Elsevier

Methods

Volume 42, Issue 1, May 2007, Pages 87-99
Methods

Methods for investigating the neural components of insight

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ymeth.2006.11.007Get rights and content

Abstract

The authors describe how they have used visual-hemifield and event-related neuroimaging approaches to study their theory specifying some of the neural components of insight. A set of problems developed by the authors, and the use of solvers’ self reports of insight, are presented to argue that advances in our understanding of insight are being unnecessarily stifled by over reliance on traditional insight problems and a widespread failure to determine whether insight has occurred on a solution-by-solution basis.

Introduction

Since the beginning of psychology as a science more than a century ago, one of the central areas of interest has been in understanding problem solving (e.g., [1], [2]). A distinction has been made between step-by-step analytic problem solving and a distinct “all-at-once” process called insight, in which the solution to a problem appears in consciousness suddenly and without conscious access to the solving process [3], [4]. Instances of insight-like phenomena can also be found in perception (e.g., sudden recognition of an object in a blurred or ambiguous picture; [5]) and language comprehension (e.g., sudden comprehension of the meaning of a joke or metaphor, [6]). Thus, insight is not limited to problem solving but appears to be a general phenomenon or mechanism of cognition.

When discussing insight researchers have used terms such as representational change, restructuring, and chunk decomposition to describe the cognitive processes necessary for insight solutions [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]. However, until very recently almost no attempts had been made to link these descriptions to the underlying brain structures and neural activity.

Advances in theories of brain function and neuroimaging techniques have made it possible to predict and view the neural activity associated with differences between insight and non-insight problem solving. For example, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) allows the entire brain to be imaged repeatedly while a person is engaged in a task, providing a view of all regions involved in the task. Thus, by making it possible to view differences in the neural activity underlying insight and non-insight solutions, the use of fMRI provides a significant addition to the information that can be gained with traditional behavioral techniques. However, many fundamental issues remain unresolved [16], and the cognitive and neural mechanisms by which people solve problems with insight remain under-specified.

It is our goal to move toward demystifying insight by revealing the neural components of problem solving. To this end we have used both behavioral and neuroimaging methods (see [17], [18], [19], [20], [21]). Other researchers are also using neuroimaging to investigate the neural components of insight (e.g., [22], [23], [24]).

Of course, the methods that researchers use should always be determined by the questions they are attempting to answer. We began with the hypothesis that the cerebral hemispheres process information differently. Specifically, both hemispheres process all types of information but the right hemisphere (RH) engages in coarser coding of information while the left hemisphere (LH) engages in finer coding of the same information. This hypothesis predicts differences in the kind of information each hemisphere should have available, therefore we began our research by using a visual-hemifield presentation paradigm, which can reveal hemispheric differences. We also have hypotheses that are more precise in their predictions about where, when, and how the brain produces solutions with insight, therefore we have used fMRI, which can provide precise information regarding the locations of activation, and electro-encephalography (EEG), which can provide precise information regarding the timing of cognitive events.

In practical terms the methods we have used can be placed into two categories: inexpensive, easy, but inexact, and expensive, complicated, but more precise. Visual-hemifield presentation is an inexpensive and relatively easy approach that can provide gross information regarding whether critical solution information is more available in one hemisphere than the other. In contrast, fMRI and EEG are expensive and complex methods that can provide far more detailed information about the location and timing of neural activity.

The aim of this paper is to provide a description of the methods we have used at a level that will be appropriate for researchers just venturing into studies of the neural mechanisms of insight and creativity. We will attempt to provide enough detail so that common and easily made mistakes can be avoided. We also will provide more details for visual-hemifield than for neuroimaging methods because individual researchers with limited resources can carry out visual-hemifield experiments. In contrast, neuroimaging experiments require a team of researchers and extensive resources therefore it is not necessary for any individual to possess all of the required technical knowledge.

We will begin by providing some background so that the rationale behind our use of these methods is clearer.

Section snippets

What is insight?

The term “insight” designates the clear or deep perception of a situation, a feeling of understanding, the clear (and often sudden) understanding of a complex situation, or grasping the inner nature of things intuitively. In cognitive psychology insight is used in contrast to step-by-step analytic problem solving. Just as different instances of analytic problem solving can arise from a wide variety of processes, only some of which will always be present, instances of insight can arise from

The distinct cognitive and neural bases of insight

Our research has been guided by a theory that states that multiple processes contribute to both non-insight and insight solutions, and that differences in how the cerebral hemispheres process information play an important role in whether a solution is produced with or without insight. The theory is derived from connectionist models of cognition (e.g., [42]), and is supported by evidence from research on visual processing (e.g., [43], [44], [45], [46], [47]) and language comprehension (see [48],

Compound remote associates

As mentioned above, we had begun to develop hypotheses regarding how hemispheric differences in processing might play an important role in insight. We thought that fundamental differences in the way that the Right-hemisphere and Left-hemisphere process information might be important for understanding differences between insight and non-insight solutions.

We quickly realized that the use of traditional insight problems would pose several difficulties for designing experiments to test our

Procedure

The basic procedure used in each of our experiments is straightforward: On each trial a tone is played and a central fixation cross is presented for 500 ms. This is done so that participants are alerted that a problem is about to appear and that they should direct their gaze to the center of the display. The fixation cross is then replaced by three problem words presented simultaneously in horizontal orientation above, at, and below the fixation cross. The problem words remain in view until the

Determining whether insight occurred

There have been some challenges to the use of RAT or CRA items as insight problems, however, these challenges seem to revolve around two related issues: (1) should a problem be called an insight problem only if it always requires an insight to reach solution, and (2) how should researchers determine whether a problem has been solved with insight? It appears that the point of greatest contention is whether it is better to determine whether insight has occurred by relying on researchers a priori

Conclusions

We believe that our research has contributed to the understanding of insight in several ways. First, by using a visual-hemifield paradigm and event-related neuroimaging, we have found general RH activation that is related to insight, and more specific RH-aSTG involvement in insight solutions. These findings provide evidence that distant associations (coarse coding) in the RH may play an important role in insight solutions. These distant associations might allow for the restructuring critical

References (89)

  • V. Prabhakaran

    Cognitive Psychology

    (1997)
  • E.M. Bowden

    Consciousness and Cognition

    (1997)
  • E.M. Bowden

    Trends in Cognitive Sciences

    (2005)
  • C.A. Kaplan et al.

    Cognitive Psychology

    (1990)
  • M.H. Van Kleeck

    Neuropsychologia

    (1989)
  • M.H. Van Kleeck et al.

    Neuropsychologia

    (1989)
  • M. Jung-Beeman

    Trends in Cognitive Sciences

    (2005)
  • C. Chiarello

    Brain & Language

    (1990)
  • M. Meyer et al.

    Cognitive Brain Research

    (2000)
  • T.T.J. Kircher

    Neuropsychologia

    (2001)
  • I. Carlsson et al.

    Neuropsychologia

    (2000)
  • K. Bowers

    Intuition in the context of discovery

    Cognitive Psychology

    (1990)
  • E. Zarahn et al.

    NeuroImage

    (1997)
  • R. Buckner

    Neuron

    (1998)
  • D.M. Barch

    NeuroImage

    (1999)
  • D. Delis

    Cortex

    (1983)
  • M. Hough

    Brain & Language

    (1990)
  • H. Brownell

    Brain & Language

    (1983)
  • E.L. Thorndike

    Psychological Monographs

    (1898)
  • W. Kohler

    Mentality of Apes

    (1925)
  • R.J. Sternberg et al.

    The Nature of Insight

    (1995)
  • U. Wagner

    Nature

    (2004)
  • G. Terzis

    Philosophical Psychology

    (2001)
  • D. Ritchie

    Metaphor and Symbol

    (2004)
  • S. Ohlsson

    Scandinavian Journal of Psychology

    (1984)
  • S. Ohlsson

    Scandinavian Journal of Psychology

    (1984)
  • G. Knoblich

    Zeitschrift Fur Psychologie

    (1998)
  • G. Knoblich et al.

    Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition

    (1999)
  • G. Jones

    Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning Memory and Cognition

    (2003)
  • J.N. MacGregor et al.

    Memory & Cognition

    (2000)
  • E.P. Chronicle et al.

    Human Experimental Psychology

    (2001)
  • J.N. MacGregor et al.

    Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition

    (2001)
  • T.C. Ormerod et al.

    Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition

    (2002)
  • R.E. Mayer

    Thinking, Problem Solving, Cognition

    (1992)
  • E.M. Bowden et al.

    Psychological Science

    (1998)
  • M.J. Beeman et al.

    Memory & Cognition

    (2000)
  • E.M. Bowden et al.

    Psychonomic Bulletin and Review

    (2003)
  • M. Jung-Beeman

    Public Library of Science—Biology

    (2004)
  • J. Kounios

    Psychological Science

    (2006)
  • J. Luo et al.

    Neuroreport

    (2004)
  • J.R. Anderson et al.

    Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

    (2005)
  • K. Duncker

    Psychological Monographs

    (1945)
  • N.R.F. Maier

    Journal of Comparative Psychology

    (1931)
  • J. Metcalfe et al.

    Memory & Cognition

    (1987)
  • Cited by (0)

    View full text