Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Update
Research FocusFrames and brains: elicitation and control of response tendencies
Research Focus
Introduction
In a recent study, De Martino and colleagues [1] investigated the neural basis of a feature of rationality that has been termed ‘invariance’, the ability to resist irrelevant cues when making choices. They found that people differ considerably in this aspect of rationality and that the selection of the option that is described most attractively within a given frame exhibits different patterns of brain activation than decisions that resist these irrelevant cues. The authors relate their findings to prospect theory [2], a model of choice that predicts different preferences for equivalent outcomes that are framed either as gains or as losses. We note the relevance of two other lines of research: a demonstration that emotionally loaded words automatically evoke approach or avoidance tendencies [3] and a test of the ability to avoid intuitively compelling but incorrect solutions to puzzles [4].
Section snippets
The study
In the study by De Martino et al. [1], fMRI data were collected from 20 participants while they considered choices between sure outcomes and gambles of equal expected value. For example, after being told to imagine that they had received $50, participants chose to either accept 40% of that amount or take a gamble that offered a 40% chance of keeping all the money and a 60% chance of losing it all. The gamble was represented graphically using a pie chart that showed the probabilities of the
Related behavioral research
Several experiments have demonstrated the automatic elicitation of approach and avoidance tendencies by emotionally loaded words. In one study [3], participants were instructed to either push a lever away from them as quickly as possible when a word appeared on a screen or pull it towards them. Although the content of the word was irrelevant to the task, participants were quicker to pull the lever towards them for good words (e.g. ‘peace’) than for bad ones (e.g. ‘vomit’) and quicker to push it
Two types of rationality?
The results of De Martino and colleagues [1] highlight how initial emotional reactions are overridden and how resistance to framing ought to be conceptualized and described. Many popular ‘two-system’ models of judgment 7, 8, 9, 10 suggest a distinction between two families of mental operations that are differentiated by their demands for mental effort and their susceptibility to interference from competing activities [11]. The two systems are associated with distinct forms of rationality.
Acknowledgements
We thank Benedetto De Martino for his patience in answering many questions. Jonathan Cohen, Drazen Prelec and Han Nguyen offered helpful comments.
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