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Temporality and psychopathology

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Abstract

The paper first introduces the concept of implicit and explicit temporality, referring to time as pre-reflectively lived vs. consciously experienced. Implicit time is based on the constitutive synthesis of inner time consciousness on the one hand, and on the conative–affective dynamics of life on the other hand. Explicit time results from an interruption or negation of implicit time and unfolds itself in the dimensions of present, past and future. It is further shown that temporality, embodiment and intersubjectivity are closely connected: While implicit temporality is characterised by tacit bodily functioning and by synchronisation with others, explicit temporality arises with states of desynchronisation, that is, of a retardation or acceleration of inner time in relation to external or social processes. These states often bring the body to awareness as an obstacle as well. On this basis, schizophrenia and melancholic depression are investigated as paradigm cases for a psychopathology of temporality. Major symptoms of schizophrenia such as thought disorder, thought insertion, hallucinations or passivity experiences may be regarded as manifesting a disturbance of the constitutive synthesis of time consciousness, closely connected with a weakening of the underlying pre-reflective self-awareness or ipseity. This results in a fragmentation of the intentional arc, a loss of self-coherence and the appearance of major self-disturbances. Depression, on the other hand, is mostly triggered by a desynchronisation from the social environment and further develops into an inhibition of the conative–affective dynamics of life. As will be shown, both mental illnesses bear witness of the close connection of temporality, embodiment and intersubjectivity.

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Notes

  1. A good example is Theunissen’s analysis in his “Negative Theologie der Zeit” (Negative Theology of Time) (1991). Cf. also, in overview, Blankenburg (1992).

  2. See also Fuchs 2005b.

  3. Csikszentmihalyi 1991.

  4. Husserl 1969/1991; on this, see also Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 75ff.

  5. Husserl often uses the metaphor of the standing-streaming “Heraclitean flow”.

  6. Cf. Merleau-Ponty 1962, 120: “Let us therefore say (...) that the life of consciousness – cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual life—is subtended by an ‘intentional arc’ which projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these respects.”

  7. Cf. Henry (1965), Merleau-Ponty (1962, 379) as well as the more recent analyses by Zahavi (2003), Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, 79f). Of course, already Husserl himself had the interrelationship between the continuity of consciousness and self-experience in view: “The flow of the consciousness that constitutes immanent time not only exists but is so remarkably yet intelligibly fashioned that a self-appearance of the flow necessarily exists in it, and therefore the flow itself must necessarily be apprehensible in the flowing. The self-appearance of the flow does not require a second flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself” (Husserl 1969, 83). Thus, Husserl’s account of the protentional–retentional structure of inner time consciousness has also to be taken as an account of the micro-structure of pre-reflective self-awareness.

  8. From the Latin conatus = endeavour, effort, drive, urge.The concept dates back to Stoic philosophy and was later used by Hobbes and Spinoza in particular to denote the living being’s striving for self-preservation (conatus sese conservandi), in close connection with affective–volitional life. For further reading, see e.g. Lin 2004.

  9. “We (...) bring to view the vital origins of perception, motility and representation by basing all these ‘processes’ on an ‘intentional arc’ which loses its tension in the patient, and which, in the normal subject, endows experience with its degree of vitality and fruitfulness” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 140). This “energetic” or affective side of intentionality is hardly present yet in Husserl’s earlier writings, but it comes increasingly to the fore in his later works, especially as regards the role of affection for attention (cf. Depraz 1994, 1998). The pre-reflective experiential directedness means a (self-)affection which Husserl also refers to as “awakening of an intention” and “drive-intentionality” (Husserl 2001, p. 198).

  10. This is at the core of Henry’s phenomology of life (Henry 1963), but is also found in Merleau-Ponty (1962, 379): “Time is the affecting of self by self.”

  11. Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 376.

  12. Naturally, the time-constituting influence of rhythmical, repetitive processes must also be taken into account, such as breathing in and out, sleeping and waking, day and night, recurring times of meal, etc. Such experiences of rhythmical repetition, however, do not constitute the “rift” or break in a continuum which shows that the past is lost and thus give rise to the forceful experience of the irreversibility of passing time.

  13. Time has been analysed from this point of view mainly by Theunissen (1991), who referred especially to psychopathological analyses of melancholia.

  14. Cf. Fuchs 2005a.

  15. Cf. on this point Schmitz 1992 and Schmitz 1965, § 6.

  16. According to Piaget, who coined the term “object permanence”, this is already possible from the eighth month of life on; cf. also Markowitsch and Welzer 2005, p. 153.

  17. Ibid, pp. 83f., 209ff.

  18. Kupke 2002, 2009.

  19. Theunissen 1991, p. 305.

  20. Straus (1960), following Hönigswald, also speaks of “experience-immanent” and “experience-transcendent” time (erlebnisimmante vs. erlebnistranseunte Zeit). The latter must not be confused with physical time.

  21. Cf. Fuchs 2000, p. 244ff.

  22. Stern 1985.

  23. Papoušek and Papoušek 1995. It should, however, be emphasised that early communication does not ideally mean “complete synchronization”, but always includes sequences of matches and mismatches which are also important for drawing the boundary between the child and its mother (Tronick and Cohn 1989). Synchronisation thus means a rhythmic or phasic harmonisation, not complete congruence.

  24. Even the slightly extended response latency which appears in intercontinental telephone conversations gives rise to some irritation, and makes it clear that normally each conversation establishes an implicit temporal coordination.

  25. Minkowski 1970, p. 72.

  26. The “élan vitale” or “élan personel” as a basic concept of Minkowski’s psychopathology should thus not be regarded as a merely individual principle, but as being tightly connected to intersubjectivity. Cf. also Levinas (1995, p. 51): “The face-to-face situation would be the actual fulfilment of time. The transition of the present to the future is not the act of a lonely subject but the intersubjective relationship.”—“The relationship to the future is the actual relationship to the other”(ibid, p. 48).

  27. As the subjective experience of the velocity of time depends mainly on the degree of our activity and involvement, the unfilled time of boredom is experienced as dilated or “creeping”, although the individual’s own time is rather accelerated in relation to external processes.

  28. Description given by a female schizophrenic patient of Bin Kimura (In: Psychopathology of self-awareness, Tokyo 1978, p. 18; quoted from Kobayashi 1998, p. 114).

  29. From a schizophrenic patient of Chapman’s (1966).

  30. Blankenburg 1969/2001, 1971; see also Fuchs 2001b.

  31. Chapman 1966.

  32. McGhie and Chapman 1961.

  33. For example, Fuchs 2000, p. 144ff., 2002; 2007a; Gallagher 2000a, b; 2005; Mishara 2007; Vogeley and Kupke 2007.

  34. See also Fuchs 2007a.

  35. Janzarik 2004.

  36. McGhie and Chapman 1961.

  37. Parnas et al. 2005, p. 245.

  38. In order to distinguish the German “Ich-Stoerungen” (that means, ‘ego-’ or ‘self-disturbances’, including thought withdrawal, thought insertion, thoughts aloud and passivity experiences) from the basic schizophrenic disturbance of self-awareness or ipseity, I refer to the former as “major self-disturbances”.

  39. One could remind here Kant’s analysis of transcendental apperception: “It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations, or otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all (...) For the manifold representations that arise in a certain intuition would not, as a whole, be my presentations if they did not belong to one self-consciousness (...), because they would not consistently belong to me’ (Critique of pure reason, Transcendental Analysis, § 16). The formulation: “otherwise something would be represented in me” describes exactly the alienation of thought that schizophrenics actually experience (“it thinks”).

  40. Klosterkötter 1988, p. 163. The delusional ascription of the experiences to certain external forces—thoughts being inserted or movements being controlled by others—can no longer be explained by the fragmentation of the basal self alone but is founded on the alterity which is constitutive of the personal self (see below as well as Fuchs 2000, pp. 171ff.).

  41. Ibid, p. 111.

  42. This is no longer a case of pathological “transcendental delay” (see p. 12 above), but of the deferral which always characterises reflection.

  43. See for a more detailed discussion of this parallel Vogeley and Kupke 2007; Kaiser and Weisbrod 2007; Fuchs 2007a.

  44. Fuster 2003, cf. also Fuster 1997.

  45. Kaiser and Weisbrod 2007.

  46. A number of studies have shown marked deficits of working memory and executive control functions which manifest themselves as formal thought disorders (Vogeley et al. 1999; Manoach 2003). Further, schizophrenic patients may exhibit problems with timing or sequencing of tasks, e.g. a disturbance of sequential finger movements (Jirsa et al. 1996), a reduced ability to discriminate stimuli in close temporal vicinity (Braus 2002), and abnormally long latencies in estimating time intervals (Mishara 2007). On this, see also Kaiser and Weisbrod 2007; Vogeley and Kupke 2007.

  47. Cf. Andreasen et al. 1998.

  48. This concept of schizophrenia has been put forward by Parnas and Sass in a number of seminal papers; see Sass and Parnas 2003; Parnas 2000, 2003; Sass 2000. My approach aims to complement their concept by elaborating its temporal dimension.

  49. This description from our own clinic I owe to Bürgy (2003).

  50. Cf. above, p. 7.

  51. On the notion of “inhabiting” or “indwelling”, see Polanyi 1967 as well as Sass 2000, 168f.

  52. McGhie and Chapman 1961.

  53. Cf. on the concept of schizophrenic hyperreflexivity, Sass 1992a; Sass and Parnas 2003; Stanghellini 2004, 150ff. It can also be traced back to Minkowski’s notions of “morbid rationalism” and “morbid geometrism” in schizophrenia (Minkowski 1927).

  54. Sass and Parnas 2003, 432.

  55. Sass and Parnas 2003, 432.

  56. On affectivity in schizophrenia, cf. in particular Sass 2004, 2007.

  57. Minkowski 1927, 99f. (own translation). Again, the loss of élan personel or “vital contact with reality” should be regarded as including the intersubjective aspect as well, as the quotation of the patient already hints at; on this, see the next chapter. A patient of our department reported a similar experience: “I feel like in the movie ‘Groundhog Day’: time and again I wake up, and the same things happen again and again. That’s how I feel—like in a dream. [...] All other people live a normal life, but for me, it’s different, it’s like cut–cut–cut ... I look at an entity, and I look at other entities, and there is emptiness in between, there is nothing in between.” Here existential time is fragmented, and the patient experiences an eternal recurrence of the same.

  58. Cf. Wiggins and Schwartz 2007.

  59. “The real world is only in the constantly conceived presumption that experience will continue in the same constitutive style” (Husserl 1929, p. 222).

  60. Taken from Parnas and Handest 2003.

  61. Locke 1975, II, xxvii, 9; Parfit 1984.

  62. Cf. e.g. Berndl et al. 1986; Steimer-Krause et al. 1990.

  63. Parnas et al. 2002.

  64. Stanghellini 2004, p. 115.

  65. Ibid, p. 99.

  66. Blankenburg 1969/2001, Stanghellini 2004.

  67. On this, cf. Fuchs 2007a.

  68. On the ontological difference in schizophrenia, see Sass 1992b.

  69. See above, p. 9, especially footnote 26: “The transition of the present to the future is not the act of a lonely subject but the intersubjective relationship” (Levinas 1995, p. 51).

  70. See above, footnote 48.

  71. Kuiper 1991, pp. 58, 157, 162.

  72. Cf. on this point, see the classical texts by Straus 1960, v. Gebsattel 1954 and Tellenbach 1980.

  73. For example, Kraus 1991; Kupke 2002.

  74. On this, cf. also Fuchs 2001a.

  75. See Tellenbach 1980. There is a host of more recent literature on the role of triggering life events related to the patients’ social relationships; cf. for example Vilhjalmsson 1993; Kessler 1997 or Kendler 2003.

  76. Kraus 1987. Using Minkowski’s (1970) distinction of ‘schizoidia’ versus ‘syntonia’ as basic personality types, one could also characterise the melancholic type as hyper-syntonic.

  77. Mead 1934; cf. on the concepts of object- and subject-ego in melancholia, especially Kraus 1991.

  78. From the socio-biological point of view, depression can also be understood as an evolutionary protective mechanism in situations of social stress or defeat which consists in a psycho-physiological block or paralysis, in passive-submissive and humble behaviour towards other members of the tribe, and which dispenses the individual temporarily from social demands and competitive situations (cf. Pillmann 2001). On the other hand, the biological level may also play a leading role in the aetiology of depression, e.g. when it is triggered by a severe somatic illness. Similarly, after repeated episodes of depression its neurobiological pathways are facilitated to such an extent that even minimal irritations may trigger a new episode.

  79. Cf. Fuchs 2005a.

  80. Cf. e.g. the studies of facial expression by Krause and Lütolf (1989).

  81. Cf. Fuchs 2000, 107, 138; Kraus 2002.

  82. On this, see Bech 1975, Kitamura and Kumar 1982, Münzel et al. 1988; Mundt et al. 1998.

  83. Theunissen 1991, 304.

  84. v. Gebsattel 1954.

  85. This distinction does not yet cover all possible pathologies of time consciousness. In obsessive–compulsive disorder, for example, a lack of the affective loading of the intentional arc manifests itself in the typical “sense of incompleteness” (Summerfeldt 2004; Ecker and Gönner 2006). This forces the patients to repeat their actions again and again, in vain seeking to achieve a sense of “closure”, that means, a feeling of having performed these actions “just right”. Of course, the mere cognitive awareness of having done so is preserved and there is no experience of discontinuity, no interruption of the intentional arc. It is the experience of fulfilment that is missing.

  86. Work has been done on the reification of time in melancholia especially by Kobayashi (1998, pp. 163ff.).

  87. Bin Kimura, Time and Self, Tokyo 1982; quoted after Kobayashi 1998, p. 168.

  88. Kuiper 1991, p. 156.

  89. Kuiper 1991, p. 168.

  90. Binswanger 1960, pp. 26f.

  91. Cf. Fuchs 2000, 112.

  92. Kuiper 1991, 136.

  93. Cf. e.g. Fuchs 2007b.

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Fuchs, T. Temporality and psychopathology. Phenom Cogn Sci 12, 75–104 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9189-4

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