Feeling bad? The “Power” of positive thinking may not apply to everyone

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Abstract

The present studies demonstrate that effects of cognitive strategies on emotions are moderated by neuroticism. In Study 1, individuals low in neuroticism who used effective strategies extensively felt less negative emotions in a hypothetical unpleasant situation than those who used such strategies minimally. However, cognitive strategy use did not affect individuals high in neuroticism. Study 2 found a similar moderating effect when participants were taught to use the different types of cognitive strategies. Likewise, reappraising a past unpleasant event helped low-neuroticism individuals feel less negative about it than their counterparts who focused on the event, but did not help high-neuroticism individuals (Study 3). In conclusion, cognitive strategies strongly influenced how low-neuroticism individuals felt, but had no effects on high-neuroticism individuals.

Introduction

From antiquity to modern times, the belief that a person’s thoughts shape his feelings, actions, and identity has given rise to the frequently dispensed advice that thinking positively makes one feel happier. To what extent is this true? Given people’s varying dispositions and differences in their ways of thinking, it is possible the common adage that thinking positively in the face of difficulties helps one overcome negative emotions may not be equally efficacious for everybody. The central goal of this research is to examine how the effects of cognitive strategies on emotions are contingent on individual differences in neuroticism.

Previous research has consistently found that neuroticism is positively correlated with negative affect, but is barely associated with positive affect (e.g., Diener and Lucas, 1999, Tellegen, 1985, Watson and Clark, 1984). Not only is neuroticism correlated with current negative affect, it also predicts negative affect over time (e.g., Costa and McCrae, 1980, Headey and Wearing, 1989). Costa and McCrae found that across various cultures, neuroticism predicted unpleasant affect over a period of 10 years. Different theories – temperament, cognitive, congruence, and goal theories – have been postulated to understand the mechanisms that underlie the links between personality traits and emotional experience (Diener & Lucas, 1999). The temperament perspective posits that the biological basis of neuroticism leads to predilections to experience negative affect (Gray, 1981, Loehlin et al., 1998). In Gray’s personality model, neuroticism is linked to the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), which produces negative affect because it is sensitive to cues of nonreward and punishment. The temperament perspective is supported by heritability studies demonstrating that genetics account for a substantial percentage of the variance in positive and negative affect (Lykken and Tellegen, 1996, Tellegen et al., 1988), and evidence indicating that about 31% of the variance in neuroticism could be attributed to shared genes (Pedersen, Plomin, McClearn, & Friberg, 1988).

Two models within the temperament perspective have been proposed to explain personality differences in emotions. The affect-level model postulates that differences in neuroticism leads to individual differences in tonic levels of negative affect, causing individuals high in neuroticism to feel more negative regardless of the circumstances or stimuli (Gross et al., 1998, Lucas and Baird, 2004). Additionally, according to the reactivity model, differences in temperament lead to differences in reactivity to emotional stimuli (Gross et al., 1998, Larsen and Ketelaar, 1989, Larsen and Ketelaar, 1991, Zelenski and Larsen, 1999). Thus, individuals high in neuroticism react more strongly to negative stimuli. As supported by experimental studies, neuroticism was positively related to negative emotions when individuals were asked to imagine an unpleasant situation (Larsen and Ketelaar, 1989, Larsen and Ketelaar, 1991). In support of both models, Gross et al. (1998) found that neuroticism correlated positively with baseline negative affect, and with increases in negative emotions in response to unpleasant stimuli.

The above discussion elucidates the relation between neuroticism and negative emotions from a temperament perspective. However, this perspective seems to suggest a strongly deterministic view of emotional experience. An important question is whether the dispositional predilections to experience negative emotions can be modified or attenuated. The cognitive perspective may offer an answer.

The cognitive perspective maintains that individual differences in cognitive processes or cognitive processing of emotional information lead to different emotional experiences (Rusting, 1998, Scheier and Carver, 1985). Past research has shown that individuals high in neuroticism process negative stimuli readily. High neurotics retrieved more unhappy (and fewer happy) memories than low neurotics (Bradley and Mogg, 1994, Mayo, 1983, Mayo, 1989). In addition, neurotics also exhibited a negative attentional bias as they responded faster to targets located with negative words (Reed & Derryberry, 1995). Using a variety of cognitive tasks, recent studies confirmed that neurotics not only process and recall negative stimuli faster and readily, but also interpret ambiguous stimuli negatively (Rusting & Larsen, 1998). Hence, one possible cognitive explanation for why neurotics experience stronger negative emotions is the superior processing of trait–congruent emotional information. Although the cognitive perspective offers a different explanation for trait differences in emotions, the documented trait–emotion relations are concordant with those obtained within the temperament paradigm.

The close links between personality and cognitive processes is exemplified in the cognitive-affective personality system (CAPS) advocated by Mischel and Shoda, 1995, Mischel and Shoda, 1998. Their model conceives personality as a system characterized by interrelated cognitive and affective units that interact dynamically. Affective reactions depend on the cognitive structures through which they are interpreted and they influence each other reciprocally. Thus, cognitive strategies can be used to regulate affective states, for example, by encoding or construing the situation differently (Cervone et al., 2001, Mischel and Shoda, 1995). In essence, dynamic reciprocal transactions occur both between this personality system and the external environment, and within the system, among the social-cognitive and affective variables.

Typically regarded as a type of cognitive process that people undergo when dealing with stressful or difficult events, coping processes have been increasingly linked to personality traits. The Big Five traits, especially neuroticism and extraversion, are related to dispositional coping styles and cognitive appraisals (Ferguson, 2001, Watson and Hubbard, 1996). Neuroticism and extraversion are consistently found to be associated with the use of ineffective and adaptive coping mechanisms, respectively (Boland and Cappeliez, 1997, McCrae and Costa, 1986). As a group, the Big Five also explained significant variation in both situational coping strategies and dispositional coping styles (Bouchard, Guillemette, & Landry-Le´ger, 2004). Personality differences are also documented in other cognitive processes such as optimism and cognitive styles. For instance, individuals high in neuroticism tended to appraise the environment negatively and to interpret ambiguous stimuli in a negative or threatening manner (Costa and McCrae, 1990, Watson and Clark, 1984). The links between personality and coping were further confirmed in a meta-analysis, which found that neuroticism predicted specific problematic coping strategies like withdrawal, wishful thinking, and negative emotion-focused coping (Connor-Smith & Flachsbart, 2007).

However, because the conceptualizations of personality and cognitive processes are closely intertwined, it is often difficult to disentangle dispositional cognitive constructs from personality traits. This is unsurprising because personality traits are also regarded as relatively enduring styles of thoughts. Some researchers suggested that cognitive measures such as locus of control and neuroticism form a common core construct, as they found that the measures of self-esteem, self-efficacy, locus of control, and neuroticism converged to form a higher-order factor, and there was no discriminant validity among these traits (Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002). On the other hand, other researchers argued that certain cognitive constructs, for example, optimism, are distinct from neuroticism (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). Scheier et al. (1994) found that the correlation between optimism and neuroticism was low, and the associations between optimism and coping strategies remained even after partialling out the effects of neuroticism. This supported their proposition that optimism could be distinguished from neuroticism. A prospective correlational study by Boland and Cappeliez (1997) also showed that optimism significantly predicted life satisfaction even after accounting for neuroticism. These results suggest that certain cognitive processes can contribute unique variance in explaining individual differences in emotional experience beyond that explained by personality traits.

Links between personality traits, emotion, and cognitive processing have been found in both correlational and experimental studies. McCrae and Costa (1986) found that personality influenced the use of effective versus ineffective coping strategies, and effective coping strategies were in turn positively related to happiness and life satisfaction. However, the associations between coping strategies and well-being were reduced after partialling out the effects of neuroticism and extraversion, implying that part of the relation between coping mechanisms and well-being might be due to the common influence of enduring personality traits. Research in the domain of happiness has also illuminated how cognitive and motivational processes influence enduring happiness (Lyubomirsky, 2001). In their research, Lyubomirsky and colleagues showed that the cognitive and motivational strategies of happy and unhappy people differed, and that these processes influenced their well-being. For example, happy people were found to perceive, interpret, and think about the same life (and hypothetical) events in more positive ways than do unhappy people (Lyubomirsky & Tucker, 1998). Their findings highlighted that individual differences in dispositional happiness were associated with individual differences in cognitive processes, which in turn influenced well-being.

In investigating the role that neuroticism plays in the stress process, Bolger and colleagues (Bolger and Schilling, 1991, Bolger and Zuckerman, 1995) presented the first framework highlighting that neuroticism influenced emotional reactivity through various mechanisms. Specifically, they found that high-neuroticism individuals had greater exposure to stressors (common daily stressors and interpersonal conflicts) and showed greater reactivity (stronger negative emotions). Importantly, they found that neuroticism influenced participants’ choice of coping strategies and how effectively those coping strategies could be used to reduce their distress. Hence, their moderation model showed that neuroticism impacts both natural coping choice in response to stressful events and the effectiveness of these coping efforts.

As found by previous research, neuroticism is linked to the selection of ineffective coping mechanisms (Connor-Smith and Flachsbart, 2007, Watson and Hubbard, 1996) and differential effectiveness of coping strategies (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995). The intertwined relations among traits, emotions, and cognitive processes have also been investigated extensively by numerous studies, which focused on how moods and traits interact to influence cognitive and emotional processing (e.g., Rusting, 1998, Rusting, 1999, Tamir and Robinson, 2004). However, few experimental studies have examined the reverse — whether traits moderate the effects of cognitive strategies on emotions. The present research addresses this issue and considers the conceptual model (Fig. 1) that neuroticism moderates the effects of cognitive strategies on emotions. Cognitive strategies, as defined here, can refer to emotion-regulation oriented strategies, coping strategies, or ways of thinking, but do not include dispositional cognitive styles. As cognitive processes encompass a wide spectrum such as coping strategies, dispositional cognitive styles, memory, and judgment, the present research is only focusing on a small subset.

Our hypothesis was that neuroticism would moderate the effects of cognitive strategies on negative emotions. Drawing on literature documenting that neuroticism is positively associated with the use of ineffective coping strategies, and that neurotics tend to cognitively process negative information readily and interpret ambiguous stimuli negatively (e.g., Bradley and Mogg, 1994, Rusting and Larsen, 1998), we predicted that the use of positive, adaptive cognitive strategies (as opposed to negative, maladaptive strategies) might not help individuals high in neuroticism as much as those low in neuroticism. That is, the frequently dispensed advice that “thinking positively when dealing with adverse situations helps you feel better” may not be as helpful for neurotics.

We should clarify that the terminology of “adaptive and maladaptive” or “effective and ineffective” does not mean that the cognitive strategies are universally beneficial or detrimental for everyone, across all situations. We recognize that the effectiveness of the strategies depends on both trait differences and circumstances; thus, the labels refer to strategies that are likely to reduce or amplify most people’s negative emotions across various negative/stressful situations.

The aims of this research were twofold. First, using a correlational study, we sought to determine that neuroticism moderated the effects of natural cognitive strategy use on emotions. Second, by manipulating the type of cognitive strategies, we sought to establish whether neuroticism moderated the effects of cognitive strategies, both for hypothetical and life events.

Section snippets

Study 1

The aim of Study 1 was to verify that neuroticism moderated the influence of cognitive strategy use on negative emotions in a hypothetical scenario. We predicted that participants who used effective cognitive strategies to a great extent would feel less negative emotions than those who did the opposite. More importantly, the effects of these strategies would be moderated by neuroticism — use of effective strategies should help individuals low in neuroticism (low N) more than those high in

Study 2

Instead of measuring the degree to which participants naturally used effective/ineffective strategies, the cognitive strategies they used in this study were manipulated. The aim was to determine whether neuroticism also moderated the effects of cognitive strategies on negative emotions if the type of cognitive strategies (effective vs. ineffective) employed to think about a hypothetical scenario was manipulated. Thus, the same vignette and similar cognitive strategies as before were used;

Study 3

Study 3 was designed to address the two alternative explanations concerning ceiling effect and baseline affect. In addition, the cognitive strategies manipulated in this study involved reappraising versus focusing on a negative event. Using these different strategies not only increases the generalizability of the earlier results, but also addresses the earlier concern because the ineffective strategies used here – focusing – assessed only cognitive-type items. Finally, as Studies 1 and 2

General discussion

Cognitive strategies can influence emotional reactions, or be used to modify one’s emotional experience, and the current findings highlight that their effects are contingent on trait differences. This supports the moderation model illustrated in Fig. 1. Using adaptive cognitive strategies as opposed to maladaptive strategies alleviates low-neuroticism individuals’ negative feelings about unpleasant situations, but do not help high-neuroticism individuals. In Study 1, neuroticism moderated the

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