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Gepubliceerd in: Psychological Research 8/2019

21-06-2018 | Original Article

From reading numbers to seeing ratios: a benefit of icons for risk comprehension

Auteurs: Elisabet Tubau, Javier Rodríguez-Ferreiro, Itxaso Barberia, Àngels Colomé

Gepubliceerd in: Psychological Research | Uitgave 8/2019

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Abstract

Promoting a better understanding of statistical data is becoming increasingly important for improving risk comprehension and decision-making. In this regard, previous studies on Bayesian problem solving have shown that iconic representations help infer frequencies in sets and subsets. Nevertheless, the mechanisms by which icons enhance performance remain unclear. Here, we tested the hypothesis that the benefit offered by icon arrays lies in a better alignment between presented and requested relationships, which should facilitate the comprehension of the requested ratio beyond the represented quantities. To this end, we analyzed individual risk estimates based on data presented either in standard verbal presentations (percentages and natural frequency formats) or as icon arrays. Compared to the other formats, icons led to estimates that were more accurate, and importantly, promoted the use of equivalent expressions for the requested probability. Furthermore, whereas the accuracy of the estimates based on verbal formats depended on their alignment with the text, all the estimates based on icons were equally accurate. Therefore, these results support the proposal that icons enhance the comprehension of the ratio and its mapping onto the requested probability and point to relational misalignment as potential interference for text-based Bayesian reasoning. The present findings also argue against an intrinsic difficulty with understanding single-event probabilities.
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Voetnoten
1
We are aware that the response “30%” also coincides with the literal representation of the false alarm rate for the PE group. Nevertheless, given the extremely low percent accuracy for this group (0% according to the strict criterion; 5% considering the rounded responses), the reported effects are independent of the interpretation of this ambiguity.
 
2
We considered the use of 100 or 10 (only observed in IA responses) in the denominator as an attempt to normalize the response. Nevertheless, as discussed below, most of the NF responses using the 100 might not be “true” normalization attempts, but rather a consequence of misleading associations.
 
3
In Experiment 2, most of the Bayesian (misaligned) ratios used 10 or 100 as denominator (66 and 80% for IA and NF formats, respectively). Therefore, although simplifications were fewer than in Experiment 1, the overall percentage of correct responses to IA problems expressed as equivalent ratios was indeed higher (49 vs 67% for Experiments 1 vs 2).
 
4
In the pilot experiment, different groups received the same IA and NF problems of Experiment 1 (see “Appendix”), but were asked for frequencies (e.g., “of the women who test positive, how many have breast cancer?”), in the IA (N = 20) and NF (N = 22) formats. For the IA group, the mean number of correct responses was similar as in the present experiments (1.42). For the NF group, it was higher than in present experiments (0.82), but still lower than for the IA group (p = .02).
 
5
Although a default frequency-based representation is defended by these authors, it is also claimed that a frequentist mechanism might produce subjective confidence for single event probabilities: “even though it might initially output a frequency, and perhaps even store the information as such, other mechanisms may make that frequentist output consciously accessible in the form of a subjective degree of confidence” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996, p. 66, note 19).
 
6
For NF problems, the mean number of correct posterior probability estimates, among participants who correctly estimated both probabilities of the datum, was 0.5. For IA problems, this mean was 1.6.
 
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Metagegevens
Titel
From reading numbers to seeing ratios: a benefit of icons for risk comprehension
Auteurs
Elisabet Tubau
Javier Rodríguez-Ferreiro
Itxaso Barberia
Àngels Colomé
Publicatiedatum
21-06-2018
Uitgeverij
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Gepubliceerd in
Psychological Research / Uitgave 8/2019
Print ISSN: 0340-0727
Elektronisch ISSN: 1430-2772
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-018-1041-4

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