Abstract
This paper seeks to analyse an under-discussed kind of self-control, namely the control of thoughts and sensations. I distinguish first-order control from second-order control and argue that their central forms are intentional concentration and intentional mindfulness respectively. These correspond to two forms of meditation, concentration meditation and mindfulness meditation, which have been regarded as central both in the traditions in which the practices arose and in the scientific literature on meditation. I analyse them in terms of their characteristic intentions, distinguish them from concentration and mindfulness in general, and examine the relations between them. Concentration involves keeping the mind focused on a single object, while mindfulness requires noticing whatever mental states occupy the focus of one’s consciousness. In the course of the investigation I examine the role of phenomenology and volition in the activity of meditating, and how they change as meditative capacities develop.
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Notes
Here I part company with Davidson’s well-known criterion: “a man is the agent of an act if what he does can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional” (1980) 46. I disagree also with the more specific claim of Al Mele that “keeping attention focused on a task is a mental action” (2009) 23.
He sets this out in his essay “Intending” (1980) 83–102.
See, e.g. the essays in Mole et al. (2011).
This is akin to James’s distinction between nucleus and fringe in Chapter IX of Principles of Psychology (1890).
See, e.g., Searle’s analysis of action in Intentionality (1983) chapter 3.
The classic illustration of an event with a deviant internal cause is Davidson’s example of the climber whose desire to rid himself of the danger of holding another man on a rope and belief that letting go of the rope would achieve this so unnerve him that he unintentionally lets go of the rope (1980) 79.
See Nash and Newberg (2013) for an alternative way of classifying meditation practices. On their schema such objectless meditation would not be classified as a form of concentration meditation.
See, e.g. Dunn et al. (1999) for a study involving novice meditators.
Whether these capacities differ much is an empirical question I cannot assess.
Davidson and Lutz also discuss this study in their (2008).
This accords closely with the characterisation Dreyfus (2011) 47 offers of mindfulness as “the paying close attention to an object, leading to the retention of the data so as to make sense of the information delivered by our cognitive apparatus.”
See Slagter et al. (2007).
See Shear and Jevning (1999).
Davis and Thompson (2014) 593.
The human mind, and presumably other animal minds, evolved with a tendency to flit about and for distractions to occur when trying to concentrate. There may have been an evolutionary advantage to our minds working in this way, perhaps for problem solving and creative activity, though it is possible too that this is a spandrel.
See Evan Thompson (2014) 168.
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Acknowledgments
For helpful comments on drafts of this paper I’d like to thank Miri Albahari, Christopher Framarin, Dave Liebesman, Bruce Mangan, Mark Migotti, Tony Scott, Evan Thompson, the fellow panelists at a meeting of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, and numerous audiences at colloquia and conferences.
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Latham, N. Meditation and self-control. Philos Stud 173, 1779–1798 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0578-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0578-y