Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Explaining the theory of mind deficit in autism spectrum disorder

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. Most involved in the debate about the explanation of the ToM deficit have failed to notice that autism’s status as a spectrum disorder has implications about which explanation is more plausible. In this paper, I argue that the shift from viewing autism as a unified syndrome to a spectrum disorder increases the plausibility of the explanation of the ToM deficit that appeals to a domain-specific, higher-level ToM module. First, I discuss what it means to consider autism as a spectrum rather than as a unified disorder. Second, I argue for the plausibility of the modular explanation on the basis that autism is better considered as a spectrum disorder. Third, I respond to a potential challenge to my account from Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone’s recent work (Gerrans, Biol Philos 17:305–321, 2002; Stone and Gerrans, Trends Cogn Sci 10:3–4, 2006a; Soc Neurosci 1:309–319, 2006b; Gerrans and Stone, Br J Philos Sci 59:121–141, 2008).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For additional diagnostic criteria, see the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association 2000, p. 75).

  2. Psychiatrists distinguish between categorical and dimensional classificatory systems. The DSM-IV is a categorical system that “works best when all the members of a diagnostic class are homogenous, when there are clear boundaries between classes, and when the different classes are mutually exclusive” (American Psychiatric Association 2000, p. xxxi). Dimensional systems, however, are for disorders on continua. The current DSM-V task force is investigating how the “concept of spectrum disorders” can work alongside the traditional Axis I–Axis II distinction (Kupfer et al. 2002, p. xx).

  3. See Baron-Cohen’s (2009) recent New York Times commentary.

  4. Baron-Cohen (2009), however, argues that this is still an open question because there has been insufficient research into possible biological differences between individuals with autism and with Asperger’s.

  5. Critics of MMT often presuppose without argument what they take to be Fodor’s view about informational encapsulation, i.e., that it is a necessary condition, leading them to argue that domain specificity would most often not be adaptive (see, e.g., Gerrans 2002, p. 310). Many have taken Fodor (1983) to be arguing that informational encapsulation is a necessary condition for a module, but Coltheart (1999) argues that on Fodor’s account informational encapsulation was only a characteristic or “typical” feature of a modular system and, in fact, Fodor does argue that the “notion of modularity ought to admit of degrees” (Fodor 1983, p. 37).

  6. However, Karmiloff-Smith (2009, p. 59) has recently argued that her “neuroconstructivist” account accommodates modularity in the adult brain, insisting that it would arise during the “ontogenetic process of gradual modularization.”

  7. I outline my criticisms of G&S’s (2008) account in more detail in Adams (forthcoming).

  8. In Adams (forthcoming), I provide additional worries facing a diachronic developmental account such as what Gerrans and Stone (2008) view themselves as providing. For similar concerns related to Karmiloff-Smith’s (1998) developmental explanation of Williams Syndrome, see Machery (2011).

  9. Similarly, when they attempt to explain behavior in other studies that I will not discuss, G&S (2008, p. 131) appeal only to “impaired low-level domain-specific mechanisms,” e.g., when explaining differences in performance between false-belief tests and false-photograph tests.

  10. Further studies supporting this conclusion include Golan et al. (2006, 2008).

  11. For a review of the literature, see Hill (2004).

References

  • Adams, M. P. (2009). Empirical evidence and the knowledge-that/knowledge-how distinction. Synthese, 170, 97–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Adams, M. P. (forthcoming). Modularity, theory of mind, and autism spectrum disorder. Philosophy of Science.

  • American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM-IV-TR) (4th ed., text revision). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.

  • Baron-Cohen, S. (1998). Does the study of autism justify minimalist innate modularity? Learning and Individual Differences, 10, 179–191.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baron-Cohen, S. (2009). The short life of a diagnosis. New York Times, November 9, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/10/opinion/10baron-cohen.html.

  • Baron-Cohen, S., Ring, H., Wheelwright, S., & Joliffe, T. (1997). Is there a ‘language of the eyes’? Evidence from normal adults and adults with autism or Asperger syndrome. Visual Cognition, 4, 311–331.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., & Plumb, I. (2001). The ‘reading the mind in the eyes’ test revised version: A study with normal adults, and adults with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42, 241–251.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Stone, V., & Rutherford, M. (1999). A mathematician, a physicist, and a computer scientist. Neurocase, 5, 475–483.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barrett, H. C., & Kurzban, R. (2006). Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate. Psychological Review, 113, 628–647.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bergeron, V. (2007). Anatomical and functional modularity in cognitive science: Shifting the focus. Philosophical Psychology, 20, 175–195.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bishop, D. V. M. (2000). What’s so special about Asperger’s syndrome? The need for further exploration at the borderlands of Autism. In A. Klin, F. R. Volkmar, & S. S. Sparrow (Eds.), Asperger syndrome (pp. 254–277). New York: The Guilford Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caramazza, A. (1986). On drawing inferences about the structure of normal cognitive systems from the Analysis of impaired performance: The case for single-patient studies. Brain and Cognition, 5, 41–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caramazza, A., & McCloskey, M. (1988). The case for single-patient studies. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 5, 517–525.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carey, S. (2009). The origin of concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Carrington, S. J., & Bailey, A. J. (2009). Are there theory of mind regions in the brain? A review of the neuroimaging literature. Human Brain Mapping, 30, 2313–2335.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers, P. (2006). The architecture of the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Coltheart, M. (1999). Modularity and cognition. Trends in Cognitive Science, 3(3), 115–120.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coltheart, M., & Langdon, R. (1998). Autism, modularity, and levels of explanation in cognitive science. Mind & Language, 13, 138–152.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture (pp. 163–228). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ekman, P. (1972). Universals and cultural differences in facial expressions of emotion. In J. K. Cole (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation: Vol. 1971 (pp. 207–283). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Factor, D. C., Freeman, N. L., & Kardash, A. (1989). Brief report: A comparison of DSM-III and DSM-III-R criteria for autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 19, 637–640.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fine, C., Lumsden, J., & Blair, R. J. R. (2001). Dissociation between ‘theory of mind’ and executive functions in a patient with early left amygdale. Brain, 124, 287–298.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. (1983). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gerrans, P. (2002). The theory of mind module in evolutionary psychology. Biology and Philosophy, 17, 305–321.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gerrans, P., & Stone, V. E. (2008). Generous or parsimonious cognitive architecture? Cognitive neuroscience and the theory of mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59, 121–141.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Glymour, C. (2001). The mind’s arrows. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Golan, O., Baron-Cohen, S., & Golan, Y. (2008). The ‘reading the mind in films’ task [child version]: Complex emotion and mental state recognition in children with and without autism spectrum conditions. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 38, 1534–1541.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Golan, O., Baron-Cohen, S., & Hill, J. (2006). The Cambridge Mindreading (CAM) face-voice battery: Testing complex emotion recognition in adults with Asperger syndrome. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 36, 169–183.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Golan, O., Baron-Cohen, S., Hill, J., & Rutherford., M. D. (2007). The ‘reading the mind in the voice’ test-revised: A study of complex emotion recognition in adults with and without autism spectrum conditions. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 37, 1096–1106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Griffith, E., Pennington, B. F., Wehner, E. A., & Rogers, S. J. (1999). Executive functions in young children with autism. Child Development, 70, 817–832.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hill, E. (2004). Evaluating the theory of executive dysfunction in autism. Developmental Review, 24, 189–233.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Humphreys, K., Minshew, N., Leonard, G. L., & Behrmann, M. (2007). A fine-grained analysis of facial expression processing in high-functioning adults with autism. Neuropsychologia, 45, 685–695.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Joseph, R. M., & Tanaka, J. (2003). Holistic and part-based face recognition in children with autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 44, 529–542.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kamp-Becker, I., Smidt, J., Ghahreman, M., Heinzel-Gutenbrunner, M., Becker, K., & Remschmidt, H. (2010). Categorical and dimensional structure of autism spectrum disorders: The nosological validity of Asperger syndrome. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 40, 921–929.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kanner, L. (1943). Autistic disturbances of affective contact. Nervous Child, 2, 214–250.

    Google Scholar 

  • Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1998). Development itself is the key to understanding developmental disorders. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2, 389–398.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2009). Nativism versus neuroconstructivism: Rethinking the study of developmental disorders. Developmental Psychology, 45, 56–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kendler, K. S., & Gardner, C. O. (1998). Boundaries of major depression: an evaluation of DSM-IV criteria. American Journal of Psychiatry, 155, 172–177.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kleinman, J., Marciano, P. L., & Ault, R. L. (2001). Advanced theory of mind in high-functioning adults with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31, 29–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klin, A., & Volkmar, F. R. (2003). Asperger syndrome: Diagnosis and external validity. Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics, 12, 1–13.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klin, A., Volkmar, F. R., Sparrow, S. S., Cicchetti, D. V., & Rourke, B. P. (1995). Validity and neuropsychological characterization of Asperger syndrome: Convergence with nonverbal learning disabilities syndrome. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 36, 1127–1140.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kupfer, D. J., First, M. B., & Regier, D. A. (2002). A research agenda for DSM-V. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lahaie, A., Motton, L., Arguin, M., Berthiaume, C., Jemel, B., & Saumier, D. (2006). Face perception in high-functioning autistic adults: Evidence for superior processing of face parts, not for a configural face-processing deficit. Neuropsychology, 20, 30–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leslie, A. M. (1987). Pretense and representation: The origins of ‘theory of mind’. Psychological Review, 94, 412–426.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Machery, E. (2011). Developmental disorders and cognitive architecture. In A. De Block & P. Adriaens (Eds.), Maladapting minds (pp. 91–116). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Machery, E., & Barrett, H. C. (2006). Debunking adapting minds. Philosophy of Science, 73, 232–246.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Robertson, L. C., Knight, R. T., Rafal, R., & Shimamura, A. P. (1993). Cognitive neuropsychology is more than just single-case studies. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 19, 710–717.

    Google Scholar 

  • Robins, E., & Guze, S. B. (1970). Establishment of diagnostic validity in psychiatric illness: Its application to schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 126, 983–987.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rutherford, M. D., Baron-Cohen, S., & Wheelwright, S. (2002). Reading the mind in the voice: A study with normal adults and adults with Asperger syndrome and high functioning autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 32, 189–194.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salmon, W. (2006). Four decades of scientific explanation. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuels, R. (1998). Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 49, 575–602.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scoville, W. B., & Milner, B. (1957). Loss of recent memory after bilateral hippocampal lesions. The Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, 20, 11–21 (reprinted in the 2000 “Neuropsychiatry Classics” section of The Journal of Neuropsychiatry & Clinical Neuroscience (New York, NY), 12(1), 103–113).

    Google Scholar 

  • Stone, V. E., & Gerrans, P. (2006a). Does the normal brain have a theory of mind? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 3–4.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stone, V. E., & Gerrans, P. (2006b). What’s domain specific about the theory of mind? Social Neuroscience, 1, 309–319.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tanguay, P. E., Robertson, J., & Derrick, A. (1998). A dimensional classification of autism spectrum disorder by social communication domains. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychology, 37, 271–277.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1992). The psychological foundations of culture. In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture (pp. 19–136). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Volkmar, F. R., Cicchetti, D. V., Cohen, D. J., & Bregman, J. (1992). Brief report: Developmental aspects of DSM-III-R criteria autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 22, 657–662.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Volkmar, F. R., Klin, A., Siegel, B., Szatmari, P., et al. (1994). Field trial for autistic disorder in DSM-IV. American Journal of Psychiatry, 151, 1361–1367.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wing, L. (1988). The continuum of autistic characteristics. In E. Schopler & G. B. Mesibov (Eds.), Diagnosis and assessment in autism (pp. 91–110). New York: Plenum Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yerys, B. E., Hepburn, S. L., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. J. (2007). Executive function in preschoolers with autism: Evidence consistent with secondary deficit. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 37, 1068–1079.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Edouard Machery and Arthur Falk for comments on a draft of this paper. I also thank Shannon Bernard-Adams for many conversations about clinical practice and Autism Spectrum Disorder.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of History & Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA, 15260, USA

    Marcus P. Adams

Authors
  1. Marcus P. Adams
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Marcus P. Adams.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Adams, M.P. Explaining the theory of mind deficit in autism spectrum disorder. Philos Stud 163, 233–249 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9809-z

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9809-z

Keywords

Search

Navigation