Abstract
The present study investigated how symptoms of mania—associated with heightened and persistent positive emotion—influence emotion experience and perception during distressing social interactions, whereby the experience of heightened positive emotion may not be socially adaptive. Specifically, mania symptoms were assessed via a validated self-report measure, and used to predict emotion experience and perception during a naturalistic conversation between romantic couples about a time of distress and suffering (N = 68 dyads). Results indicated that mania symptoms were associated with increased positive and decreased negative emotion experience and perception between couples, as well as decreased empathic accuracy for partners’ negative but not positive emotions. These findings suggest that mania symptoms may be associated with “rose-colored” glasses characterized by a positively biased emotional experience and outward perception even during perhaps the most intimate and distressing social situations.
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Notes
Because individual emotion findings were generally consistent with the results from the composites, and internal consistency was high within the scale, we used composites rather than individual emotion items for statistical parsimony.
Follow-up analyses including role (speaker vs. listener) in the models revealed that role did not moderate effects of mania symptoms (ASRM scores) on positive or negative emotion experience or perception (ps > .60). For the empathic accuracy analyses, role also did not moderate the directional bias of ASRM (ps > .40) or the Truth Force (ps > .20), and the three-way interaction between ASRM scores, truth force, and role was not significant (ps > .30) for positive or negative emotion experience or perception composites.
For positive emotion, gender did not moderate the directional bias or truth force (ps > .80), but did moderate the bias force (b = −0.09, t(186.00) = −2.49, p < .05), such that men demonstrated a weaker bias force compared to women; that is, women assumed more similarity than did men. In the same model, partner ASRM scores did not moderate the directional bias, truth force, or bias force (ps > .10). Consistent with what is reported in the main text, in this model, directional bias was negative and significant, (b = −0.13, t(99.82) = −2.89, p < .01), the truth force was positive and significant (b = 0.14, t(239.54) = 2.96, p < .01), and the bias force was positive and significant (b = 0.81, t(239.43) = 22.12, p < .001). Perceiver ASRM of the perceiver did not moderate directional bias, the truth force, or the bias force (ps > .20).
For negative emotion, gender did not moderate the directional bias (p > .10) but did moderate the truth force (b = −0.12, t(208.91) = −2.31, p < .05), such that men were less accurate at perceiving negative emotion in their partners overall. Gender did not moderate the bias force (p > .90), but partner ASRM scores did moderate the directional bias (b = 0.03, t(250.39) = 3.17, p < .01), such that individuals whose partners scored higher in ASRM were more likely to overestimate their partners’ negative emotions. Partner ASRM scores did not moderate the truth force or bias force (ps > .10). In this model, consistent with what is reported in the main text, directional bias was positive and significant, (b = 0.16, t(124.08) = 4.12, p < .001), the truth force was positive and significant (b = 0.42, t(247.85) = 8.41, p < .001), and the bias force was positive and significant (b = 0.44, t(240) = 8.83, p < .01). Perceivers with higher ASRM scores overestimated their partners’ negative emotion less than those with lower ASRM scores (b = −0.03, t(251.11) = −3.07, p < .01). Perceivers with higher ASRM scores were less accurate in their perceptions of their partners’ negative emotions than those with lower scores (b = −0.03, t(250.58) = −2.89, p < .01), and individuals with higher ASRM scores assumed similarity to a weaker extent than did those with lower ASRM scores (b = −0.03, t(250.43) = −3.00, p < .01).
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Dutra, S.J., West, T.V., Impett, E.A. et al. Rose-colored glasses gone too far? Mania symptoms predict biased emotion experience and perception in couples. Motiv Emot 38, 157–165 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-013-9363-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-013-9363-4