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Analog and Digital Representation

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue for three claims. The first is that the difference between analog and digital representation lies in the format and not the medium of representation. The second is that whether a given system is analog or digital will sometimes depend on facts about the user of that system. The third is that the first two claims are implicit in Haugeland's (1998) account of the distinction.

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Notes

  1. These capacities are present early in infancy, and remain present in older children and adults, long after the acquisition of precise numerical capacities. Moreover, approximate numerical capacities similar to those observed in humans have been documented in a range of other species.

  2. See for example, Wynn (1992), Dehaene (1997), Laurence and Margolis (2005), and Gallistel et al. (2006).

  3. See also von Neumann (1958), Goodman (1968), and Lewis (1971).

  4. See for example, Spelke (2003), Hauser and Spelke (2004).

References

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, 433 Logan Hall, 249 S. 36th St., Philadelphia, PA, 19104-6304, USA

    Matthew Katz

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  1. Matthew Katz
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Correspondence to Matthew Katz.

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Katz, M. Analog and Digital Representation. Minds & Machines 18, 403–408 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9112-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9112-8

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