Swipe om te navigeren naar een ander artikel
Dishonest responding is an important part of the behavioral repertoire and perfectly integrated in communication and daily actions. Thus, previous research aimed at uncovering the cognitive mechanisms underlying dishonest responding by studying its immediate behavioral effects. A comprehensive account of the aftereffects of this type of behavior has not been presented to date, however. Based on the methods and theories from research on task switching, we, therefore, explored the notion of honest and dishonest responding as two distinct intentional sets. In four experiments, participants responded either honestly or dishonestly to simple yes/no questions. Crucially, robust switch costs were found between honest and dishonest responding when questions succeeded promptly (Exp. 1) but also when an unrelated task intervened between questions (Exp. 2). Surprisingly, responding dishonestly to a question also affected responses in the subsequent intervening task in terms of a more liberal response criterion. Time to prepare for the upcoming intentional set further induced asymmetrical switch costs (Exp. 3). Finally, a novel control condition (Exp. 4) allowed us to pinpoint most of the observed effects to negation processing as an inherent mechanism of dishonesty. The experiments shed new light on the cognitive mechanisms underlying dishonesty by providing strong support for the concept of distinct mental sets for honest and dishonest responding. The experiments further reveal that these mental sets are notably stable and are not disturbed by intervening task performance. The observed aftereffects of dishonest responding might also provide a potent extension to applied protocols for lie detection.
Log in om toegang te krijgen
Met onderstaand(e) abonnement(en) heeft u direct toegang:
Allport, D. A., Styles, E. A., & Hsieh, S. (1994). Shifting intentional set: exploring the dynamic control of tasks. In C. Umiltà & M. Moscovitch (Eds.), Conscious and nonconscious information processing: Attention and performance (pp. 421–452). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Clark, H. H., & Chase, W. G. (1972). On the process of comparing sentences against pictures. Cognitive Psychology, 3(3), 472–517. CrossRef
Cohen, R. A. (2011a). Arousal. In J. Kreutzer, J. DeLuca, & B. Caplan (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Clinical Neuropsychology (pp. 247–249). New York, NY: Springer New York. CrossRef
Cohen, R. A. (2011b). Yerkes-Dodson Law. In J. Kreutzer, J. DeLuca, & B. Caplan (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Clinical Neuropsychology (pp. 2737–2738). New York, NY: Springer New York. CrossRef
Franz, V. H., & von Luxburg, U. (2014). Unconscious lie detection as an example of a widespread fallacy in the Neurosciences. Retrieved January 1, 2015 from http://arxiv.org/pdf/1407.4240.
Gilbert, D. T. (1991). How mental systems believe. American Psychologist, 46(2), 107–119. CrossRef
Meiran, N. (1996). Reconfiguration of processing mode prior to task performance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 22(6), 1423–1442. doi: 10.1037/0278-7318.104.22.1683.
Pfister, R. (2013). Breaking the rules: Cognitive conflict during deliberate rule violations. Berlin: Logos.
Serota, K. (2014). Lying, prevalence of. In T. R. Levine (Ed.), Encyclopedia of deception (Vol. 2, pp. 619–621). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd. doi: 10.4135/9781483306902.n233.
van’t Veer, A. E., Gallucci, M., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. (2015). Unconscious deception detection measured by finger skin temperature and indirect veracity judgments—results of a registered report. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1–11.
van’t Veer, A., Stel, M., & van Beest, I. (2013). Limited capacity to lie: cognitive load interferes with being dishonest. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2351377.
Walczyk, J. J., Griffith, D. A., Yates, R., Visconte, S. R., Simoneaux, B., & Harris, L. L. (2012). Lie detection by inducing cognitive load: Eye movements and other cues to the false answers of “witnesses” to crimes. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 39(7), 887–909. doi: 10.1177/0093854812437014. CrossRef
Wirth, R., Pfister, R., Foerster, A., Huestegge, L., & Kunde, W. (2015). Pushing the rules: Effects and aftereffects of non-conformity. Psychological Research, 1–15. doi: 10.1007/s00426-015-0690-9
Zuckerman, M., DePaulo, B. M., & Rosenthal, R. (1981). Verbal and nonverbal communication of deception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 14, pp. 1–59). New York, NY: Academic Press. doi: 10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60369-X
- The dishonest mind set in sequence
- Springer Berlin Heidelberg