Hindsight Bias Around the World
Abstract
Hindsight bias refers to the tendency to overestimate in hindsight what one has known in foresight. Recently, two experiments extended the research to include samples from different cultures (Choi & Nisbett, 2000; Heine & Lehman, 1996). Asking their participants what they would have guessed before they knew the outcome (“hypothetical design”), Choi and Nisbett (2000) found that Koreans, in comparison to North Americans, exhibited more hindsight bias. Heine and Lehman (1996), however, reported that Japanese people in comparison to Canadians showed marginally less hindsight bias. In a second study, in which participants were asked to recall what they had estimated before they knew the outcome (“memory design”), the latter authors found no difference in hindsight bias between Japanese people and Canadians. We extended these studies with 225 Internet participants, in a hypothetical design, from four different continents (Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America). Hindsight bias was large and similar for all samples except for German and Dutch participants who showed no hindsight bias at all. While the latter effect may be based on peculiarities of the material and of the participants, the former underscores the worldwide stability of the phenomenon. In addition a follow-up surprise rating (paper and pencil) in China (35 participants) and Germany (20 participants) revealed that only less surprising items led to hindsight bias while more surprising ones did not. We suggest that the basic cognitive processes leading to hindsight bias are by-products of the evolutionary-evolved capacity of adaptive learning. On top of these basic processes, individual meta-cognitions (e.g., elicited by surprise) or motives (e.g., a self-serving motive) may further moderate the amount of bias, thus explaining the diverging results of Choi and Nisbett (2000), Heine and Lehman (1996), and our own study.
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