Time uncertainty and occurence uncertainty of the stimulus in a simple reaction time task

doi:10.1016/0001-6918(72)90029-7

Acta Psychologica

Volume 36, Issue 6, December 1972, Pages 492-503

https://doi.org/10.1016/0001-6918(72)90029-7 Get rights and content

Abstract

Relatively little attention has been paid to the effect of the so-called ‘catch trials’ on the level of performance in reaction-time experiments. The first investigator to approach systematically this important problem, which is significant also outside the sphere of reaction-time studies, was Gordon (1967), who demonstrated that reaction speed in a simple reaction-time task is an accelerating function of stimulus probability, i.e., the probability of delivery of the stimulus at a trial.

The present study aims at clarifying the same problem using a somewhat different experimental setting. Instead of only one foreperiod duration as used by Gordon, four different foreperiods were employed. Also measurements under stimulus-certainty conditions were introduced for purposes of comparison. In addition, the frequency of trials was equalized between experimental conditions involving differing stimulus probabilities, instead of Gordon's equalization of the response rate.

Eight subjects participated in 12 experimental sessions. The results suggested a linear relationship between the stimulus probability and the reaction time.

Finally, the concept of occurence uncertainty of the stimulus, designating the subject's uncertainty as to whether the stimulus would be presented at a trial, was compared with Klemmer's time uncertainty as a determinant of the simple reaction time, and three factors were proposed to explain the slowing down of reactions as occurence uncertainty increases.

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The circle cue was temporally informative of when the target would appear (p = 0.88). In all conditions, the targets were presented using an aging distribution of trials, in which a target is equally likely to be presented following each cue-target interval, a practice that creates an implicitly probable temporal sequence (Gabay & Henik, 2008; Hayward & Ristic, 2013a; Näätänen, 1972). The cue-target intervals of 100 and 1200 ms were used to capture the time courses of ASO and voluntary temporal attention, both of which normally exert strong effects at early cue-target times.
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This certainty might have counteracted the negative effects on RTs of a long–long foreperiod sequence. Earlier research has shown that the introduction of a small proportion of trials in which the target is not presented, i.e., catch trials, can be a more powerful manipulation to reduce the objective probability of target occurrence over the course of the foreperiod (see Correa, Lupiáñez, Milliken, & Tudela, 2004; Näätänen, 1972; Sanabria, Capizzi, & Correa, 2011; Steinborn et al., 2008). Catch trials effectively decrease the probability of target onset so that, as time goes by without target presentation, there is no need keeping track the passage of time since it is not assured that the target is going to occur.
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^☆: Supported by The Finnish Research Council for the Humanities and The Emil Aaltonen Foundation (Tampere, Finland).

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Time uncertainty and occurence uncertainty of the stimulus in a simple reaction time task☆

Abstract

Acta Psychologica

Acta Psychologica

Acta Psychologica

Effects of foreperiod, foreperiod variability and probability of stimulus occurence on simple reaction time

Journal of Experimental Psychology