Embodying meaning: Insights from primates, autism, and Brentano

doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2009.01.010

Neural Networks

Volume 22, Issue 2, March 2009, Pages 190-196

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neunet.2009.01.010 Get rights and content

Abstract

In this paper I offer an analysis of social meaning in terms of coding intentional relations between agents and objects. This analysis is amenable to embodied interpretations of intentionality and Theory of mind and may prove of help for the task of simulating the attribution of intentionality with neural networks. Work with non-human primates suggests that evolution first dealt with the problem domain of social meaning by selecting specific adaptations for coding behaviour as intentional in the sense of Brentano, i.e., as directed to or being about objects (for example, gaze following behaviours). Work with autism suggests that alterations in these basic mechanisms of intentional attribution may explain some of the most prevalent problems with social meaning in this condition. Brentanian mechanisms for encoding intentional relations between agents and objects are more basic and evolutionarily more primitive than representational theories of mind. However, some of the key components of representational theories of mind may be already present in the intentional abilities of primates, suggesting that the decisive evolutionary step may have consisted of a re-organization of existing abilities rather than the creation of new skills. Neural network models and models of the evolution and development of primitive mechanisms for intentional encoding may benefit from mutual cross-fertilization.

Section snippets

Introduction: Meanings of meaning

Meaning is a complex and multifaceted notion, ranging from simple instances of the type “clouds mean rain”, based on the recognition of natural physical connections (what Grice (1957) called Natural Meaning), to more complex cases such as what I mean when I point to the clouds outside my window and say “it’s going to rain” implying that we should cancel our picnic plans. The latter is an instance of what Grice called Non-Natural Meaning, where meaning is achieved through an interplay of complex

Brentano and the intentionality of mind

The Theory of mind approach to social meaning is deeply rooted in a Cartesian view of cognition, where mental phenomena are seen as radically different from behaviour. Descartes proposed that the uniqueness of minds was explained by their being made of an altogether different type of substance (res cogitans) in contrast with the res extensa of which the physical world was made. Of course, modern cognitive science assumes that mental phenomena are just functions of res extensa (the neural

A prototypical case: Gaze and attention

Vision is one of the primary ways of relating to the world in many animal species, especially so in primates, that have evolved sophisticated colour and stereoscopic vision and expanded brain areas specialized in the processing of visual stimuli (Gomez, 2004). Vision is not a passive affair, but one in which animals actively look at the surrounding world. This involves an orientation of the eyes in particular directions that normally requires a concurrent orientation of the head or even the

Is gaze really coded intentionally?

Do primates really code a relation between agents and objects, or do they just turn in the direction of gaze in a reflex-like way? There is some evidence that primates’ gaze following is genuinely intentional in Brentano’s sense (i.e., involves the coding of a directed relation). For example, chimpanzees do not simply turn in the direction of a model’s gaze: they actively look for an object in the line of gaze of the model. Thus, if there is a screen in the way of the model, they look at the

Beyond gaze: Coding intentional action

Is gaze a special case, or is the intentional coding of behaviour a more general feature of primate social cognition? Mounting behavioural and physiological evidence suggests that intentional coding is the norm. For example, Perret (1999) and Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004) report the existence of neurons in the rhesus monkey brain that fire specifically to the sight of hands grasping objects, but not to the sight of a hand grasping in vacuo, or the sight of an object (e.g., a sponge) being

Intentionality and meaning

We have thus an evolutionary scenario in which primates routinely code others’ behaviour in relation to potential targets on the basis of an intentional (in Brentano’s sense) reading of behavioural cues such as gaze, reaching, etc. They give meaning to the actions of others by relating them to specific targets. This is a powerful breeding ground for the evolution of more complex forms of social meaning, especially those that involve the selection of behaviours specialized in conveying social

Autism: Meaning blindness?

This perspective may also help to understand some paradoxical findings in autism research. There is a sub-group of high-functioning people with autism spectrum disorders–i.e., individuals with general intelligence and language skills within the normal range–who can pass traditional (“Cartesian”) Theory of mind tests, such as false-belief tests (Frith, 2003). These people seem to have some notion of private, unobservable representations and how they can affect the behaviour of others. However,

Embodied origins of disembodied meaning

In addition to Brentanian intentionality, humans possess representational Theories of mind in the Cartesian style. We do attribute “disembodied” mental states detachable from behaviour, and this allows us to engage in very complex forms of social meaning and communication. Where do representational theories of mind come from? Are they a radical evolutionary departure from the Brentanian mechanisms that make intentional sense of behaviour?

The key difference between Brentanian and

Simulating perceived intentionality

A challenge for the Brentanian intentionality framework is to specify the mechanisms whereby agent–object intentional relations are encoded and how they interact in evolution and development with other mechanisms of social cognition, especially representational theories of mind. Neural simulation could help clarify many aspects of this challenge. For example: How is the illusion of gaze direction acquired? Is it the consequence of simple associative learning of the correspondence between

Concluding remarks

Although the analysis of social meaning in humans seems to lead to cognitive accounts based on the attribution of disembodied intentions via representational Theories of mind á la Descartes, an evolutionary perspective based upon a fresh development of the Brentanian notion of intentionality suggests a different picture. Social meaning may have emerged in evolution through the coding of embodied intentions—relations between agents and their targets as advertised by their behaviour towards

Acknowledgements

This paper was written under Project REFCOM (NEST-PATHFIN DER INITIATIVE Project 12787). My gratitude to the participants in this project for useful discussions on the topic of reference and communication, particularly to Tim Crane, K. Zuberbühler, D. Byrne, and V. Janik. My thanks also to Toni Gomila for his very helpful comments on Brentano and intentionality.

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2009 Special IssueEmbodying meaning: Insights from primates, autism, and Brentano

Abstract

Section snippets

Introduction: Meanings of meaning

Brentano and the intentionality of mind

A prototypical case: Gaze and attention

Is gaze really coded intentionally?

Beyond gaze: Coding intentional action

Intentionality and meaning

Autism: Meaning blindness?

Embodied origins of disembodied meaning

Simulating perceived intentionality

Concluding remarks

Acknowledgements

Animal Behaviour

Neural Networks

Animal Behaviour

Journal of Human Evolution

Advances in the Study of Behaviour

What chimpanzees know about seeing revisited: An explanation of the third kind

How monkeys see the world

Intentionality as the mark of the mental

Tractatus de homine, et de formatione foetus

Comparative social cognition

Annual Review of Psychology

Autism: Explaining the enigma

Apes, monkeys, children and the growth of mind

Species comparative studies and cognitive development

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Pointing behaviors in apes and human infants: A balanced interpretation

Child Development

The evolution of pretense: From intentional availability to intentional non-existence

Mind and Language

2009 Special Issue
Embodying meaning: Insights from primates, autism, and Brentano