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Predictive Accuracy as an Achievable Goal of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Malcolm R. Forster
Malcolm R. Forster*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin-Madison
*
Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, 5185 Helen C. White Hall, 600 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53706; mforster@facstaff.wisc.edu; homepage http://philosophy.wisc.edu/forster/.
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Abstract

What has science actually achieved? A theory of achievement should (1) define what has been achieved, (2) describe the means or methods used in science, and (3) explain how such methods lead to such achievements. Predictive accuracy is one truth-related achievement of science, and there is an explanation of why common scientific practices (of trading off simplicity and fit) tend to increase predictive accuracy. Akaike's explanation for the success of AIC is limited to interpolative predictive accuracy. But therein lies the strength of the general framework, for it also provides a clear formulation of many open problems of research.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 69 , Issue S3 , September 2002 , pp. S124 - S134
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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