Re-evaluating evidence for linguistic relativity: Reply to Boroditsky (2001)

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2006.07.008

Cognition

Volume 104, Issue 2, August 2007, Pages 417-426

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2006.07.008 Get rights and content

Abstract

Six unsuccessful attempts at replicating a key finding in the linguistic relativity literature [Boroditsky, L. (2001). Does language shape thought?: Mandarin and English speakers’ conceptions of time. Cognitive Psychology, 43, 1–22] are reported. In addition to these empirical issues in replicating the original finding, theoretical issues present in the original report are discussed. In sum, we conclude that Boroditsky (2001) provides no support for the Whorfian hypothesis.

Introduction

Recently, the psychological community has seen renewed interest in the linguistic relativity hypothesis, the claim (Whorf, 1939/1956, Whorf, 1941/1956) that the language one speaks structures how one thinks (for varying perspectives, see, e.g., Li and Gleitman, 2002, Levinson et al., 2002, Lowenstein and Gentner, 2005, Papafragou et al., 2002 and the volume edited by Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003). Though most researchers currently reject the strongest form of this hypothesis, which claims that one can only think in accordance with the grammatical structure of one’s language, (though see, e.g., Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 2005), several researchers have adopted “weaker” versions of the hypothesis, claiming language “influences” or “suggests” thought patterns or default modes of interpreting the world rather than determining cognition absolutely (e.g., Hunt & Agnoli, 1991). One influential study, receiving 35 citations in PsycInfo and ∼55 citations in Google Scholar, is Boroditsky (2001), which serves as the point of departure for the work reported below.

In a study on the mental representation of time, Boroditsky (2001) noted that temporal relations are cross-linguistically expressed using spatial metaphors. For example, in English we can talk of “pushing a meeting back” in time or “looking forward to tomorrow”. Though such metaphors are pervasive in the world’s languages, there is at least one dimension on which they can differ: orientation. As the examples just given suggest, English typically uses a horizontally oriented spatial metaphor for temporal relations.¹ Events are described as points or expanses on a horizontal line and can be moved along it. In Mandarin Chinese, by contrast, spatial metaphors for temporal relations tend to be vertically oriented, as the example in (1), from Boroditsky (2001), shows.

(1) Space
tā xià le shān méi yo˘u
has she descended the mountain or not?
Time
xià ge yuè
next (or following) month

Boroditsky found that these prevalent spatial metaphors had lasting effects on temporal cognition. Specifically, she reported that English speakers exhibit cross-domain priming from horizontal spatial relations to temporal relations whereas Mandarin speakers exhibit such priming from vertical spatial relations to temporal relations.

The current report raises some theoretical and empirical issues for Boroditsky (2001) that challenge the validity of its experimental outcome and by extension its potential larger implications. Specifically, we report six unsuccessful attempts to replicate the basic finding of Boroditsky (2001) that English speakers think of time as horizontal. Additionally, we point out some apparent empirical and theoretical inconsistencies in the original report that would pose a serious challenge to Boroditsky’s interpretation of her results, even if they were replicable.

Section snippets

Boroditsky (2001): procedure and results

Subjects in the Boroditsky (2001) paradigm were presented with a series of pictures and sentences, with their task being to indicate whether the sentences were true or false. The stimuli were composed of targets and primes. The primes were composed of pictures depicting spatial relations (for example, two balls, one above the other) accompanied by sentences that described them (see Fig. 1). Targets were sentences describing the order of months in a year. Half of the targets (the spatial

Attempted replications

This section reports on six different attempts to replicate Boroditsky’s finding that English speakers think of time horizontally, specifically that they exhibit cross-domain priming from spatial relations to temporal relations only when the spatial primes are horizontal. As in Boroditsky (2001), only trials on which the subjects correctly responded to the primes and responded within the time limit were analyzed. Overall, we observed target error rates very similar to, though typically slightly

Interpretive issues

Setting these empirical issues aside for the moment, Boroditsky (2001) also reports a result that vastly complicates, if not outright contradicts, the claim that native language spatial metaphors for temporal relations structure the time domain. In Experiment 3 of this series, English speakers were trained in a “new way to talk about time” by receiving 90 examples of sentences making use of the vertical metaphor for time found in Mandarin (e.g., Bill Clinton was president belowRonald Reagan).

Discussion and conclusions

The present work has demonstrated that the Whorfian finding that native language structures mental representation of temporal relations is distinctly unreliable. Boroditsky (personal communication) does report being able to replicate the effect with English speakers. However, we maintain that such results must be treated with extreme caution in light of our repeated inability to do so. Given this questionable nature of the empirical basis for the claim of such relativistic effects on mental

Acknowledgements

The work reported in this paper was accomplished predominantly in preparation for the first author’s undergraduate thesis at Swarthmore College and was supported in large part by a grant from the Howard Hughes Medical Institute. Thanks go to Lila Gleitman and John Trueswell for much advice, discussion, and encouragement, and to Samantha Crane for data collection at the University of Pennsylvania. Particular thanks to Lera Boroditsky for helping us to minimize procedural differences and for

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^☆: This manuscript was accepted under the editorship of Jacques Mehler.

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Brief articleRe-evaluating evidence for linguistic relativity: Reply to Boroditsky (2001)☆

Abstract

Introduction

Section snippets

Boroditsky (2001): procedure and results

Attempted replications

Interpretive issues

Discussion and conclusions

Acknowledgements

Cognitive Psychology

Cognition

Cognition

Cognition

Cognitive Psychology

Cognition

Cognitive Psychology

Cognitive Psychology

Brief article
Re-evaluating evidence for linguistic relativity: Reply to Boroditsky (2001)☆