The nested neural hierarchy and the self

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Abstract

In spite of enormous recent interest in the neurobiology of the self, we currently have no global models of the brain that explain how its anatomical structure, connectivity, and physiological functioning create a unified self. In this article I present a triadic neurohierarchical model of the self that proposes that the self can be understood as the product of three hierarchical anatomical systems: The interoself system, the integrative self system, and the exterosensorimotor system. An analysis of these three systems and their functional features indicates that the neural hierarchy possesses features of both non-nested and nested hierarchies that are necessary for the creation of a unified consciousness and self. These functional properties also make the central nervous system a biologically unique entity unlike anything else in nature.

Introduction

The question I address in this paper is: “How does the brain create a self?” For the purposes of the present inquiry, I define the self by three critical features – its relationship to consciousness, its unity, and its persistence in time. Thus, I propose the following definition: the self is a unity of consciousness in perception and action that persists in time (Feinberg, 2009). This definition of the self presupposes that there must be something conscious, that the consciousness in question must exist in some sense unified, and that this consciousness possesses a temporal aspect. In other words, whatever there is “something that it is like to be” any conscious organism (Nagel, 1974) must be unified and endure beyond the instantaneous moment of that organism’s perception and action. While there is an emerging “neuroscience of the self” that addresses important issues regarding which brain structures are critical for the creation and maintenance of the self, we currently lack unifying models that “bridge the gap” between the microstructure, macrostructure, connectivity and physiology of the brain and the unified sense of self as subjectively experienced. In this article I present a neurobiological model of the self but focus primarily on the issues of the self as a unity of consciousness in perception and action. For a discussion of the issue of its persistence in time, see Feinberg, 2009.

Section snippets

Three hierarchical systems create the self

I have argued previously (Feinberg, 2009) that the brain creates the neural apparatus of the self through three dissociable hierarchical systems: the anatomically central/medial interoself system, the anatomically peripheral exterosensorimotor system, and the integrative self system that is interposed between the other two (Fig. 1). These three systems can be understood as the result of the two major neuroanatomical patterns of organization. The first is the radial pattern (or medial–lateral

Nestedness and the neural hierarchy

At the outset of my discussion I offered a definition of the self that included a “unity of consciousness in perception and action”. A fundamental enigma is how the multiple zones and hierarchical levels critical to the self allow the subjective sense of unification. The key to understanding how the self and mind are unified lies in the analysis of the nature of biological hierarchies (Feinberg, 2000, Feinberg, 2001a, Feinberg, 2001b, Feinberg, 2008, Feinberg, 2009, Feinberg and Keenan, 2005).

Conclusions

I have presented here a theory of the neurobiology of the self and consciousness that are embodied by systems that are necessarily hierarchical. This raises the question whether in fact the self and consciousness are ontologically necessarily both biological and hierarchical. I propose that for a system to possess consciousness and a self it must be engineered as an evolving hierarchical system (Salthe, 1985). I believe that given that all known instances of entities which possess a self

Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part from grants from The Gerald J. and Dorothy R. Friedman New York Foundation for Medical Research. The author thanks Jill K Gregory, CMI, FAMI Medical Illustrator, Multimedia Department, Continuum Health Partners for the illustrations in this article.

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  • Cited by (0)

    Forthcoming in T. E. Feinberg (Ed.) Brain and self: Bridging the gap. A special issue of Consciousness and Cognition.

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