Exorcizing the homunculus from ideomotor/simulation theory: a commentary on Bach et al. (2022), Frank et al. (2023), and Rieger et al. (2023)

Excerpt

The contributions to this special issue are trying to understand why imagining oneself acting can have very similar effects as actually performing the imagined action. While this may sound almost like magical thinking, these kinds of phenomena are widespread and often systematically used in sports and other areas that rely on human actions. Bach et al. (2022), Frank et al. (2023), and Rieger et al. (2023) (BFR in short) argue that they are much less surprising if one considers the intimate relationship between perception and action. Human action is much more than merely responding to particular stimuli in particular ways, and many of the stimuli we perceive are actually generated by our own actions (Dewey, 1896). Hence, perception and action may not just represent two different faculties that are related or that interact, but may rather be two sides of the same coin. In fact, Hommel et al. (2001) have suggested that the terms perception and action refer to the exact same sensorimotor activity, only that the perception term highlights the receptive, and the action term the productive aspect of this activity. The suggestions of BFR are very much along these lines, which leaves me nothing to complain about the very useful approaches that these authors are suggesting. I’m convinced that taking their insights on board will move our understanding of imagery forward. Instead, I would like to characterize a theoretical challenge that is likely to be the next obstacle in our scientific journey. …