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Coping with uncertainty: police strategies for resilient decision-making and action implementation

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Abstract

This study uses a hostage negotiation setting to demonstrate how a team of strategic police officers can utilize specific coping strategies to minimize uncertainty at different stages of their decision-making in order to foster resilient decision-making to effectively manage a high-risk critical incident. The presented model extends the existing research on coping with uncertainty by (1) applying the RAWFS heuristic (Lipshitz and Strauss in Organ Behav Human Decis Process 69:149–163, 1997) of individual decision-making under uncertainty to a team critical incident decision-making domain; (2) testing the use of various coping strategies during “in situ” team decision-making by using a live simulated hostage negotiation exercise; and (3) including an additional coping strategy (“reflection-in-action”; Schön in The reflective practitioner: how professionals think in action. Temple Smith, London, 1983) that aids naturalistic team decision-making. The data for this study were derived from a videoed strategic command meeting held within a simulated live hostage training event; these video data were coded along three themes: (1) decision phase; (2) uncertainty management strategy; and (3) decision implemented or omitted. Results illustrate that, when assessing dynamic and high-risk situations, teams of police officers cope with uncertainty by relying on “reduction” strategies to seek additional information and iteratively update these assessments using “reflection-in-action” (Schön 1983) based on previous experience. They subsequently progress to a plan formulation phase and use “assumption-based reasoning” techniques in order to mentally simulate their intended courses of action (Klein et al. 2007), and identify a preferred formulated strategy through “weighing the pros and cons” of each option. In the unlikely event that uncertainty persists to the plan execution phase, it is managed by “reduction” in the form of relying on plans and standard operating procedures or by “forestalling” and intentionally deferring the decision while contingency planning for worst-case scenarios.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Psychology, Health and Society, School of Psychology, University of Liverpool, Eleanor Rathbone Building, Bedford Street South, Liverpool, L69 7ZA, UK

    Claudia van den Heuvel, Laurence Alison & Nicola Power

Authors
  1. Claudia van den Heuvel
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  2. Laurence Alison
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  3. Nicola Power
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Laurence Alison.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Coding guidelines

Coders were presented with a transcript of the discussions between decision-makers during the hostage negotiation simulation. They were also given the following guidelines with regard to coding the discourse taking place during the situation. There were three forms of coding: (1) coding the decision phase; (2) coding the uncertainty coping strategy used; and (3) coding the decision as “made” or “omitted”.

1.1 Decision phase coding

 

Decision phase (code)

Description

Situation assessment (SA)

Participants are creating a storyboard or an image of what is going on at that moment in time (e.g. what is going on? What do I perceive?)

Plan formulation (PF)

Participants discuss strategies for dealing with the dynamic event

They formulate options/hypotheses on how to deal with situation

They define the roles/responsibilities required to carry out strategy

Plan execution (PE)

Participants create tactics for carrying out a previously defined plan

They discuss the physical actions required to execute previously formulated plans

They assign the roles/responsibilities to carry out tactical action

1.2 Coping with uncertainty strategy codes

 

Uncertainty coping strategy (code):

Description of how each strategy and tactics to achieve this:

Reduction (R)

Seeking further information to reduce uncertainty via the tactics of

 Advice seeking (from external sources and each other)

 Extrapolating meaning from information at hand—for example, “if the offender is saying X, it means he might be inclined to do Y”

 Discussing standard operating procedures, policy, and plans

 Redundant deliberation—asking repeated questions, not making any progress in their thinking, planning, or decision-making

Assumption-based reasoning (AbR)

Constructing assumption-based hypotheses to reduce uncertainty via the tactics of

 Mental simulation (create hypothetical mental models and simulating the steps of their plans if they were to implement them)

 Mental rehearsal (testing hypothetical mental model by imagining possible consequences if they were to implement a plan or strategy)

 Anticipatory thinking (focusing on the potential outcome of their actions in both short term and long term)

Weighing pros and cons (WPC)

Listing and trading off the pros and cons of possible courses of actions to overcome uncertainty

Forestalling (F)

Remove uncertainty by avoiding non-reversible actions through

 Preparing for worst-case scenario: identifying various contingency plans that may be used in case offender does something extreme (e.g. becomes violent to the victims, tries to escape)

 Intentional deferral: an active choice to not make a decision yet, with explicit intention to revisit this decision at a later point in time

Suppression (S)

Taking a carelessly calculated gamble to reduce uncertainty via the tactics of

 Denial of uncertainty (either knowingly or unknowingly)

 Acknowledging uncertainty but not doing anything about it

Reflection-in-action (RIA)

Process of continually critiquing and revising assumptions via

 Reflecting on previously chosen actions; for example, “before when the offender said X, we said/did Y. That resulted in Z”

 Reframing their mental models; for example, “I thought the offender was X but this indicates he might be Y”

 An incremental and deliberate monologue describing the dynamic environment; for example, “I think what the offender is now feeling/doing is…”

1.3 Decision made versus omitted

Every discussion should be given one decision “Made” or “Omitted” code at the end of that discussion. The discussion will only be coded for a decision “made” if the team has explicitly identified a decision and tasked someone with implementing that choice; for example, “Great, on your advice then, the decision is to provide the offender with food”.

Appendix 2: Example quotes of coping strategies coded during the SA phase

 

Coping strategy

Tactic within strategy

Description of strategy in HN context

Quote

Reduction (initial SA)

Active information search

The IC and NC often sought intelligence, information, and advice from each other in order to inform their understanding of the dynamic situation

OK, run me through, where are we going to take this to? Stage 1: if I said to you, “I’m putting negotiators in there (if I am explaining this to someone else) what do I expect to get in the next half hour?”

Assumption-based reasoning (initial SA)

Conjecturing

Officers made assumptions about what was occurring inside the stronghold (when insufficient information was available) to create a working understanding of the incident

“I don’t think it is reality that they would give up all the hostages because if they do give up all the hostages then they’ve given up bargaining chips. My view on these people is that the reason why they have the hostages is to buy them time, to mentally think about where they are and to escape. To give up all the hostages is like giving themselves up, so I don’t think that as a criminal I would be releasing hostages on that.”

Reflection-in-action (iterative SA)

Stepping back and reflecting

The NC and IC discussed previous actions in order to make an informed decision

IC: “right, what have we done for them?”

NC: “we’ve swapped over negotiators when they asked us to. We haven’t told them any lies, we have been engaging with them […] we have engaged with them, been nice to them […] haven’t gone crashing in, haven’t told them any lies…”

IC: “well, can’t we use all that and say ‘right we have done all that, what are you now going to do for us?’”

Suppression (maladaptive SA)

Decision omission

Discussion over whether to introduce a “reality check” to the offenders (by making consequences clear to the offenders), was omitted as the NC attempted to suppress high levels of uncertainty.

IC: “so why are you, if it is 50–50, why are you advising to go with the reality check, or you just saying that’s an option?”

NC: “I’m just saying that’s an option (shrugs)”

Appendix 2.1: Example quotes of coping strategies coded during the PF phase

 

Coping strategy

Tactic within strategy

Description of strategy in HN context

Quote

Assumption-based reasoning

Mental simulation

The IC used mental simulation to plan the potential processes of action

“I don’t want to get into choosing, if they start giving me names and saying “you choose” I’m not going to do that. They’ve […] given me an opening bid, and I sort of want it to be known that I am interested in that opening bid. I don’t know what words you’re going to use as a negotiator but I am interested… but here is my counter bid, let the 3 go and the car will get to you”

Mental rehearsal

Tactical advisor used mental rehearsal by imagining potential scenarios before choosing one when advising over the provision of a car

“Depending on the time and on the fuel switch, we could actually have the strike down within the cartilage of the tunnel area. Which gives us some control as they come out of the tunnel”

Anticipatory thinking

The IC visualized the consequences of their actions in terms of later stages of investigation, as well as post-incident procedures or examination of their decision-making and rationales

IC: So we are going to coroner’s court, and when we get to coroner’s court I need to be able to say that I got some advice and I was able to make a decision

IC: […] what I really need is some options so that I can start making choices. Because at the moment, she dies, other people die, I’m at coroner’s court or public enquiry and I am trying to explain some decisions I have made, and at the moment, I can’t make any. Because I’m not being given any options by my Tac Advisor, by my intelligence people, or by you

Weighing pros and cons

Plan prioritization

The IC and NC discussed whether or not to provide the hostage takers with a car

IC: In relation to the car, my gut instinct is to say no. However what this now presents us with is a tactical option. If we have more than one hostage on the bus, and we can present them with a car which means they take no hostages, I’ve saved a load of lives. And therefore presenting a car might actually give me some tactics

NC: So let the three go and then the car will be put in. What about… I appreciate what you were saying about not wanting to get into it, but are we possibly not letting them leave with two hostages?

IC: sorry, by all means give me another solution to save three lives. Because I can’t get into it, we can sit here forever and make them starve to death, or we can sit here forever and see if they just give people up. I mean, that is an option, but I have got to say, I’ve got no information on the identity of the hostages, I don’t know what illnesses they’ve got, I know that one has allegedly had her thumb cut off, so they are being physically assaulted now, so I actually have an imperative to do something. I can’t have a tactical imperative on that for all the reasons I have given you. So, that’s all I can come up with at the moment

Reduction (maladaptive PF)

Redundant deliberation

The IC sought advice on “known unknowns”; blocking the team decision process from reaching PE and instead directing them back to SA

“To that end, I don’t know if you’ve got there yet, or if they’ve asked what’s going to happen, it doesn’t sound like they’ve got any kind of conception that this is going to end any other way than the way they want it to. When it comes to reality, if they asked “what would happen if we gave ourselves up?” what would you say?”

Reduction-assumption-based reasoning loop (maladaptive PF)

Redundant deliberation

The IC and NC engaged in a Reduction-Assumption-based reasoning loop when redundantly deliberating whether to request the release of hostages

IC: “Now, your advice please on this—do we ask for all the hostages to be released or do we ask for one of the hostages to be released?” (reduction)

NC: “I don’t think it is reality that they would give up all the hostages because if they do give up all the hostages then they’ve given up bargaining chips. My view on these people is that the reason why they have the hostages is to buy them time, to mentally think about where they are and to escape.” (assumption-based reasoning)

IC: “How do the other hostages feel if we say “oh give up A hostage” […] that is the bit I need your advice on is—what is the best way to approach this? I want to save someone.” (reduction)

NC: “My advice to you is that I don’t think in the reality here that anybody will get seriously injured, if we play this strong.” (assumption-based reasoning)

Appendix 2.2: Example quotes of coping strategies coded during the PE phase

 

Coping strategy

Tactic used within strategy

Description of strategy in HN context

Example

Reduction

Using standard operating procedures

The IC, when deciding on the issue of implementing a communication device, sought advice from the technical support unit (TSU) officer and then implemented the decision based on the standard operating procedures for crisis negotiation

TSU: “AT the INK you’re only speaking on demand, whereas the field phone will have the dynamic footage coming in”

IC: “Perfect, on your advice that’s what we should do. Alright, I’m happier with that and I’ll tell you why I’m happier with that. Because it means that I now know that you are negotiating towards the planned objective, rather than endless “we’re just trying to chat” and that’s what we are meant to do. […]. Ok. Decision—you can go and tell them, they are going to negotiate a field phone in and then give them a reality check”

Assumption-based reasoning

Mental simulation

Officers would mentally simulate the exact procedures by which they would execute their actions and “play out” the anticipated consequences of that action

IC: “Right, ok, in order to help you get towards that option, I would like you (to NC) to get your team to negotiate in something, yeah? Because when I think the phone went in and we haven’t actually had any data back from that as to where he is and those other two are still on the bus. As soon as they are off the bus, I don’t care what it is, food or medicine, say let’s take food down there, yeah? Unconditional, he hasn’t asked for it, we’re worried about all of you, we’ve got some comfort for you.[…] we approach the bus with one, with a food parcel, leave it down for them, then we get an intelligence gain don’t we. Can you do me a favour, have a word with the TSU, explain what we are going to do, and whoever is going to take the food forward, we want them to have a camera on them and a recording device so that they can just talk through what they are seeing and what’s there and they can just give us a situation”

Forestalling

Preparing for worst-case scenario

The IC explicitly chose to prepare an option, but omit decision implementation; making it an available option if, in the “worst-case scenario”, they would have to implement it

“OK, right. Can you after this meeting go and do some work on that for me? and at least then I have got that as an option but at the moment I haven’t got any vehicle so I haven’t really got any tactical options at all. NC—what have you got for me?”

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van den Heuvel, C., Alison, L. & Power, N. Coping with uncertainty: police strategies for resilient decision-making and action implementation. Cogn Tech Work 16, 25–45 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10111-012-0241-8

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