Perceived responsibility and compulsive checking: An experimental analysis

doi:10.1016/0005-7967(94)00089-3

Behaviour Research and Therapy

Volume 33, Issue 6, July 1995, Pages 673-684

https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(94)00089-3 Get rights and content

Abstract

An experiment was carried out on 30 Ss who qualified for the DSM-IIIR diagnosis of OCD in order to test the hypothesis, derived from cognitive theory, that changes in perceived responsibility are followed by corresponding changes in the urge to check compulsively. The manipulation succeeded in increasing/decreasing perceived responsibility, as required for the experiment. Decreased responsibility was followed by significant declines in discomfort and in the urge to carry out the compulsive checking. Increased responsibility was followed by corresponding increases in discomfort and urges, but these failed to reach a statistically significant level. Additionally, two types of OCD-related cognitive biases were encountered.

References (14)

R. Hodgson et al.
Obsessional-compulsive complaints
Behaviour Research and Therapy
(1977)
S. Rachman
Obsessional-compulsive checking
Behaviour Research and Therapy
(1976)
S. Rachman
Obsessions, responsibility and guilt
Behaviour Research and Therapy
(1993)
J. Rheaume et al.
Inflated responsibility in OCD
Behaviour Research and Therapy
(1995)
G. Roper et al.
An experiment on obsessional checking
Behaviour Research and Therapy
(1973)
E. Sanavio et al.
The components of the Maudsley obsessional-compulsive questionnaire
Behaviour Research and Therapy
(1985)
K. Sher et al.
Cognitive dysfunction in compulsive checkers: Further explorations
Behaviour Research and Therapy
(1984)

There are more references available in the full text version of this article.

Cited by (215)

Beliefs about losing control and other OCD-related cognitions: An experimental investigation
2024, Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry
Cognitive theories of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) suggest that dysfunctional beliefs influence symptoms. However, well-established belief domains do not fully explain OCD symptomatology, suggesting other cognitive mechanisms may be involved. An additional belief domain which may play a role in OCD is beliefs about losing control. Indeed, these beliefs have been found to be associated with OCD symptoms. However, the relationships between beliefs about losing control and other OCD phenomena, including other relevant dysfunctional beliefs, is unclear. The aim of this study was to examine the relationships between beliefs about losing control and appraisals hypothesized to be relevant to OCD.
A total of 163 participants completed the experimental protocol, wherein they received false (positive or negative) feedback regarding the likelihood they may lose control and completed a vignette task asking them to read hypothetical scenarios relevant to OCD concerns (checking, and aggressive thoughts). Vignettes were followed by questions and prompts used to measure OCD-relevant appraisals.
Based on MANOVAs, beliefs about losing control had a significant impact on appraisals in the checking, F (151) = 5.55, p = .001, and aggressive thoughts, F (151) = 2.898, p = .037, vignettes. However, planned comparison indicated that in the aggressive thoughts vignettes, this effect was in the opposite direction than was hypothesized.
The losing control induction may have inadvertently influenced participants’ beliefs about the utility of thought control.
Findings provide preliminary evidence for an association between beliefs about losing control and OCD-relevant appraisals.
In/stability of moral sense of self and OCD
2024, Journal of Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders
Why are people with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) susceptible to deontological (vs. altruistic) guilt? The present research addresses this question by examining the association of OC tendencies with deontological rather than altruistic guilt. Specifically, we conducted two correlational studies in which we examined whether and how the perceived instability of the moral sense of self (i.e., instability of morality) is associated with OC tendencies and deontological (vs. altruistic) guilt. As predicted, the results of path analysis models showed that the susceptibility to deontological (vs. altruistic) guilt typical of individuals with OC traits is primarily associated with the perceived instability of morality relative to the perceived status of morality (Study 1) and instability of extraversion (Study 2). These results suggest that deontological guilt and its association with OC traits can be understood better when the instability of the moral sense of self and vulnerability to sudden changes in moral status are considered. We discuss how these results contribute to theory, research, and clinical practice on OCD, morality, and guilt.
Dr. Jack Rachman's contributions to our understanding and treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder
2023, Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry
This paper reviews the development of the cognitive-behavioural model of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) through the work of Dr. Jack Rachman and the research his ideas inspired or shaped.
A narrative review of Rachman's work and important developments in related areas was conducted.
Rachman was highly responsive to theoretical and empirical developments in the field, and continuously developed his model of OCD over the course of his career. Key developments in his thinking and of those in related areas are described.
This is a narrative review that highlights important developments in the cognitive behavioural model of OCD only.
The CBT model of OCD has strong empirical support and CBT treatment is the most effective psychotherapy. Continued development in our understanding of attachment and in the persistence of compulsions is warranted.
Just let me check: The role of individual differences in self-reported anxiety and obsessive-compulsive features on subjective, behavioural, and physiological indices during a checking task
2022, International Journal of Psychophysiology
Checking behaviour has been described as a form of preventative behaviour used by an individual to establish control over the environment and avoid future misfortune. However, when compulsive, checking behaviours can become disabling and distressing and have been linked to the maintenance of anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders. Despite this, there is limited literature across the field that has assessed the impact of dimensional measures of anxiety and obsessive-compulsive features (i.e., negative affect, uncertainty, and perfectionism) in driving checking behaviour. As such, the present study examined the impact of individual differences in self-reported anxiety and obsessive-compulsive features on subjective, behavioural, and physiological indices during a visual discrimination and checking task (n = 87). Higher self-reported anxiety and obsessive-compulsive features were associated with higher subjective ratings of unpleasantness and the urge to check during the task. Moreover, higher self-reported anxiety and obsessive-compulsive features related to general negative affect, uncertainty, and perfectionism were associated with greater checking frequency during the task. Lastly, stronger obsessional beliefs about perfectionism and the need for certainty were found to predict poorer accuracy, slower reaction times, and higher engagement of the corrugator supercilii during the task. In sum, these findings demonstrate how different anxiety and obsessive-compulsive features, in particular perfectionism and the need for certainty, may relate to and maintain checking behaviour in low threat contexts, which likely has implications for models of excessive and persistent checking in anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders.
Who guards over obsessive fear of guilt? The case of Not Just Right Experiences and disgust
2022, Journal of Affective Disorders Reports
Background Guilt emotion, responsibility, disgust and Not Just Right Experiences (NJREs) are currently considered pivotal ingredients of Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Significant associations have been found between these variables and Obsessive–Compulsive (OC) symptoms, both in non-clinical and clinical populations. The main objective of our study was to shed light, in a nonclinical sample, on the patterns of association between these different constructs hypothesized to underlie OC symptoms. Methods Ninety-six healthy participants filled out measures of NJREs, OC symptoms, fear of guilt, and proneness to experiencing disgust. Results showed that while fear of guilt is a significant predictor of the different symptom clusters of OCD, disgust and NJREs differently contribute to symptomatic manifestation. Specifically, these findings suggest that while fear of feeling guilty is a cross-sectional ingredient of symptomatology, disgust and/or NJREs may function as sentinels of guilt, resulting in different behavioral outcomes. Limitations The use of healthy participants and of a single measure for NJREs, guilt, and disgust could limit the generalizability of the results. Conclusions These results support the primary role of guilt in the phenomenology of OC symptoms and support the perspective arguing for the centrality of the role of guilt in OC symptoms.
Excessive reassurance seeking versus compulsive checking in OCD: Comparing implicit motivators and mechanisms
2022, Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry
Excessive reassurance seeking (ERS) in OCD increases following scenarios with high threat and personal responsibility, but the mechanism via which ERS addresses these concerns is unclear. We investigated whether reassurance following OCD-related threats facilitated temporary threat re-appraisal and/or transferred responsibility to others. We also examined the ‘checking by proxy’ theory of OCD ERS by comparing the functional mechanisms of reassurance and checking behaviour.
Community participants (N = 398) were recruited through MTurk and randomised to one of four conditions: ambiguous object-derived (checking) information, ambiguous person-derived (reassurance) information, unambiguous object-derived information and unambiguous person-derived information. Participants read scenarios that conveyed a risk of harm or contamination before imagining receiving reassurance or checking information as per their condition. Ratings of personal and external responsibility, threat likelihood and uncertainty were made before and after receiving the information.
In support of a checking by proxy hypothesis of ERS, participants in the unambiguous information conditions reported decreased uncertainty, decreased estimated threat likelihood and increased responsibility of others, regardless of whether they imagined checking or receiving reassurance. Those in the ambiguous conditions reported no changes in threat estimation or responsibility beliefs. OCD symptom level moderated responses to ambiguity: unlike low OCD, high OCD participants did not respond differentially to ambiguous versus unambiguous reassurance.
The study was performed online due to Covid-19 restrictions and utilised non-clinical participants.
Like checking, reassurance facilitates short-term threat re-appraisal and diffuses responsibility following obsessive threats. Differentiated responses to reassurance ambiguity disappear as OC symptoms increase.

View all citing articles on Scopus

View full text