ReviewThe mechanism of self-recognition in humans
Introduction
How do we recognize ourselves and how do we distinguish ourselves from other people? In this paper, we examine theoretical and experimental evidence for a set of mechanisms by which we become aware of our body and our actions. These mechanisms are interesting to consider, for a number of reasons. First, the ability to recognize oneself as the agent of a behavior—the sense of agency—is the way by which the self builds as an entity independent from the external world. Second, by way of consequence, self-recognition is a prerequisite for attributing a behavior to its proper agent (be it oneself or another person) and ultimately for establishing social communication with our conspecifics. One of the main outcomes of the paper will be that our body is a behaving body, and that self-recognition is largely dependent on the recognition of one’s own actions. Thus, the distinction between self-generated actions and actions produced by other agents, and the corresponding ability to attribute an action to its agent will appear to be key functions for self-recognition.
The self/other distinction of the origin of an action may seem relatively simple when movements are overtly executed. In this condition, there is a possibility for monitoring sensory signals arising from the moving limbs and from the effects on the external world of the movements produced either by the self or the other, and comparing them with the signals resulting from the action generation mechanism. Which renders this distinction difficult is the existence of a number of situations where the action generation mechanism is activated, but where the action remains covert. In this paper, we will consider two such situations. One is that of imagined actions which has been extensively studied under the heading of “motor imagery”; another one is that of observation of actions performed by someone else, a situation which has been introduced more recently within the realm of covert action. Although the two situations are clearly dissimilar, they have in common to both rely on neural simulation of the imagined or the observed action.
The existence of covert action, which is an essential constituent of motor cognition, raises the problem for the self of disentangling from one another different modalities of motor representations which may be present more or less simultaneously within the same brain. Action recognition thus cannot be treated separately from the more general process extending to recognition of action-related mental states like intentions or desires. In this paper, we will develop the concept of “shared representations” as a potential difficulty for action recognition and self-recognition both in normal subjects and in subjects suffering pathological conditions.
Section snippets
Ownership and authorship in self-recognition
In the present section, we will focus on identifying the constituents of self-recognition in adult subjects. There are several potential sources of information which may contribute to self-recognition. First, the matching of visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals originating from the same body parts contributes to an intermodal sensory image of the body. Second, the matching of one’s intentions and the bodily effects of self-generated actions contributes to a sense of the self as an agent.
The nature of the mechanisms for self-recognition and attribution
There are several ways of conceiving the mechanisms involved in self-recognition. As we shall see in this section, however, most, if not all hypotheses about these mechanisms refer to one aspect of self-recognition, namely, action recognition. This predominance of action recognition over other possible cues for self-recognition, which was clearly highlighted by the above experiments, opens a number of empirical and theoretical questions.
In the following paragraphs, two empirically-based
Conclusion. A neural hypothesis for self-recognition and its failures: the ‘Who’ system
In this concluding section, a framework for integrating self-recognition to the neural substrate and for accounting for its failures is presented. Our present conception of action recognition [55], [58] is based on the existence of neural networks subserving the various forms of representation of an action. Accordingly, each representation entails a cortico-subcortical network including to a various extent activation of interconnected neural structures. Although these ensembles are clearly
References (64)
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science
Trends Cogn. Sci.
(2000)- et al.
Limited conscious monitoring of motor performance in normal subjects
Neuropsychologia
(1998) - et al.
Looking for the agent. An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients
Cognition
(1997) - et al.
Sense of body and sense of action both contribute to self recognition
Cognition
(2002) Conscious thought as simulation of behavior and perception
Trends Cogn. Sci.
(2002)- et al.
The timing of mentally represented actions
Behav. Brain Res.
(1989) - et al.
Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind reading
Trends Cogn. Sci.
(1998) Neural simulation of action: a unifying mechanism for motor cognition
Neuroimage
(2001)- et al.
Mental simulation of action in human subjects
Curr. Opin. Neurobiol.
(1999) - et al.
Beyond consciousness of external reality. A “Who” system for consciousness of action and self-consciousness
Consciousness Cogn.
(1998)
Activation of the Heschl’s gyrus during auditory hallucinations
Neuron
Recognizing one’s own face
Cognition
Perceptual adaptation to inverted, reversed and displaced vision
Psychol. Rev.
Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see
Nature
Left tactile extinction following visual stimulation of a rubber hand
Brain
Synaesthesia in phantom limbs induced with mirrors
Proc. R. Soc. Lond.
Detection of intermodal proprioceptive-visual contingency as a potential basis of self-perception in infancy
Dev. Psychol.
Volition: a new experimental approach
Scand. J. Psychol.
Preserved adjustment but impaired awareness in a sensory–motor conflict following prefrontal lesions
J. Cogn. Neurosci.
Self-monitoring in schizophrenia revisited
NeuroReport
Neural basis of the spontaneous optokinetic response produced by visual inversion
J. Comp. Physiol. Psychol.
Das Reafferenzprinzip. Wechselwirkungen zwischen Zentralnervensystem und Peripherie
Naturwissenschaften
An internal model for sensorimotor integration
Science
Central cancellation of self-produced tickle sensation
Nat. Neurosci.
Voluntary action and conscious awareness
Nat. Neurosci.
Time of conscious intention to act in relation to cerebral activities (readiness potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act
Brain
Spatio-temporal prediction modulates the perception of self-produced stimuli
J. Cogn. Neurosci.
Cited by (393)
Interacting in virtual reality: When the Proteus effect stimulates 3D MMORPG players to buy
2024, Technological Forecasting and Social ChangeCognitive load decreases the sense of agency during continuous action
2023, Acta Psychologica