary for inducing the craving experience. According to the authors, imaginal prefiguration plays a role in activating craving (that in community samples has a transient nature). In contrast, verbal perseveration contributes to the escalation and maintenance of craving and is, therefore, crucial for the ‘cementing’ of addictive behavior. Imaginal prefiguration-induced craving becomes clinically significant once the verbal perseveration component is activated. In support of this view, verbal perseveration is responsible for transitioning from social to problem drinker status and from problematic drinking behavior to alcohol dependence (Caselli et al.,
2012).
Recently, Marino et al. (
2019), examining the role of desire thinking and craving in problematic Facebook use (PFU), have observed that the imaginal prefiguration component of DT (i.e., creating mental images of oneself using Facebook and anticipating the sensations that one would feel online) predicts craving for Facebook use. Such urge is associated with the verbal perseveration component of DT (i.e., repetitive self-talk regarding the need to use Facebook), which in turn leads the higher levels of PFU. Başer et al. (
2022) evidenced that higher scores on DT were associated with higher scores on problematic social networking sites use after controlling for boredom, affect, and impulsivity. Sharifi Bastan et al. (
2022) found that negative affect, impulsivity, and thought suppression indirectly predicted craving and problematic social media use through the mediating role of DT. Noteworthy, a recent study (Gao et al.,
2023), indicated that desire thinking plays a key role in problematic mobile phone use independent of demographic characteristics, big five personality traits, negative affect, and self-control.
These results are promising because they encourage exploring desire thinking as a potential underlying mechanism linking established variables associated with PSU (like boredom proneness and psychological distress) to craving and PSU.
Discussion
The current study aimed to examine the role of desire thinking in problematic Smartphone use. The first goal was to reassess the associations between psychological distress, boredom proneness, and PSU (Casale et al.,
2021) and between craving and PSU (De-Sola et al.,
2017). Following previous research (Casale et al.,
2021; Elhai et al.,
2018; Lepp et al.,
2017), the results of the current study indicated a positive association between PSU and psychological distress and boredom proneness on the one hand and an association between craving and PSU on the other hand. The second aim was to understand the function of desire thinking in the association between some psychological correlates of PSU (i.e., psychological distress and boredom proneness) and PSU levels by also evaluating the role of craving. The path analysis of our hypothesized model shows that the model fits the data very well. Extending what was already observed for other behavioral addictions (Mansueto et al.,
2019), the current findings provide further evidence of the role of desire thinking in PSU (Gao et al.,
2023). In particular, a relevant part of the imaginal prefiguration component as a ‘cognitive strategy’ to cope with negative emotional states (i.e., psychological distress and boredom proneness) emerged. However, when activated, it might lead to PSU directly and indirectly through the induction of craving. An explanation for the dysfunctionality of desire thinking originates from the triphasic formulation of the Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model for addictive behaviors (Spada et al.,
2013b; Wells & Matthews,
1996), which posits that in the pre-engagement phase desire thinking can become dysfunctional as it does not assist in downregulating negative thoughts and emotions but instead favors their prolongation by distributing attentional resources to them instead of meditating on the content of such experiences, as well as the experience of craving.
Moreover, our results revealed that imaginal prefiguration is associated with craving independently of verbal perseveration. This finding is in line with a previous study conducted in a community sample where different from clinical samples, a direct effect of the imaginal prefiguration component on craving was found (Caselli & Spada,
2015). It is possible to assume that the elaboration of the positive consequences related to Smartphone use (i.e., the imaginal prefiguration component of desire thinking) has a more substantial relevance in the activation of craving compared to the prolonged self-talk on the good reasons for using it (i.e., the verbal perseveration component of desire thinking). Concurrently, according to the present findings, the verbal perseveration component, which follows the imaginal prefiguration component, is associated with PSU independently of craving. An explanation may lie in the desired target (i.e., the Smartphone) being easily achievable, especially in a sample of young adults, and, consequently, craving being a transient experience.
Finally, in line with previous studies (McIntosh et al.,
2006), being men positively predicted boredom proneness, whereas, inconsistently to what was previously reported (Matud et al.,
2015), gender did not affect psychological distress levels. This result could be partially explained by the fact that, in the current study, the sample predominantly comprises women. Age was found to predict PSU negatively, supporting previous evidence that younger people report higher levels of PSU (Elhai et al.,
2017). Moreover, in the current study, being younger is associated with high levels of psychological distress and boredom proneness. Prior studies indicate boredom proneness rises early in adolescence (Spaeth et al.,
2015) and declines later in adolescence into adulthood (Perone et al.,
2023; Schulenberg et al.,
2012). This further raises the possibility adolescence is a critical period to help youth acquire healthy responses to situations that induce boredom since adolescents who experience boredom and psychological distress are more likely to engage in unhealthy behaviors (Biolcati et al.,
2018).
Limitations and Recommendations
The current study results must be considered in light of some methodological limitations. First, our work’s cross-sectional design did not permit us to draw causal inferences. Although the poorer fit of the alternative models tested in the current study supports the contention that desire thinking precedes craving (and not the contrary), future longitudinal studies are needed to verify whether desire thinking dimensions can prospectively predict craving and PSU, even after a phase of interruption from the desired target. Second, data was collected through self-report measures, which may be affected by social desirability and self-report biases. Previous studies showed that PSU does not correlate strongly with actual smartphone use (Rozgonjuk et al.,
2018), and although PSU correlates with psychopathology variables, psychopathology variables are not strongly correlated with tracked smartphone use (Rozgonjuk et al.,
2021). Future studies should implement mixed methods, including objective measures of smartphone usage (e.g., daily minutes of phone screen time), as well as more robust methodologies such as Ecological Momentary Assessment. Third, the non-probability sampling method (i.e., convenience sampling) and some specific sample characteristics, such as the average age of participants and the fact that the sample was predominantly composed of women, limited the results’ generalizability. Future replications among more representative samples and clinical samples are needed.
Finally, it would be helpful to test the proposed model in a sample of adolescents who could not use the Smartphone (for example, when they are at school). Similarly, it would be helpful to test the proposed model in experimental studies, where abstinence from Smartphones can be manipulated.
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