The emergence of a shared action ontology: Building blocks for a theory☆
Introduction
Actions in the external world can be experienced as such, recognized, and understood. Simultaneously, the intentional content correlated with them (i.e., their satisfaction conditions resp. their intended goal-state) is interpreted by the observer as playing a causal role in determining the behavior of the observed other individuals. From a first-person perspective, the dynamic social environment appears as populated by volitional agents capable to entertain, similarly to the observer, an intentional relation to the world. We experience other agents as directed at certain target states or objects. We are “intentionality-detectors”: As human beings, we cannot only mentally build an “objective,” third-person account of the behaviors constituting the events of our social world. Beyond phenomenally experiencing the objective nature of a witnessed action, we can also experience its goal-directedness or intentional character, similarly to when we experience ourselves as the willful conscious agents of an ongoing behavior.
In the present paper we will provide and integrate some empirical and conceptual building blocks for a theory of the emergence of a common ontology between members of a group. We will examine, from a third-person scientific perspective, the fundamentally relational character of actions in the world. In particular, we want to look at the “ontological commitments” the brain makes when representing actions and goals. It will be further shown that the brain builds an ontology, an internal model of reality, which—on a very fundamental level within its representational architecture—incorporates the relational character of inter-actions between organism and environment, and that this architecture can actually be traced at the microfunctional level implemented in the brain’s neural networks. The same subpersonal ontology then guides organisms when they are epistemic agents in a social world: Interpersonal relations become meaningful in virtue of a shared action ontology.
An action ontology can only be shared and successfully used by two systems, if there is a sufficient degree of functional overlap between them, if they decompose target space in similar ways. We will posit that the cognitive development of social competence capitalizes upon such a shared ontology to trigger the timely onset of behaviors such as gaze following, shared attention, and mind reading, which will eventually give rise to a full-blown capacity to entertain mental accounts of the behavior and goal states of other agents. We will also propose that what makes humans special is the fact that their functional ontology is much richer in socially individuated goal representations and that their model of reality is not only rich and flexible, but that they can actively expand their own functional ontology by mentally ascribing distal goals to conspecifics.
Neuroscientific results discussing the functional properties of mirror neurons, a class of premotor neurons in the monkey brain, will be introduced. It will be proposed that mirror neurons can be conceived of as the dawning of what the equivalent matching systems in our human brains are the fully developed realization of: a fundamental and mostly unconscious representational structure capable to build a shared action ontology. However, in closing we will also provide an example for a late and high-level utilization of this structure: enabling beings like ourselves to mutually acknowledge each other as persons, and to consciously experience this very fact at the same time.
Section snippets
The neural underpinnings of social understanding
Primates, and particularly human beings are social animals whose cognitive development capitalizes upon the interaction with other conspecifics (adults, siblings, etc.). During social interactions we overtly manifest our inner intentions, dispositions and thoughts by means of overt behavior. We reciprocate this by trying to figure out what are the intentions, dispositions, and thoughts of others, when witnessing their behavior. Detecting another agent’s intentions, or other inner states, helps
Embodied simulation
So far we have characterized the function of mirror neurons in terms of implicit action understanding, by means of embodied simulation. The notion of simulation is at present employed in many different domains, often with different, not necessarily overlapping meanings. Simulation is a functional process that possesses a certain representational content, typically focussing on the temporal evolution or on possible states of its target object. For example, an authoritative view on motor control
Sharing an action ontology: the general idea
One useful way to look at the brain is to describe it as a dynamic representational system. Every representational system presupposes an ontology: A set of assumptions about what the elementary building blocks of the reality to be represented actually are. By necessity, it constructs primitives. For example, many natural languages, viewed as representational systems, typically assume that extralinguistic reality is constituted by objects, properties, and relations. Their underlying ontology
Goals
We think that the neuroscientific data so far presented make it necessary to conceptually restructure the questions that have to be asked. Let us begin by defining some basic notions. What is a goal? From a strict scientific point of view, no such things as goals exist in the objective world. All that exists are goal-representations, for instance, as we have seen in Section 2, those activated by biological nervous systems. A goal-representation is, first, formed by the representation of a
Actions
On a non-conceptual level, actions are elementary building blocks of reality for certain living organisms: Some kinds of organisms have developed agent-detecting modules, and some of them also conceive of themselves as agents. They have an extended ontology, because their reality has been considerably enriched. We can define such functionally enriched systems as possessors of an “action ontology.” Let us now define what an action is on a conceptual level. Let us begin by distinguishing
What is a PMIR?
Before addressing the problem of the phenomenal aspect of the shared action ontology, we must first focus on the way the agent-object relationship can be phenomenally represented. What is the phenomenal model of the intentionality relation (for details see Metzinger, 2003, Chapter 6)? It is a conscious mental model, and its content is an ongoing, episodic subject–object-relation. Here are four different examples, in terms of typical phenomenological descriptions of the class of phenomenal
Intentionality phenomenalized
The philosophical step just taken consists in phenomenalizing intentionality. Phenomenalizing intentionality, we submit, may be an indispensable first step in the project of naturalizing intentionality tout court. Meaning and the conscious experience of meaningfulness have to be separated. Of course, this does not mean that no such thing as intentional content exists.
Mental representations possess at least two kinds of content: Phenomenal content (PC) and intentional content (IC). As a large
Consciously sharing an action ontology: A phenomenological multi-level analysis
Phenomenal mental models are instruments used to make a certain subset of information currently active in the system globally available for the control of action, for focal attention and for cognitive processing. A phenomenal model of transient subject–object relations makes an enormous amount of new information available for the system: All information related to the fact that it is currently perturbed by perceptual objects, that certain cognitive states are currently occurring in itself,
Acknowledgements
Vittorio Gallese was supported by MIURST and the Eurocores Program of the European Science Foundation.
Thomas Metzinger was supported by the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and Neuroscience.
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We thank Wolfgang Prinz for a number of very helpful comments to an earlier version of this paper.