Narrative possibility and narrative explanation

Abstract

Narratives are about not only what actually happened, but also what might have. And narrative explanations make productive use of these unrealized possibilities. I discuss narrative explanation as a form of counterfactual, difference-making explanation, with a demanding qualification: the counterfactual conditions are historically or narratively (not merely logically or physically) possible. I consider these issues in connection with literary, historical and scientific narratives.

Introduction

It is often argued that narratives are most appropriate for describing what happened. They are not appropriate for explaining why it happened precisely because they don't go beyond description, most famously or infamously because they don't (and given their descriptive function shouldn't) include lawlike generalizations about what would happen (or would have happened) if; they are, and should be, only about what did. In a previous paper (Beatty, 2016), I argued to the contrary that narratives are especially appropriate for describing what took place in the context of what might have instead. Here I focus on the explanatory and not just the descriptive character of narratives, and the role of what might have been. I'm concerned here with what was “narratively” or “historically” possible at a specific time and place, not just logically or physically possible, and how narratives make productive use of such real (very real) though unrealized possibilities.

I'll be using branching diagrams like Fig. 1 to analyze narrative structure and the structure of the world described and explained by narratives.¹ Here the occurrence of event A leaves open the possibility of either B1 or B2. The occurrence of B1 leaves open the possibility of either O1 or O2, and forecloses the possibility of B2 and along with it O3 and O4. A–B1–O2 is one possible history in this world, A–B2–O4 another. There are multiple possible histories in this world; only one can come to pass.

My thesis is that the narrative A–B1–O2 explains O2 in the context of surrounding branches. Such a narrative is a causal explanation in the sense that it highlights counterfactual difference-making events. But it is a particular kind of counterfactual difference-making explanation that satisfies two conditions:

• An alleged cause like B1 makes a counterfactual difference to the outcome. Had B1 not occurred, then O2 would not have occurred (check the diagram).

• Counterfactual alternatives to alleged causes like B1 are historically or narratively possible. The particular events leading up to and including the occurrence of A left open the possibility of B2 as well as B1 (check the diagram). For the time being, I'll refer to such historically or narratively possible alternatives as real possibilities.

The unrealized histories A–B2–O3 and A–B2–O4 are relevant context. They communicate that B1 was not bound to occur at the time of A, B2 was also a real possibility, and that O2 would not have happened had B2 occurred instead.