Attention in the predictive mind
Section snippets
Prediction-error coding
An enormous amount of research has been devoted, over the last sixty years, to the discovery of efficient methods for gathering and disseminating information. The concepts that have emerged from this research have often been applied in theories of the mind. One of them enables us to draw a distinction between two quite different strategies for information gathering.
To see that distinction, suppose that I want to gather information about x from those of my sources that are in touch with x’s
Surprisal and selection
We have said that systems employing prediction error coding owe some of their efficiency to the fact that the only information to be propagated up through such systems is ‘surprising’, in the sense that it is information about those aspects of the incoming signal that have not already been predicted by the system’s prior hypotheses (see for example Barto et al., 2013, Friston, 2009). It is this that prevents resources from being taken up with the transmission of redundant information.
Some
Attention and precision
About half of the visual information that was presented in Neisser and Becklen’s experiment was consistent with the hypothesis that the filmed scene was one in which a hand game is being played. About half was consistent with the hypothesis that the scene was one in which a ball game is being played. Since these hypotheses are quite different, the information that is predicted by either one will tend not to be predicted by the other. The central claim of the prediction error theory is that the
The variety of attention shifts
When, following Friston, Hohwy writes that “attention is nothing but precision optimization in hierarchical inference”, his claim is explicitly a ‘nothing but’ claim. If true, it should apply with full generality. It should therefore apply to attention in all its forms. Psychologists have traditionally drawn distinctions between these forms. They have distinguished between feature-based and object-based attention; between endogenous and exogenous attention; and (what is not quite the same
Active inference
The argument above does not yet take account of an important complication, coming from Hohwy’s theory of action. That theory increases the complexity of the problem that we have just identified, without – we contend – doing anything to address the ultimate source of it.
In order for actions to be subsumed within the prediction-error theory they must be explained as attempts to minimize the prediction errors that are generated by our top-down hypotheses. The minimization of such errors is, Hohwy
Conclusions
Hohwy tell us that his “account of attention is interesting because it reduces attention to a simple matter of learning regularities of precision in nature” (p. 205). That account fails to apply to cases in which it is not regularities in nature that determine the way in which attention is allocated. There are instances of voluntary attention where the gain cannot be set by expectations of precision (whether or not these expectations are ‘learnt from nature’). When the relevant expectation is a
Acknowledgments
Madeleine Ransom and Sina Fazelpour are both supported by the Joseph Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship Program. Christopher Mole’s research is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Grant No.: 435-2015-0321.
The authors would like to thank Andy Clark, Adrian Downey, Dustin Stokes, Jona Vance, and the referees for this journal.
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