Attention to action and awareness of other minds
Section snippets
Awareness of action
Will, the sense of being in control of our own actions is a major component of consciousness (along with emotion and cognition). But are we aware of all aspects of our own actions? Milner and Goodale (1995) have intensively studied a patient, known as DF, who demonstrates a striking lack of awareness of certain aspects of her own action. As a result of damage to her inferior temporal lobe DF suffers from form agnosia. In other words, she is unable to perceive the shapes of things. She cannot
Neural correlates of awareness of action
We may get clues about the function of awareness of action by studying the neural correlates of this awareness. The basic experimental paradigm is to try and keep the action the same while varying awareness. In one study reported by Jueptner et al. (1997), subjects learned a choice reaction time task in which there were four stimuli corresponding to four keys. The stimuli came on in a sequence, which repeated exactly every eight trials. As subjects learned this sequence, their responses became
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2015, Consciousness and CognitionCitation Excerpt :This implies, first, that all the preparatory stages leading up to overt action may occur in the mental simulation of action. These preparatory stages include not just the activation of the motor commands but also the construction of at least two models, one model of the efference commands, and one model of the anticipated sensory consequences of the action (Blakemore, 2003; Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Desmurget & Sirigu, 2009; Frith, 2002, 2005; Grush, 2004; Haggard, 2005; Waszak et al., 2012; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001; Wolpert et al., 1995). The anticipated sensory consequences include those things that are temporally bound to the action in intentional binding.
Examining intention in simulated actions: Are children and young adults different?
2014, Consciousness and CognitionCitation Excerpt :Several definitions have been applied to the term intention. In the context of action processing, we associate it with ‘choice with commitment’ (Cohen & Levesque, 1990), and for our interests, ‘intention [commitment] to act and the consequences of the action‘ (Frith, 2002). Searle (1983) also complements the general idea by suggesting that intention initiates a transaction between mind and environment by representing the end or aim of the action before the action is undertaken.