Elsevier

Cognition

Volume 107, Issue 1, April 2008, Pages 266-283
Cognition

Discussion
Beyond Simulation–Theory and Theory–Theory: Why social cognitive neuroscience should use its own concepts to study “theory of mind”

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.07.019Get rights and content

Abstract

The debate between Simulation–Theory (ST) and Theory–Theory (TT) provides the dominant theoretical framework for research on “theory of mind” (ToM). Behavioural research has failed to provide clear methods for discriminating between these theories, but a number of recent studies have claimed that neuroimaging methods do allow key predictions of ST and TT to be tested. In the current paper it is argued that neuroimaging studies have not in fact provided any data that discriminates between ST and TT accounts of propositional attitude ascription, and moreover that it is uncertain that they will in the future. However, it is also argued that the fault lies with the ST/TT debate, not with the methods and concepts of neuroimaging research. Neuroimaging can certainly contribute to our understanding of ToM, and should contribute to the project of developing theoretical models more firmly grounded in specific cognitive and neural processes than ST or TT.

Introduction

Social cognitive neuroscience gives us exciting new ways to study how humans and other animals explain and predict behaviour in terms of mental states. This emerging discipline can usefully inherit many concepts and paradigms from 25 years of developmental, comparative and theoretical work into theory of mind (see e.g., Apperly et al., 2005, Frith and Frith, 2003, Saxe, 2006). However, I will argue that an important exception is the longstanding debate between “Theory–Theory” (TT) and “Simulation–Theory” (ST) accounts of theory of mind (ToM). Despite claims to the contrary, social cognitive neuroscience has been no more successful than behavioural approaches in producing clear evidence to discriminate between these theories. Although better evidence may be forthcoming, it may also be that the debate between TT and ST is not the most useful theoretical framework for generating predictions or interpreting data in investigations of ToM. I will suggest that social cognitive neuroscience is already equipped with the right conceptual tools for generating empirically tractable hypotheses that will be a more reliable way of advancing our understanding of ToM.

Section snippets

Different ways of explaining behaviour

“Theory of mind” or folk psychology is the ability to treat agents as the owners of unobservable mental states – beliefs, desires and the like – and to explain and predict the behaviour of agents in terms of such mental states.

Theory–Theory and Simulation–Theory

Philosophers distinguish two very general accounts of theory of mind, which have provided the dominant interpretive frameworks for empirical investigations. Theory–Theory (TT) accounts propose that theory of mind abilities are constituted by a set of concepts (belief, desire, etc.) and governing principles about how these concepts interact (e.g., people act to satisfy their desires according to their beliefs). The proposed status of these concepts and principles varies widely, from symbols and

Comparing neural activation for judgements about self and other

According to ST, predictions about what a target person will think or do depend, at least in part, upon using our own mind to simulate the target’s mental processes. In contrast, TT suggests that predictions about others depend upon a different set of processes (involving concepts and general principles) from those involved when our own beliefs, desires and intentions form the basis for our own behaviour. It follows that an appropriate comparison of neural activation for “self” and “other”

Dependence of judgements about others on perceived similarity to self

In recent studies it has been suggested that functional neuroimaging can provide data to discriminate ST from TT by showing that the neural activity for 3rd person ToM judgements is modulated by perceived similarity to self (e.g., Frith and Frith, 2006, Mitchell et al., 2005, Mitchell et al., 2006, Saxe and Wexler, 2005). This argument has been made most strongly by Mitchell and colleagues in two studies, and it is their argument and data that will be discussed here. There are two components to

Conclusions

Simulation–Theory and Theory–Theory currently define the terms of most philosophical debate about the nature of folk psychology, and the influence of this debate extends into the empirical literature on theory of mind. However, it has proved extremely difficult to find behavioural phenomena that provide clear evidence in favour of either ST or TT. Importantly, this may not be due to a lack of ingenuity on the part of experimental psychologists. Rather, as Stich and Nichols (1997) suggest,

Acknowledgements

I thank Sarah Beck, Steven Butterfill, Kimberly Quinn, Dana Samson, Rebecca Saxe and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on drafts of this manuscript.

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