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Randomness: off with its heads (and tails)

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Abstract

Although widely investigated and used in psychology, the concept of randomness is beset with philosophical and practical difficulties. In this paper, I propose a resolution to a long-standing problem in psychological research by arguing that the inability to comprehend and produce random behavior is not caused by a defect on the part of the observer but is a consequence of conceptual confusion. Randomness describes a state of high complexity which defies analysis and understanding. The well-known biases in predictive behavior (e.g. hot-hand and gambler’s fallacy) are not caused by the observers’ inability to comprehend randomness but reflect a natural pattern-seeking response to high-complexity situations. Further, I address the circularity at the heart of the randomness debate. Replacing randomness with complexity in psychology and cognitive science would eliminate many of the current problems associated with defining, investigating and using this elusive term.

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Notes

  1. Under a “single agent”, I broadly consider any agent that can be separated from the environment (e.g. steam engine, roulette, human observer etc.).

  2. Here is von Mises’ definition of randomness requiring both infinity and equiprobability [from Eagle (2005, p. 756)]: an infinite sequence S of outcomes of types \( {\text{A}}_{1} , \ldots ,{\text{A}}_{\text{n}} , \) is vM-random iff (1) every outcome type Ai has a well-defined relative frequency \( {\text{relf}}_{\text{i}}^{\text{s}} \) in S; and (2) for every infinite subsequence S* chosen by an admissible place selection, the relative frequency of Ai remains the same as in the larger sequence: \( {\text{relf}}_{\text{i}}^{\text{s}} = {\text{relf}}_{\text{i}}^{{{\text{s}}^{*} }} . \)

  3. Recent attempts to quantify the structure of random sequences ultimately represent a sophisticated incarnation of gambler’s fallacy (Aksentijevic 2015).

  4. Cutting referred to invariance as “absence of change” and transformations as “ways of invoking a change” (1998, p. 79).

  5. Similar problems can be found in other sciences but are outside the scope of this paper.

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Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank Lisa Kainan for making available her unpublished doctoral dissertation and Ruma Falk for her encouragement and advice.

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  1. Department of Psychology, Whitelands College, University of Roehampton, Holybourne Avenue, London, SW154JD, UK

    Aleksandar Aksentijevic

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  1. Aleksandar Aksentijevic
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Correspondence to Aleksandar Aksentijevic.

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Aksentijevic, A. Randomness: off with its heads (and tails). Mind Soc 16, 1–15 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-015-0187-7

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