Part of
Exploring the Self: Philosophical and psychopathological perspectives on self-experienceEdited by Dan Zahavi
[Advances in Consciousness Research 23] 2000
► pp. 203–
Edited by Dan Zahavi
[Advances in Consciousness Research 23] 2000
► pp. 203–
Self-reference and schizophrenia
A cognitive model of immunity to error through misidentification
Cited by
Cited by 64 other publications
Banick, Kyle
2019. What is it like to think about oneself? De Se thought and phenomenal intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18:5 ► pp. 919 ff. 
Barrett, Nathaniel F.
2023. Affect and the Feeling Self. In Enjoyment as Enriched Experience [Palgrave Perspectives on Process Philosophy, ], ► pp. 227 ff.
Bayne, Tim & Elisabeth Pacherie
2007. Narrators and comparators: the architecture of agentive self-awareness. Synthese 159:3 ► pp. 475 ff.
Billon, Alexandre
2013. Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology 26:2 ► pp. 291 ff.
Billon, Alexandre
2019. Editorial: Schizophrenia and Other Pathologies of Self-Awareness Widening the Focus. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10:2 ► pp. 257 ff.
Billon, Alexandre
2023. What Is It Like to Lack Mineness?. In Self-Experience, ► pp. 314 ff.
Carruthers, Glenn
2011. The nature of representation and the experience of oneself: A critical notice on Gottfried Vosgerau'sMental Representation and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 24:3 ► pp. 411 ff.
Champagne, Marc
2013. Can “I” prevent you from entering my mind?. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12:1 ► pp. 145 ff.
Chen, Wei, Jing Zhang, Yanyan Qian & Qiyang Gao
2017. How disentangled sense of agency and sense of ownership can interact with different emotional events on stress feelings. Psicologia: Reflexão e Crítica 30:1
Cherniak, A. & N. Zavyazkina
2020. FORMATION OF NARRATIVES IN SCHIZOPHRENIA AND SCHIZOPHRENIC PERSONALITY DISORDER. ΛΌГOΣ МИСТЕЦТВО НАУКОВОЇ ДУМКИ
Clowes, Robert
2015. Thinking in the Cloud: The Cognitive Incorporation of Cloud-Based Technology. Philosophy & Technology 28:2 ► pp. 261 ff.
de Haan, Sanneke & Leon de Bruin
2010. Reconstructing the minimal self, or how to make sense of agency and ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9:3 ► pp. 373 ff.
De Vecchi, Francesca
2013. Ontological Dependence and Essential Laws of Social Reality the Case of Promising. In The Background of Social Reality [Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, 1], ► pp. 233 ff.
Dibitonto, Daria
2014. No Non-Sense without Imagination: Schizophrenic Delusion as Reified Imaginings Unchallengeable by Perception. In Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making, ► pp. 181 ff.
Dummer, Timothy, Alexandra Picot-Annand, Tristan Neal & Chris Moore
2009. Movement and the Rubber Hand Illusion. Perception 38:2 ► pp. 271 ff.
Duncan, Matt
2019. The Self Shows Up in Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10:2 ► pp. 299 ff.
Ford, Judith M.
2017. Current Approaches to Studying Hallucinations: Overcoming Barriers to Progress. Schizophrenia Bulletin 43:1 ► pp. 21 ff.
Fradkin, Isaac, Baruch Eitam, Asher Y. Strauss & Jonathan D. Huppert
2019. Thoughts as Unexpected Intruders: Context, Obsessive-Compulsive Symptoms, and the Sense of Agency Over Thoughts. Clinical Psychological Science 7:1 ► pp. 162 ff.
Fuchs, Thomas
2010. Phenomenology and Psychopathology. In Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, ► pp. 546 ff.
Fuchs, Thomas
2013. Temporality and psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12:1 ► pp. 75 ff.
Fuchs, Thomas
2015. Zeiterfahrung in Gesundheit und Krankheit. In Mensch und Zeit, ► pp. 168 ff.
Gallagher, Shaun
2001. Dimensions of Embodiment: Body Image and Body Schema in Medical Contexts. In Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine [Philosophy and Medicine, 68], ► pp. 147 ff.
Gallagher, Shaun
2003. Self-narrative in schizophrenia. In The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry, ► pp. 336 ff.
Gallagher, Shaun
2007. The Natural Philosophy of Agency. Philosophy Compass 2:2 ► pp. 347 ff.
Gallagher, Shaun
2010. Phenomenology and Non-reductionist Cognitive Science. In Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, ► pp. 21 ff.
Gallagher, Shaun
2023. Minimal self-consciousness and the flying man argument. Frontiers in Psychology 14
Gallagher, Shaun
2024. The Self and its Disorders,
Gallagher, Shaun & Dylan Trigg
2016. Agency and Anxiety: Delusions of Control and Loss of Control in Schizophrenia and Agoraphobia. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 10
Grünbaum, Thor
2010. Action and Agency. In Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, ► pp. 337 ff.
Harduf, Amir, Gabriella Panishev, Eiran V. Harel, Yonatan Stern & Roy Salomon
2023. The bodily self from psychosis to psychedelics. Scientific Reports 13:1
Hart, James G.
2008. The Archaelogy of Spirit and the Unique Self: A Husserlian Reading of Conrad-Martius. Axiomathes 18:4 ► pp. 407 ff.
Howell, Robert J.
2023. Self-Awareness and The Elusive Subject,
Howell, Robert J. & Brad Thompson
2017. Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8:1 ► pp. 103 ff.
LANGLAND‐HASSAN, PETER
2008. Fractured Phenomenologies: Thought Insertion, Inner Speech, and the Puzzle of Extraneity. Mind & Language 23:4 ► pp. 369 ff.
Lubashevsky, Ihor & Natalie Plavinska
2021. Human Temporality: Qualitative Description. In Physics of the Human Temporality [Understanding Complex Systems, ], ► pp. 137 ff.
Lukitsch, Oliver
2020. Effort, Uncertainty, and the Sense of Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11:4 ► pp. 955 ff.
Lynn Stephens, G. Lynn & George Graham
2007. Philosophical Psychopathology and Self- Consciousness. In The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, ► pp. 194 ff.
Pablo López-Silva, Tom McClelland & Peter Langland-Hassan
2023. Thought Insertion as a Persecutory Delusion. In Intruders in the Mind, ► pp. 171 ff.
Ma, Ke, Bernhard Hommel & Hong Chen
2019. The roles of consistency and exclusivity in perceiving body ownership and agency. Psychological Research 83:1 ► pp. 175 ff.
Maes, J. P. M. A. & A. R. Van Gool
2008. Misattribution of agency in schizophrenia: An exploration of historical first-person accounts. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7:2 ► pp. 191 ff.
Martin, Lily A. L., David Melchert, Monika Knack & Thomas Fuchs
2023. Relating movement markers of schizophrenia to self-experience—a mixed-methods study. Frontiers in Psychiatry 14
McLear, Colin
2019. The mind's “I”. European Journal of Philosophy 27:1 ► pp. 255 ff.
Meijsing, Monica
2007. Real people and virtual bodies: How disembodied can embodiment be?. Minds and Machines 16:4 ► pp. 443 ff.
Meijsing, Monica
2022. Cartesian People 2: The Body an Illusion. In A Philosophy of Person and Identity [Studies in Brain and Mind, 21], ► pp. 57 ff.
Morgan, Daniel
2023. Temporal experience as metaphysically lightweight. European Journal of Philosophy 31:1 ► pp. 209 ff.
Moulin, Chris J. A., Fabien Carreras & Krystian Barzykowski
2023. The phenomenology of autobiographical retrieval. WIREs Cognitive Science 14:3
Pachoud, Bernard & Marli Nascimento Stieffatre
2005. Psychopathologie et réinsertion professionnelle. Cliniques méditerranéennes n o 72:2 ► pp. 147 ff.
Parnas, Josef
2003. Self and schizophrenia: a phenomenological perspective. In The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry, ► pp. 217 ff.
Colin Renfrew, Chris Frith, Lambros Malafouris & Malafouris, Lambros
2008. Between brains, bodies and things:tectonoeticawareness and the extended self. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 363:1499 ► pp. 1993 ff.
Rossetti, Ileana, Martina Repossi, Vincenzo Florio, Benedetta Demartini, Andreas Conca, Orsola Gambini & Angelo Maravita
2022. Sense of body ownership and body agency in schizophrenia. Scientific Reports 12:1
Schofield, Steve
2006. On the Phenomenon of Inserted Thoughts: A Critique of Shaun Gallagher’s Neurophenomenological Account of Thought Insertion. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 6:2 ► pp. 1 ff.
Seeger, Max
2015. Authorship of thoughts in thought insertion: What is it for a thought to be one's own?. Philosophical Psychology 28:6 ► pp. 837 ff.
Sousa, Paulo & Lauren Swiney
2013. Thought insertion: Abnormal sense of thought agency or thought endorsement?. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12:4 ► pp. 637 ff.
Stephens, G. Lynn & George Graham
2017. Philosophical Psychopathology and Self‐Consciousness. In The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, ► pp. 484 ff.
Taylor, John G.
2003. Paying attention to consciousness. Progress in Neurobiology 71:4 ► pp. 305 ff.
Taylor, John G.
2013. Understanding the Mental Disease of Schizophrenia. In Solving the Mind-Body Problem by the CODAM Neural Model of Consciousness?, ► pp. 163 ff.
Van Duppen, Zeno
2016. The phenomenology of hypo- and hyperreality in psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15:3 ► pp. 423 ff.
Vega, Katia, Abel Arrieta, Felipe Esteves & Hugo Fuks
2014. FX e-Makeup for Muscle Based Interaction. In Design, User Experience, and Usability. User Experience Design for Everyday Life Applications and Services [Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 8519], ► pp. 643 ff.
Vega, Katia & Hugo Fuks
2016. Skin Interfaces. In Beauty Technology [Human–Computer Interaction Series, ], ► pp. 43 ff.
Welshon, Rex
2013. Searching for the neural realizers of ownership unity. Philosophical Psychology 26:6 ► pp. 839 ff.
Young, Garry
2006. Kant and the Phenomenon of Inserted Thoughts. Philosophical Psychology 19:6 ► pp. 823 ff.
Zahavi, Dan
2003. Phenomenology of self. In The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry, ► pp. 56 ff.
Zahavi, Dan
2007. Subjectivity and the First‐Person Perspective. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 45:S1 ► pp. 66 ff.
[no author supplied]
2016. Bibliographie. In Le self, ► pp. 228 ff.
This list is based on CrossRef data as of 24 march 2024. Please note that it may not be complete. Sources presented here have been supplied by the respective publishers. Any errors therein should be reported to them.