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15-06-2016 | Original Article

The dishonest mind set in sequence

Auteurs: Anna Foerster, Robert Wirth, Wilfried Kunde, Roland Pfister

Gepubliceerd in: Psychological Research | Uitgave 4/2017

Abstract

Dishonest responding is an important part of the behavioral repertoire and perfectly integrated in communication and daily actions. Thus, previous research aimed at uncovering the cognitive mechanisms underlying dishonest responding by studying its immediate behavioral effects. A comprehensive account of the aftereffects of this type of behavior has not been presented to date, however. Based on the methods and theories from research on task switching, we, therefore, explored the notion of honest and dishonest responding as two distinct intentional sets. In four experiments, participants responded either honestly or dishonestly to simple yes/no questions. Crucially, robust switch costs were found between honest and dishonest responding when questions succeeded promptly (Exp. 1) but also when an unrelated task intervened between questions (Exp. 2). Surprisingly, responding dishonestly to a question also affected responses in the subsequent intervening task in terms of a more liberal response criterion. Time to prepare for the upcoming intentional set further induced asymmetrical switch costs (Exp. 3). Finally, a novel control condition (Exp. 4) allowed us to pinpoint most of the observed effects to negation processing as an inherent mechanism of dishonesty. The experiments shed new light on the cognitive mechanisms underlying dishonesty by providing strong support for the concept of distinct mental sets for honest and dishonest responding. The experiments further reveal that these mental sets are notably stable and are not disturbed by intervening task performance. The observed aftereffects of dishonest responding might also provide a potent extension to applied protocols for lie detection.

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The differing frequencies of the questions resulted from a bug in the program. Yet, question frequency did not alter the observed pattern, as indicated by follow-up ANOVAs with the within-subjects factors intention (honest vs. dishonest), intention sequence (repetition vs. switch) and question frequency (rare vs. frequent) on RTs and error rates. Neither the main effect of question frequency nor any interaction of question frequency with the other factors approached significance in these analyses, ps ≥ .108. Equally, Exp. 2 fixed the presentation frequencies and replicated the results of Exp. 1.

Following the suggestions of an anonymous reviewer, we reanalyzed target RTs and error rates in a 2 × 2 ANOVA with the within-subjects factor intention (honest vs. dishonest) and response sequence (repetition vs. switch). The latter factor describes whether the key press response repeated or switched from question to target. Target RTs in Exp. 2 yielded a marginally significant interaction of intention and response sequence for Exp. 2, F(1, 30) = 3.34, p = .078, n _p ² = .10 which suggested a trend toward a more pronounced effect of intention for response switches. The same interaction was not significant for error rates, F < 1. We also did not find any significant interaction of the two factors in Exp. 3 and 4, ps ≥ .107.

Note that lie detection is usually achieved via physiological measures (e.g., Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; Gamer, Verschuere, Crombez, & Vossel, 2008; van’t Veer, Gallucci, Stel, & van Beest, 2015; Vandenbosch, Verschuere, Crombez, & De Clercq, 2009). Approaches to lie detection via RTs could prove as a fruitful extension to these methods.

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Titel: The dishonest mind set in sequence
Auteurs: Anna Foerster
Robert Wirth
Wilfried Kunde
Roland Pfister
Publicatiedatum: 15-06-2016
Uitgeverij: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Gepubliceerd in: Psychological Research / Uitgave 4/2017
Print ISSN: 0340-0727
Elektronisch ISSN: 1430-2772
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-016-0780-3

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