Abstract
Developmental studies indicate that children initially possess a compressed intuition of numerical distances, in which larger numbers are less discriminable than small ones. Education then “linearizes” this responding until by about age eight, children become able to map symbolic numerals onto a linear spatial scale. However, this illusion of compression of symbolic numerals may still exist in a dormant form in human adults and may be observed in appropriate experimental contexts. To investigate this issue, we asked adult participants to rate whether a random sequence of numbers contained too many small numbers or too many large ones. Participants exhibited a large bias, judging as random a geometric series that actually oversampled small numbers, consistent with a compression of large numbers. This illusion resisted training on a number-space mapping task, even though performance was linear on this task. While the illusion was moderately reduced by explicit exposure to linear sequences, responding was still significantly compressed. Thus, the illusion of compression is robust in this task, but linear and compressed responding can be exhibited in the same participants depending on the experimental context.
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