Abstract
In Experiment 1, complex propositional reasoning problems were constructed as a combination of several types of logical inferences: modus ponens, modus tollens, disjunctive modus ponens, disjunctive syllogism, and conjunction. Rule theories of propositional reasoning can account for how one combines these inferences, but the difficulty of the problems can be accounted for only if a differential psychological cost is allowed for different basic rules. Experiment 2 ruled out some alternative explanations for these differences that did not refer to the intrinsic difficulty of the basic rules. It was also found that part of the results could be accounted for by the notion of representational cost, as it is used in the mental model theory of propositional reasoning. However, the number of models as a measure of representational cost seems to be too coarsely defined to capture all of the observed effects. Frank Rijmen was supported by the Fund for Scientific Research, Flanders (FWO).
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Frank Rijmen was supported by the Fund for Scientific Research, Flanders (FWO).
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Rijmen, F., De Boeck, P. Propositional reasoning: The differential contribution of “rules” to the difficulty of complex reasoning problems. Memory & Cognition 29, 165–175 (2001). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03195750
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03195750