ABSTRACT
The idea that the mind is functionally differentiated is not new. But after spending quite some time in hiding under the name of "faculty psychology" as one of philosophy's many – many – shameful family secrets, it experienced a threefold revival in the final quarter of the 20th century, with psychology, economics, and philosophy for once converging on something. In psychology, many of the central insights of dual process theory were anticipated by studies showing how easily human judgment and agency is swayed by extraneous features of the situation. Dual process theorists relish cognitive shortcomings, but it would be misleading, or at the very least an overstatement, to suggest that mind simply does not work. Pathological phenomena such as confabulation or utilization behaviors suggest that this may be how action works in general. The experience of action initiation that starts from a prior state of mental inaction is essentially the opposite of the truth.
