Abstract
Among the different approaches to questions of biomedical ethics, there is a view that stresses the importance of a patient’s right to make her own decisions in evaluative questions concerning her own well-being. This approach, the autonomy-based approach to biomedical ethics, has usually led to the adoption of a subjective theory of well-being on the basis of its commitment to the value of autonomy and to the view that well-being is always relative to a subject. In this article, it is argued that these two commitments need not lead to subjectivism concerning the nature of well-being.
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Varelius, J. Autonomy, Subject-relativity, and Subjective and Objective Theories of Well-being in Bioethics. Theor Med Bioeth 24, 363–379 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:META.0000006908.26112.fe
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:META.0000006908.26112.fe