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Expected Utility Theory and the Experimentalists

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Experimental Economics

Part of the book series: Studies in Empirical Economics ((STUDEMP))

Abstract

The experimental evidence against expected utility theory is, on balance, either uninformative or unconvincing. When one modifies the experiments to mitigate these criticisms the evidence tends to support traditional theory.

Dewey H. Johnson Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of South Carolina. I am grateful for comments from seminar participants at the University of Melbourne, University of South Carolina, University of Stockholm, and the University of Western Ontario. John Hey provided a firm, but sympathetic, editorial hand.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, 29208, USA

    Glenn W. Harrison

Authors
  1. Glenn W. Harrison
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of York, Heslington, York, Y01 5DD, UK

    John D. Hey

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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Harrison, G.W. (1994). Expected Utility Theory and the Experimentalists. In: Hey, J.D. (eds) Experimental Economics. Studies in Empirical Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51179-0_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51179-0_4

  • Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-51181-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-51179-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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