Introduction
Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are most well known for the way they affect individuals’ social communication and interaction. Yet they are also characterised by non-social symptoms such as repetitive behaviours and activities and unusual responses to sensory input. These latter so-called ‘sensory sensitivities’ have risen to greater prominence with their inclusion in the recently revised diagnostic criteria for ASD, the DSM-5 (APA
2013). Such sensitivities are known to be common (Baranek et al.
2006; Tomchek and Dunn
2007), can cause much distress to individuals (Leekam et al.
2007), and have a negative impact on social relationships (Hilton et al.
2010) and family life (Baranek et al.
2006).
Sensory sensitivities also vary considerably between
and within individuals on the autism spectrum (Grandin
2009; Hazen et al.
2014). They can include
hypo-
sensitivity, where an individual may seem to be unaware of, or slow to respond to, a stimulus that would normally be expected to elicit a response;
sensory seeking, in which an individual exhibits an unusual behaviour such as a craving for, or intense interest in, certain sensory experiences; and
hyper-
sensitivity, where an individual is especially sensitive to sensory input. Autistic
1 individuals can also experience
sensory overload, where they become overwhelmed by incoming stimuli. In these situations, bright colours and lights, for example, can feel like a “bombardment” (Williams
1994, p. 22) and a hug like “a tidal wave of sensation” (Grandin
1992, p. 108).
Several accounts have been proposed to explain sensory sensitivities in autism, including weak central coherence (Frith and Happé
1994; Happé and Booth
2008), enhanced perceptual functioning (Mottron et al.
2006) and enhanced discrimination/reduced generalisation (Plaisted
2001). All of these accounts, however, have focused predominantly on superior processing at low levels, and thus fail to explain the full range of sensory sensitivities in autism.
More recently, computational accounts of sensory perception have attempted to explain sensory sensitivities in autism in terms of difficulties in generating expectations in regards to the sensory environment (Lawson et al.
2014; Sinha et al.
2014; Van de Cruys et al.
2014). Incoming sensory information is inherently noisy and ambiguous. Pellicano and Burr (
2012) suggest that autistic individuals may have difficulties dealing with this ambiguity because they rely less on prior knowledge—due to difficulties either constructing internal working models of the world or combining them effectively with sensory signals—leading ultimately to a greater reliance on bottom-up sensory signals and a tendency to perceive the world more accurately or “as it really is” (p. 504). Without an internal template to guide interpretation, perceptual stimuli that should seem irrelevant may be enhanced, leading to sensory sensitivities such as hyper-sensitivity and sensory overload.
Difficulties dealing effectively with uncertainty are at the heart of Pellicano and Burr’s (
2012) model and related accounts (Lawson et al.
2014; Van de Cruys et al.
2014), which all attempt to explain autistic perception at the computational and neural levels. Manifestations of perceptual differences in autism at the psychological level have hitherto been largely unexplored. One relevant construct, ‘intolerance of uncertainty’, characterised by the belief that uncertainty is negative and poorer functioning in situations of uncertainty (Buhr and Dugas
2002), has received much attention outside the autism literature, having been identified as a cognitive vulnerability factor for the development of generalised anxiety disorder (Carleton et al.
2012; Freeston et al.
1994) and also implicated in social anxiety (Whiting et al.
2014), obsessive compulsive disorder (Calleo et al.
2010) and depression (Carleton et al.
2012). The construct has typically been measured using a questionnaire (Carleton et al.
2007; Freeston et al.
1994), in which two factors have been identified: a
desire for predictability, in which an individual perceives unexpected events as negative and craves sameness; and
uncertainty paralysis, in which an individual is unable to act when faced with uncertainty (Birrell et al.
2011).
Two recent studies have investigated the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and anxiety in autistic children. Boulter et al. (
2014) found that increased levels of intolerance of uncertainty, as measured by the Intolerance of Uncertainty scale (Rodgers et al.
2012; Walker
2009), were associated with elevated levels of anxiety, as measured by the Spence Children’s Anxiety scale (Spence,
1998), in both children with (n = 114) and without autism (n = 110). In the same study, Boulter et al. showed that, once the effect of intolerance of uncertainty on anxiety had been taken into account, diagnostic group no longer significantly predicted anxiety, suggesting that high levels of intolerance of uncertainty might explain the high levels of anxiety consistently found in autistic children (Simonoff et al.
2008; White et al.
2009). Using the same questionnaire measures, Chamberlain et al. (
2013) also reported increased levels of intolerance of uncertainty and anxiety in a group of autistic adolescents compared to a matched typically developing group, but failed to find any group difference in psychophysiological responses to an unpredictable threat (in the form of a puff of air to the neck).
Anxiety in autism has been repeatedly linked to individuals’ sensory sensitivities (Ben-Sasson et al.
2008; Green and Ben-Sasson
2010; Pfeiffer et al.
2005). Green et al. (
2012) and Wigham et al. (
2015) suggest one particular causal relationship: that sensory over-responsivity gives rise to anxiety. Yet there are other possible explanations of this link (Green and Ben-Sasson
2010). Following Pellicano and Burr (
2012), difficulties dealing effectively with uncertainty at the computational or neural level may give rise to beliefs at the psychological level that uncertainty is negative and should be avoided. Desire to reduce this uncertainty, may lead to an increase in anxiety symptoms, such as ruminative thinking about various possible negative outcomes and hyper-vigilance to signs of threat in the environment. It is in these situations that individuals might be more likely to notice and react to aversive external sensory stimuli (Green and Ben-Sasson
2010). Only one study has investigated the association between intolerance of uncertainty and sensory sensitivities in autism. Wigham et al. (
2015) reported a moderate positive correlation between scores on the Intolerance of Uncertainty scale and sensory over-responsiveness, as measured by the Short Sensory Profile in children with autism (n = 53).
The current study sought to extend the work of Wigham et al. (
2015) by examining the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty, sensory sensitivities and anxiety in groups of children with and without autism. Our study had four aims. First, we examined between-group
and within-group differences on all three variables. Like previous studies (Boulter et al.
2014; Tomchek and Dunn
2007), we expected that parents would report elevated levels of intolerance of uncertainty, sensory sensitivities and anxiety in their autistic children, relative to typical children, and that there would be strong positive links between these variables within each group.
Second, we tested the veracity of the aforementioned causal account regarding the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty, sensory sensitivities and anxiety by examining the role of anxiety as a potential mediating factor in the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and sensory sensitivities.
Third, we examined potential differences, if any, in the nature of the relationships between these three constructs between autistic
and typically developing children. While Boulter et al. (
2014) reported a similarly sized significant and positive relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and anxiety in both autistic children and typical children, implying that intolerance of uncertainty plays an equally important role in the development of anxiety in both groups, it remains unknown whether the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and sensory sensitivities follows a similar pattern in both autistic and typical children.
Finally, we extended Boulter et al.’s (
2014) work, which found that intolerance of uncertainty mediated the relationship between autism diagnosis and anxiety, to determine whether intolerance of uncertainty might also explain the relationship between autism diagnosis and sensory sensitivities.
Discussion
This study investigated the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and sensory sensitivities in groups of autistic and typical children. Consistent with previous research (Boulter et al.
2014; Chamberlain et al.
2013; Tomchek and Dunn
2007), parents of children on the autism spectrum reported greater levels of intolerance of uncertainty, anxiety and sensory sensitivities in their children than parents of typically developing children. Critically, we extended previous research by showing that intolerance of uncertainty explained approximately half the variance in autistic children’s sensory sensitivity scores and this relationship was partially mediated by children’s anxiety levels. Although the nature of the relationship was similar for both groups, intolerance of uncertainty explained considerably less of the variance (one third, in fact) in typically developing children’s sensory sensitivities. In addition, although anxiety scores partly explained the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and sensory sensitivities in children with autism, intolerance of uncertainty and sensory sensitivities remained significantly associated in this group even after the effects of anxiety were controlled for.
The significant positive association between intolerance of uncertainty, anxiety and sensory sensitivities in children with autism replicates Wigham et al.’s (
2015) findings, and extends it further through the inclusion of a comparison group of typically developing children. There are a number of possible explanations for the stronger correlation between intolerance of uncertainty in the autistic group (
r = −.67) compared to the typical group (
r = −.38). First, although there was a wide range of scores in both groups on all measures (see Table
2), with some parents even reporting sensory atypicalities in their typical children, a lack of variation in scores may have precluded the possibility of observing a stronger relationship between sensory sensitivities and intolerance of uncertainty in the typical group. Second, the processes at work might be the same in children with and without autism, but the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and sensory sensitivities could be stronger when individuals have higher scores on both measures. Future research which investigates the levels of sensory sensitivities in individuals who have high levels of intolerance of uncertainty and anxiety but who are not autistic would be informative here.
Third, the scale used to measure intolerance of uncertainty may have tapped a distinct underlying process in the group of autistic children, regarding the way individuals deal with uncertainty. The current study was guided by a theoretical account of autistic perception put forward by Pellicano and Burr (
2012), who hypothesised that difficulties utilising prior experience when processing inherently ambiguous sensory information give rise to a greater reliance on bottom-up sensory signals and, subsequently, differences in the way that autistic individuals interpret sensory information. The finding that intolerance of uncertainty had a direct effect on autistic children’s sensory sensitivities, over and above anxiety, supports this explanation.
In addition to explaining the direct effect of intolerance of uncertainty on autistic children’s sensory sensitivities, it may be possible to extend Pellicano and Burr (
2012) to include the mediating role of anxiety found here. Difficulties generating predictions at the computational or neural level may translate to beliefs at the psychological level that uncertainty is negative and potentially threatening. This ‘intolerance of uncertainty’ may in turn engender attempts to decrease uncertainty; manifesting in anxiety symptoms such as rumination about the possibility of various negative outcomes and an attentional bias to potentially threatening stimuli in the environment. In this hypervigilant state, individuals may be more likely to notice and respond to aversive sensory stimuli, and less likely to successfully disengage from potentially threatening sensory stimuli (Green and Ben-Sasson
2010).
Although we have a priori theoretical reasons (e.g., Pellicano and Burr
2012) to support this particular causal story, we must be cautious about doing so given the cross-sectional nature of the data. It is also plausible that sensory sensitivities might
cause anxiety and intolerance of uncertainty. Donna Williams, who is autistic, describes how “sensory overload caused by bright lights, fluorescent lights, colours, and patterns makes the body react as if being attacked or bombarded, resulting in such physical symptoms as headaches, anxiety, panic attacks or aggression” (Williams
1994, p. 43). Consistent with this view, there is evidence to suggest that sensory over-responsivity predicts the development of anxiety in toddlers (Green et al.
2012). Experimental intervention studies would be helpful in elucidating the causal or bidirectional relationships between the full range of sensory sensitivities, anxiety and intolerance of uncertainty, and the mechanisms which underpin them.
Future research in this area would also benefit from the collection of self-report data from children with and without autism in regards to their own sensory sensitivities, in addition to their levels of intolerance of uncertainty and anxiety. There is some evidence to suggest that the differences in anxiety levels between autistic and typically developing children on the Spence Children’s Anxiety scale are more pronounced among parent-reported, than child-reported data (Boulter et al.
2014), but whether this discrepancy is replicated in reports of sensory sensitivities is as yet unknown. Using varied methods of measurement, such as both self- and other-report, would also reduce potential bias due to common method variance.
In conclusion, intolerance of uncertainty is well established as an important construct in the development of affective symptoms (Calleo et al.
2010; Dugas et al.
2012; Whiting et al.
2014). Our study shows that it also appears to be highly relevant to sensory sensitivities, particularly among autistic children. Sensory interventions in autism are common (Green et al.
2006) yet there is huge variation in the principles underlying these interventions, the behaviours they target, and the methodologies that are applied, as well as a lack of rigorous evaluation of their effectiveness (see review by Case-Smith et al.
2015). Further investigation into the relationships between these constructs could be vital for the development of effective interventions for sensory sensitivities in children with and without autism.