Children's early understanding of false belief
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Cited by (189)
Extended difficulties with counterfactuals persist in reasoning with false beliefs: Evidence for teleology-in-perspective
2021, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology2.5-year-olds succeed in identity and location elicited-response false-belief tasks with adequate response practice
2020, Journal of Experimental Child PsychologyCitation Excerpt :Thus, children might successfully represent an agent’s false belief and nevertheless fail an elicited-response task because they cannot cope with these additional processing demands (Scott, Roby, & Smith, 2017). Consistent with this claim, several studies have identified modifications to elicited-response tasks that enable slightly younger, 3.5-year-old children to succeed (Bartsch, 1996; Bialecka-Pikul, Kosno, Bialek, & Szpak, 2019; Chandler et al., 1989; Lewis & Osborne, 1990; Mitchell & Lacohée, 1991; Psouni et al., 2019; Roth & Leslie, 1998; Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013; Salter & Breheny, 2019). For instance, 3.5-year-olds respond correctly at above-chance levels if asked where Sally will look first for the marble, which clarifies the experimenter’s intention and increases the salience of the marble’s original location (e.g., Siegal & Beattie, 1991; Yazdi, German, Defeyter, & Siegal, 2006).
Reliability and generalizability of an acted-out false belief task in 3-year-olds
2019, Infant Behavior and DevelopmentMemory and inferential processes in false-belief tasks: An investigation of the unexpected-contents paradigm
2019, Journal of Experimental Child PsychologyThe relationship between parental mental-state language and 2.5-year-olds’ performance on a nontraditional false-belief task
2018, CognitionCitation Excerpt :Many psychological methods are sensitive to procedural variations – small changes in things like the nature or timing of stimuli can impact the results. This has been well documented for elicited-response false-belief tasks, where subtle changes, such as the addition of the word first to the test question (e.g., Siegal & Beattie, 1991; Yazdi et al., 2006), impact the age at which children succeed (e.g., Bartsch, 1996; Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Friedman & Leslie, 2005; Hansen, 2010; Lewis & Osborne, 1990; Mitchell & Lacohée, 1991; Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013; Setoh, Scott, & Baillargeon, 2016; Westra, 2017). Nontraditional tasks are no exception, as we have demonstrated in our own work: modifications in the linguistic ambiguity of a false-belief story impacted whether 3-year-olds succeeded or failed as a group in a preferential-looking task, and whether or not their performance was correlated with their verbal ability (Scott & Roby, 2015).
Early False-Belief Understanding
2017, Trends in Cognitive Sciences