Mindfulness Within Consciousness
Take the following text from the
Saṃyutta-nikāya:
Monks, there are these five defilements of gold that when the gold is afflicted by them, it is not soft, not pliable, not shining, stiff, not fully conducive to work. Which five? Iron, monks, is a defilement of gold that when the gold is afflicted by it, the gold is not soft, not pliable, not shining, stiff, not fully conducive to work. Copper… tin… lead… silver, monks, is a defilement of gold that when the gold is afflicted by it, the gold is not soft, not pliable, not shining, stiff, not fully conducive to work.
In the very same way, monks, there are these five defilements of consciousness (citta) that when consciousness is afflicted by them, consciousness is not soft, not pliable, not shining, stiff, and does not enter concentration fully toward the destruction of the inflows. Which five? Sensual desire… hostility… sloth and torpor… restlessness and remorse… doubt is a defilement of consciousness that when consciousness is afflicted by it, consciousness is not soft, not pliable, not shining, stiff, and does not enter concentration fully toward the destruction of the inflows.
pañcime bhikkhave jātarūpassa upakkilesā yehi upakkilesehi upakkliṭṭhaṃ jātarūpaṃ na ceva mudu hoti na ca kammaniyaṃ na ca pabhassaraṃ pabhaṅgu ca na ca sammā upeti kammāya. katame pañca? ayo… lohaṃ… tipu… sīsaṃ… sajjhu bhikkhave jātarūpassa upakkileso yena upakkilesena upakiliṭṭhaṃ jātarūpaṃ na ceva mudu hoti na ca kammaniyaṃ na ca pabbhasaraṃ pabhaṅgu ca na ca sammā upeti kammāya.
evameva kho, bhikkhave, pañcime cittassa upakkilesā, yehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ cittaṃ na ceva mudu hoti na ca kammaniyaṃ, na ca pabhassaraṃ pabhaṅgu ca, na ca sammā samādhiyati āsavānaṃ khayāya. katame pañca? kāmacchando… [byāpādo… thīnamiddhaṃ… uddhaccakukkuccaṃ… vicikicchā] cittassa upakkileso yena upakkilesena upakiliṭṭhaṃ cittaṃ na ceva mudu hoti na ca kammaniyaṃ na ca pabbhasaraṃ pabhaṅgu ca na ca sammā samādhiyati āsavānaṃ khayāya. (SN V.92; VRI V.214)
The five defilements (
upakkilesa) of consciousness (
citta) listed here are more often referred to as the obstructions (
nīvaraṇa) of sensual desire (
kāmacchanda), hostility (
byāpāda), sloth and torpor (
thinamiddha), restlessness and remorse (
uddhaccakukkucca), and doubt (
vicikicchā). In some cases, removing these obstructions is the condition for a successful mindfulness practice, as in the five discourses that follow the one just quoted (most clearly in the
Āvaraṇa-nīvaraṇa-sutta at SN V.94–96; VRI V.219), which combine to say that the seven limbs of enlightenment (
bojjhaṅgā) are “conducive to the realization of the fruit of liberation through knowledge” (
vijjā-vimutti-phala-sacchikiriyāya saṃvattanti), so long as they are not characterized by these same obstructions. The first of the seven limbs is mindfulness, which in this scheme leads to qualities associated with deep meditative experience in
jhāna (Arbel,
2017, ch. 4, Gethin,
2001, ch. 5; Shulman,
2014, ch. 3), such as
pīti (rapture),
samādhi (concentration), and
upekkhā (equanimity). More commonly, as in the gradual scheme of the path (
anupubbisikkhā, e.g., in the
Sāmaññaphala-sutta at DN I.70–72), the practice of mindfulness precedes the effort to deal with these same obstructions. In this sequence, the obstructions appear as subjective stances or attitudes that must be subdued in order to enter the
samādhi meditative states of
jhāna (see below); as the text quoted says, so long as they exist — “consciousness does not enter concentration fully toward the destruction of the inflows.” In the gradual sequence, one deals with the obstructions immediately after practicing mindfulness and awareness (
sati-sampajañña, addressed through the formula on awareness of body-postures), suggesting the mindfulness and the practices to which it is related cleanse the mind of impurities that remain so that
samādhi can ensue.
For the context of the present discussion, it is important to see how this last text understands consciousness and the role of Buddhist practice in developing it. Here, we learn, consciousness has textures, such as softness, lightness, or brightness; consciousness can be stiff and rigid or conducive to understanding. Consciousness is not a general or abstract idea, but a living, changing, and conditioned locus of mental life that possesses different qualities, which can be cultivated for its liberating effect.
Within this Buddhist context, mindfulness can be understood as a set of techniques for paying attention, which are deliberately used to alter, deepen, and enhance consciousness. This is a subtle point that may be difficult to appreciate within current scientific perplexity about consciousness, for which, at best, the mind performs specified functions in the service of the biological organism. Yet in the Indian and Buddhist religious contexts, practices of attention would be seen to derive from consciousness, which itself is considered as the basic condition of existence. The phenomenological logic of the Indian approach may be more intuitive than it seems at first — experience is the most basic, phenomenologically real, fact of human life. Within it, everything that exists relies on subjective presentation and is given within the human immediate mode of knowing self and world. Within this picture, the mental is the gateway to the physical, rather than vice versa.
In Indian philosophical traditions, there is a strong inclination to see consciousness as the most basic, indeed the only stable, fact about human experience. The
Bhagavad-gītā recommends that practitioners differentiate between the existent and the non-existent, taking the first to be the hard and stable reality of conscious selfhood, and the second as the ephemeral facts of the senses, objectivity, and materiality (verse 2.15; see elaborate discussion of text and commentary in Ram-Prasad,
2013). Such understandings reflect a powerful metaphysical framework, first articulated in the
Upaniṣads (Olivelle,
1998)
, which discuss the dependency of the material world on subjective fact of knowing, and relate creation stories on the emergence of physicality and objectivity from the primordial Self (as in
Bṛhādāraṇyaka-upaniṣad 1.4,
Chāndogya-upaniṣad 6, and
Aitareya-upaniṣad 1). These perspectives are developed in compelling ways by different Indian schools, most distinctly in
Advaita Vedānta non-dualism (Potter,
2014), with the
Sāmkhya system providing a related formulation within a dualistic framework (Larson,
1979).
Buddhism debated the
Upaniṣadic notion of an absolute Self (Collins,
1982; Gombrich,
1996, ch. 1; Shulman,
2014, ch. 2; although see Bhattacarya,
2015) and denied an ontological basis for reality in eternal or cosmic consciousness, yet it nonetheless developed its ideas within this intellectual climate. Buddhism thus prioritizes consciousness and subjective experience in many strands of its psychological and philosophical analyses, while adopting its own, more pragmatic and empirical approach. For Buddhist philosophy, consciousness has no essence; it is not a Self. Nevertheless, it remains the fundamental condition for, or feature of, any life event, the
sine qua non of experience. Buddhism thus developed a powerful interest in the subjective structures and mental conditioning of experience, accepting that subjectivity is the governing factor that conditions human life and provides the gateway to most forms of objectivity. As Sonam Kachru (
2021) insightfully framed this position, Buddhism is interested in the different ways of “being minded,” speaking of humans as “cosmological beings,” who are born into a mind and world that are completely intertwined and relationally defined and experienced. Reality is, for certain forms of Buddhism, this same mental appearance.
A convenient example for the Buddhist approach could be the mature and influential eleventh century introductory manual to
Abhidhamma — advanced Buddhist philosophy, the
Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha (Bodhi,
2000; Heim,
2022; Olendzki,
2011; Wijeratne & Gethin
2007). In its first verse, this text defines four ultimately real elements of existence. Of these, the first is consciousness (
citta), which is spelled out in the first chapter of the work as a list of no fewer than 89 types or states (or 121, depending on the counting of
jhānas). Thus, any moment of existence is defined as an event of consciousness, to which are tied relevant accompanying mental factors (
cetasika), with 52 such
cetasikas defined in the second chapter. The next three chapters then analyze diverse patterns of interaction between consciousness(es) and its (or their) related factors, one of which is
sati, mindfulness, which accompanies certain positive states of mind. Matter (
rūpa), the third fundamental category of existence, is discussed in Chapter 6, and includes both material elements and sense experience. However, matter too is explained to arise from karma, here defined as the conscious quality of intention or volition (
cetanā), as well as from consciousness itself, and specifically from 75 states of consciousness described in the first chapter, while nutriment (
āhāra) and heat or climate (
utu) are also causes of matter. This chapter ends with a succinct reference to the fourth and final category of existent —
nibbāna (
nirvāṇa).
This is not the place to enter the intricate analyses of the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha or observe how it synthesizes and revises earlier canonical sources, texts that all betray a deep interest in the subjective determination of experience and in providing a meticulous definition for any moment of consciousness, the qualities it harbors, and the conditioning that shapes it. We should, however, mention one of the key ideas of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, the first Abhidhamma treatise that provides the structure for Theravāda Abhidhamma, which defines any moment, or “arising of consciousness” (cittuppāda), as possessing a positive (kusala), negative (akusala), or undefined (abyākata) moral quality. These moral qualities are embedded within any mental factor that characterizes each conscious state, thereby serving as the most important determining factor for the flow of experience. A central concern of this Buddhist analytical project becomes the identification of the finely tuned manner in which any phenomenon of experience, and any conscious state, possesses such a conditioning, ethical quality. With this, the Dhammasaṅgaṇī provides a mature Buddhist understanding that sees life as deeply concerned with the ethical quality of consciousness.
These central Abhidhamma treatises highlight the understanding that in Buddhism, consciousness is not one, self-evident thing, but a variegated reality, deeply immersed in the changing webs of conditioned human action. Consciousness is never abstract, without texture, quality, and moral inclination. It determines the next moment, and the one after, again and again, through its inner structures, which possess moral value. As Daniel Stuart (
2020: p. 284) says in another Buddhist philosophical context: “Consciousness is no longer a simple element of human experience, standing separate from sense experience and only capable of cognizing feelings/sensations. It is a complex of relational cognitions, dynamically intertwined with and engaged in filtering the data of sense experience.” Thus, the Buddhist idea is not to establish consciousness as a clear, unchanging, unitary fact, yet at the same time it does see consciousness(es) as the defining feature of reality, the central fact of existence and experience. Here, I would argue that the attempts to employ Buddhist resources to define a minimal form of consciousness as the stable point of perspective, a so-called minimal-self (Zahavi
2011, followed by Dreyfus,
2011b; Thompson,
2011; and others), do not suit the philosophy of the early Buddhist tradition (Krueger,
2011). For this context, Buddhists would agree with Dennett’s (
1991) warning against “Cartesian materialism”: there is no permanent subject who is cognizant of “the theatre of experience.” Nevertheless, as Dennett too realizes, in a manner that is becoming the norm in philosophy of mind (e.g., Koch
2012; Nagel,
1974), experience is a fundamental feature of life.
The early Buddhist discourses, as these are preserved in the Pāli
nikāyas, offer their own formulations for the determinative powers of consciousness and ethics, even if they do not necessarily argue this point straightforwardly. An important statement is provided by the seminal formulation on the 12 links of dependent-origination (Shulman
2008). This theory explains, among other things, how consciousness (
viññāṇā) is conditioned by inclinations that were created through previous actions (
saṅkhāra), then to condition perceptual experience, desire, and attachment, which then propel the process of rebirth. “Dependent on mental constructions – consciousness (arises)” (
saṅkhāra-paccayā viññāṇaṃ; SN II.1), etc., as is stated in the paradigmatic formulation of this teaching at the opening of the second book of the
Saṃyutta-nikāya, then to be repeated time and again. Here, we see that subjective inclinations determine perceptual, conative, emotional, and cognitive aspects of experience, while also impacting the realities into which humans are born.
Another informative example for the primacy of consciousness in the early tradition is the definition of “the world” (
loka), or of “everything” (
sabbaṃ), as consisting of the five aggregates (the physical and mental features of experience) or the six senses and their perceptual objects, in texts like the
Sabba-sutta (SN IV.15; VRI IV.23) or the
Samiddhi-sutta (SN IV.39; VRI IV.68). “The world” proves to be equal to the structures of subjective experience (Gethin,
1986; Harvey
1995, ch. 8).
The following, classic verses from the
Dhammapada demonstrate the conditioning force of consciousness:
36. It is so difficult to see, so fine, flying about as it pleases;
the wise man should guard his consciousness –
a protected consciousness leads to pleasure.
sududdasaṃ sunipuṇaṃ yathākāmanipātinaṃ;
cittaṃ rakketha medhavī, cittaṃ guttaṃ sukhāvahaṃ.
37. It goes far, alone, bodyless, hidden deep inside;
those who will control their consciousness
will be freed from the bonds of Māra.
dūraṅgamaṃ ekacaraṃ asarīraṃ guhāsayaṃ;
ye cittaṃ saṃyamessanti mokkhanti mārabhandhanā.
43. A mother or father cannot do this for anyone,
nor can any other relatives –
a well-directed consciousness
will take one to the best.
na taṃ matā pitā kayirā aññe vāpi ca ñātakā;
sammāpaṇihitaṃ cittaṃ seyyaso naṃ tato kare.
Compare these last verses, which employ the concept of
citta, translated here as
consciousness, to the
Dhammapada’s famous opening verses:
1.1,2All events are preceded by mind, made be mind, mind is their chief.
If one speaks or acts with a defiled mind,
suffering will pursue him,
like the wheel following the foot of the bull.
All events are preceded by mind, made be mind, mind is their chief.
If one speaks or acts with a bright mind,
joy will pursue him,
like one’s persistent shade.
manopubbaṅgamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomayā,
manasā ce paduṭṭhean bhāsati vā karoti vā,
tato naṃ dukkham anveti, cakkaṃ’va vahato padaṃ.
manopubbaṅgamā dhamma manoseṭṭhā manomayā,
manasā ce pasannena bhāsati vā karoti vā,
tato naṃ sukkham anveti, chāyā’va anapātinī.
We learn that experience follows upon its mental conditioning, it is produced by the mind, which generates joy or pain, depending on its moral quality. Here we can see how in speaking of consciousness, we are using slippery terms — as opposed to the previous verses that focused on “consciousness” (citta), the last ones employ the concept of “mind” (manas), while the doctrine of dependent-origination preferred viññāṇa, a term that can mean consciousness, but can also be seen to relate to cognition or perception. Indeed, the translations for Pāli or Sanskrit terms that in English are rendered as consciousness, attention, awareness, perception, mind, understanding, knowledge, or mindfulness are just as slippery as their counterparts in other languages, in which they are all used to circularly define each other. Here, it is more important to see the overall picture, according to which subjectivity is the basic condition of human life, which Buddhist practice is designed to cultivate and enhance.
Another important concept that emphasizes the primacy of mind and the power of ethics in determining mental life is the doctrine of karma, to which we now turn.
Karma
The texts that have been quoted suggest that for Buddhism, consciousness shapes human life: the structures of consciousness and of subjectivity, the ways of being-minded, are responsible not solely for the what people experience, but for the realities in which they find themselves. Here it is worth recalling that the conditioning of experience by action and by the patterns of subjectivity refers also to the meaning of karma — anything a person does, feels, thinks, or intends influences the way she or he exists in the world.
Karma is often thought of as a metaphysical doctrine regarding rebirth and other types of retribution that exceed empirical observation. At the same time, it has a pragmatic side, which is grounded in the understanding that life is generated through the habituated patterns of mental life. When, for example, a person is less inclined to anger, she (or he) will have more flexibility when dealing with difficult situations, will conduct her body and heart in a healthier manner, and will shape situations that are more beneficial to her and to her environment. Furthermore, people around her will appreciate this quality, respect her, and be favorably disposed toward her. This is why the ethical mind is the best predictor of human health and prosperity.
In this context of karma and the Buddhist understanding of consciousness, it should be emphasized that the notion of experience does not refer only to subjective perception, but also, at the very least, to the way objective content is appropriated and presented in consciousness. Within this view, reality is at least pragmatically and epistemically, and in some places ontologically and metaphysically, placed within the mental, responsive to a synergic movement between inner and outer conditions and contents, which are themselves subjectively determined and presented. Within the present discussion, the question of how this notion of karma relates to rebirth, or how powerful is the subjective impact on external objects, can be left aside. Yet the idea that experience is thickly determined by subjective presentation and appropriation, which has at least some degree of influence on the external world, is central to the Buddhist effort of mental cultivation.
Although such understandings move away from modernized presentations of Buddhist doctrine, it is worth recalling the manner in which these understandings of karma are expressed in the classic articulations of Buddhist folklore found in the tales on the Buddha’s previous lives (
Jātaka; Appleton,
2010; Shulman,
2018), a key mode of cultural understanding in Theravāda societies for millennia. These tales are helpful in understanding the Buddhist notion of consciousness, and the way its textures are conditioned through thought and action, thereby highlighting the value of ethical cultivation. Such stories work under the assumption that the traces of one’s actions that are preserved within conscious inclinations are carried by people across lives; indeed, this is the only thing they are thought to take with them from this life. The Buddha is the being who grew aware of this fact, and made use of the laws of karma in order to produce, over vast expanses of time, an enlightened consciousness.
The tales of the Buddha’s previous births ostensibly relate the marvelous acts he produced in the distant past, even when he was born as an animal. Once, he was born as a magnificent white elephant, who refused the role of the prize royal elephant until the mahouts of the palace guaranteed the safety and welfare of his blind mother who remained behind in the forest (
Jātaka 455). In another rebirth as an elephant, while knowing that his efforts for the sake of others are the only ones that will expand his consciousness to the state of an all-knowing Buddha, the
bodhisatta, the Buddha-to-be, sawed off his own huge, glorious tusks in order to help the hunter who shot him complete his mission successfully (
Jātaka 514). Once, as a monkey, he climbed down a deep precipice in order to save a lost and hopeless traveler, then carrying him back up on his back and showing him the way home, even after the latter tried to kill and eat him (
Jātaka 516). In another lifetime, as a golden deer-king, he offered his own life in place of the pregnant doe whose turn it was to become the king’s lunch of game (
Jātaka 12). Such perseverance, patience, and care were cultivated by the
bodhisatta for many lifetimes, thereby slowly but surely creating the state of mind and heart that would later allow him to forsake desire and achieve insight. These stories, familiar to Buddhists from the pictures or carvings on the walls of temples (Brown,
1997), from public festivals and performances (Spencer,
1966; Bowie,
2017), or from their central role in traditional storytelling (Obeyesekere,
1991; Hallisey & Hansen,
1996), present the Bodhisattva’s path to awakening as a ripening of his ethical mind.
Buddhism is often thought of as a concentrated effort to lead to the end of suffering, and there are many statements in the texts that would support such an interpretation. However, seen in this light, the idea of Buddhism as an effort toward the maturation, cultivation, and development of consciousness may be no less compelling. Suffering is not a straightforward category, and its employment in early Buddhist texts does not necessarily correspond to the way it is understood by modern, individual, post-enlightenment subjects. Modernized Buddhism has catered to contemporary sensitivities by suggesting that the suffering that troubled the early Buddhists is purely psychological. Yet the early Buddhist understanding of suffering related more to the anxieties facing endless rebirth and to being placed “within the jaws of death” (as in Sutta-nipāta 776, maccu-mukhe) and to concerns in face of the afterlife. This is implied by the definition of suffering in the first noble truth — “birth is suffering, old age is also suffering, sickness is also suffering, death is also suffering, etc.” (jāti’pi dukkhā jarā’pi dukkhā vyādhi’pi dukkhā maraṇaṃ’pi dukkhaṃ; SN V.421; VRI V.1081). Moreover, the Buddha (as he is presented in the texts) could ask his students — “and which is the suffering for the understanding of which one lives the holy life under the ascetic Gotama?” (katamaṃ pana taṃ dukkhaṃ yassa pariññāya samaṇe gotame brahmacariyaṃ vussatīti, SN IV.51; VRI IV.81). The very framing of the question suggests that the answer is not self-evident, and the fact that different answers are provided for this type of question speaks for itself.
Indeed, the Buddha’s answer here is painfully different than what contemporary students of Buddhism would accept:
sight (or – the eye) is suffering; for the understanding of this one lives the holy life under the ascetic Gotama. Forms are suffering… eye-consciousness is suffering… eye-contact is suffering… any feeling that arises based on eye contact, whether pleasurable, painful or neither, is suffering… hearing (or - the ear)…smell (or - the nose)… taste (or - the tongue)… touch (or- the body)… the mind (or – thought)...
cakkhu kho, āvuso, dukkhaṃ, tassa pariññāya bhagavati brahmacariyaṃ vussati. rūpā…cakkhuviññāṇaṃ… cakkhusamphassaṃ… yampidaṃ cakkhusamphassapaccayā uppajjati vedayitaṃ sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā tampi dukkhaṃ. tassa pariññāya bhagavati brahmacariyaṃ vussati… sotaṃ…ghāṇaṃ…jihvā…kayo… mano… (SN IV.51; VRI IV.81).
To think that any moment of sight or hearing, any possible sensory experience, is suffering, suggests that the annihilation of suffering is not a simple end we can easily penetrate. In a corresponding statement, the Buddha responds to the question “which is suffering?” (katamaṃ nu kho dukkhaṃ) by listing the five aggregates, meaning that any experience is suffering by definition (SN III.196; VRI III.174). What would the annihilation of all these experiences actually mean?
Rather than thinking of Buddhist practice necessarily as an effort to alleviate suffering, it may be fruitful to contemplate it as an effort toward the maturation of consciousness, as the dedicated and sustained attempt to cultivate and develop the basic, natural conditions of experience. For Buddhist thinkers, a development of this sort will affect conditions in the present life and in ones further ahead. In this sense, Buddhism is surely interested in changing the reality of suffering — in altering the mental structures that create it, while knowing that mind is chief of all things. This knowledge is liberating, drawing one away from constricted conditioning and toward greater calm and contentment.
This is the philosophical and psychological climate in which mindfulness is meant to operate, one in which contemplative practice is used in service of the developing of consciousness. A contemplative effort of this sort continues an ethical practice, which creates positive conditions within the mind and helps it become more conducive to health and development. We turn to an analysis of mindfulness and its relation to ethics and mental cultivation in the early discourses.
Mindfulness, Samādhi, and Mental Cultivation
Mindfulness receives diverse presentations in the early Buddhist discourses. The texts that have been given the main bulk of scholarly attention are a number of discourses from the
Majjhima-nikāya (“The Collection of the Buddha’s Middle-length Discourses,” hereafter the
Majjhima or MN), among which the
Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta (MN 10) is by far the most prominent (Anālayo,
2003). This text can be considered as an anthology of mindfulness practices, which are classified according to analytical observations of the body (
kāya), feelings (
vedanā), consciousness/mind (
citta), and “phenomena” (
dhamma). In this text, it is evident that mindfulness is understood as a form of attentiveness that needs to be constructed or “established” ([
sati-]
paṭṭhāna, Sanskrit
smṛty-upasthāna). For example, one is instructed to contemplate the disgusting nature of bodily organs and grow mindful of the way that the body is similar to a corpse in different stages of disintegration. Or, one analyzes mental content according to Buddhist philosophical schemes, such as the five obstructions, four noble truths, or five aggregates. In this text,
sati is presented as a direction of attention in ways that will train the senses to perceive reality according to the Buddhist notion of truth. When one sees that the body is like a corpse and grows accustomed to perceiving its disgusting nature, the mind will incline toward detachment. Mindfulness is thereby used in order to actively change the structures of subjective presentation (Shulman,
2010).
The list of practices in the
Sati-paṭṭhāna is not definitive, and when compared to parallel versions of this text that survive in other languages, some elements are added and others lost (Kuan,
2008; Anālayo
2011). This points to the dynamic nature of the practice and demonstrates that mindfulness is a flexible category, spanning a diversity of both conceptual and non-conceptual applications of attention. To take again the example of “establishing mindfulness” in relation to the body, the human body is not presented as magnificent and awe-striking, but is thoroughly disgusting and full of filth. The gruesome nature of the body may be no less real, but the sole emphasis on this aspect shows that evaluation, indeed judgement, is active (Dreyfus,
2011a). The conceptual emphasis of this text is fortified in its longer version, the “Great Discourse on the Establishing of Mindfulness” (
Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna-sutta, Dīgha 22), where the observation of the four noble truths is expanded through the importation of a discourse that provides a comprehensive, theoretical exposition of this teaching (the
Saccavibhaṅga-sutta, MN 141).
When these two discourses are paired with the other two key articulations of mindfulness in the
Majjhima, the relation between mindfulness and concentrated meditation is underscored. In the
Kāyagatāsati-sutta (“The Discourse on Mindfulness Directed to the Body”, MN 119), the meditations on the body that are listed in the
Sati-paṭṭhāna are repeated, but here lead to the deep meditative states of
jhāna, which are not mentioned in the
Pāli version of the latter (although they do appear in the Chinese; see Anālayo,
2011, pp. 80–93; Kuan,
2008, Ch. 5). A less direct relation between
sati and
jhāna can be identified in the
Satipaṭṭhāna through the analysis of the seven limbs of enlightenment, referred to above. References to
jhāna are further advanced in the
Ānāpānassati-sutta (“The Discourse on Mindfulness of Breathing,” MN 118), where an elaboration on the scheme of the seven limbs of enlightenment is used that establishes mindfulness through practices of breathing, observations of the mind and of feelings, and conceptual modes of observation, which allow the mind to intensify its concentration. In the last, the monk carries out his breathing while observing impermanence (
anicca), dispassion (
virāga), cessation (
nirodha), and relinquishment (
paṭinisagga). With the four applications of mindfulness fixed, the practitioner proceeds through the scheme of the seven limbs, and with them enters states of
samādhi.
The Ethics of Mindfulness
The general trend in the discourses on mindfulness that are more commonly emphasized in contemporary discussion, and which were referred to in the previous section, is to present
sati as an application of attention that is oriented toward the entrance into
samādhi. When a broader textual sample is examined, it becomes clear that the relation between
sati and
samādhi was considered to follow upon earlier ethical practice. For example, in the influential categorization of the gradual path (
anupubbi-sikkhā) from the
Long Discourses (discussed above),
sati appears within the continuum that begins with a diversity of ethical practices, proceeds through preliminary meditative practices that include
sati, and culminates in
samādhi experience and the arising of the knowledges that constitute awakening (Ben-David,
2024). In this sequence, ethical practices receive elaborate treatment, and include, among other things, abiding by the precepts and cultivating a variety of behavioral restrictions that lead to a calmed mental state of reduced anxiety (
bhaya) and inner joy that is free of guilt (
ajjhataṃ anavajja-sukhaṃ paṭisaṃvedeti; DN I.70). Only at this stage is one said to pursue a more intense and focused mental observation, when practices of mindfulness and awareness (
sati-sampajañña) appear between restraint of the senses (
indriya-saṃvara) and content (
saṃtuṭṭhi), then leading to the clearing of the obstructions and to
samādhi states of
jhāna. Simply, mindfulness facilitates the transition from ethical practice to concentrated meditation.
A corresponding articulation that is more interesting for our purposes is found in the Gaṇakamoggallāna-sutta (“Discourse to the accountant Moggallāna,” MN 107), which reworks parts of the same sequence in a manner that provides new emphases on the role of mindfulness in the ethical project. In this text, the expansive ethical instruction of the gradual sequence is condensed into a short formula in which the Buddha instructs his disciple to be ethical (silavā hohi, MN III.2; VRI III.75), and thus to abide restrained in the restraint of the pātimokkha (the monkish behavioral code; pātimokkha-saṃvara-saṃvuto viharāhi), endowed with good conduct in both his behavior and senses (ācāra-gocara-sampanno), while finding fault in the slightest blame (aṇumattesu vajjesu bhayadassāvī), and training after having undertaken the rules of training (samādāya sikkhassu sikkhāpadesu). This leads to the instruction to restrain the senses, which is equal to the one in the gradual path, and to guidance regarding restrictions of food and of sleep, which replace the cultivation of content.
At this stage, the discourse relates to the practice of mindfulness and awareness, which lead to the adoption of a remote place of practice and the removal of the obstructions, after which the monk will achieve the four
jhānas. After the monk returns from his alms-round, he sits cross-legged, places his body erect, and establishes mindfulness in front of him (
so pacchābhattaṃ piṇḍapātapaṭikkanto nisīdati pallaṅkaṃ ābhujitvā ujuṃ kāyaṃ paṇidhāya parimukhaṃ satiṃ upaṭṭhapetvā, MN III.3). In a beautiful formulaic passage, the discourse formulaically describes the way that the monk removes the obstructions:
He abandons covetousness to the world; he abides with a consciousness devoid of covetousness, and purifies his consciousness from covetousness.
He abandons the hostility and anger[or – the defect of hostility]; he abides with a consciousness with no hostility, caring for all beings and creatures, and purifies his consciousness from hostility.
He abandons sloth and torpor; he abides without sloth and torpor, perceiving light, mindful and aware, and purifies his consciousness from sloth and torpor.
He abandons restlessness and remorse; he abides with no over-excitement, his consciousness internally calmed, and purifies his consciousness from restlessness and remorse.
He abandons doubt; he abides having crossed doubt, without saying this or that about ethical qualities (kusalesu dhammesu), and purifies his consciousness from doubt.
so abhijjhaṃ loke pahāya vigatābhijjhena cetasā viharati, abhijjhāya cittaṃ parisodheti; byāpādapadosaṃ pahāya abyāpannacitto viharati sabbapāṇabhūtahitānukampī, byāpādapadosā cittaṃ parisodheti; thīnamiddhaṃ pahāya vigatathinamiddho viharati ālokasaññī sato sampajāno, thinamiddhā cittaṃ parisodheti; uddhaccakukkuccaṃ pahāya anuddhato viharati ajjhattaṃ vūpasantacitto, uddhaccakukkuccā cittaṃ parisodheti; vicikicchaṃ pahāya tiṇṇavicikiccho viharati akathaṃkathī kusalesu dhammesu, vicikicchāya cittaṃ parisodheti (MN III.3; VRI III.75).
This passage may read as a familiar, ordinary contemplative technique used on the path toward samādhi and liberation. However, its wording and placement right before the entrance into samādhi reveal a deep understanding regarding the nature of the mind and the manner in which its quality is affected by moral practice. This meditation points to the combined work of ethical and mental cultivation, which go hand in hand, with the latter being a more advanced and refined level of the former. Together, they impact subtle inclinations of mind, which are adapted to make consciousness more ethically cleansed and complete. It is not only that one “abides with a consciousness with no hostility, caring for all beings and creatures, and purifies his consciousness from hostility,” an attitude we would surely see as moral. Here, sloth and torpor, restlessness and remorse, and sensual desire and doubt, which are elements that we would not necessarily classify as moral, are transformed in a manner that shows how the ethical quality of consciousness that is pursued through practice, and which allows the mind to enter samādhi, is an alteration of basic inclination of consciousness. The ethical efforts, and the meditative or attentive one involved in sati and related practices, were designed to create this change in the textures of consciousness. Calm (as in samatha) is shown to be a moral quality, reflecting the way the mind was cultivated and transformed.
This contemplation offers an example for the way that meditation is used as a method to purify the mind and maximize its moral potential, with mindfulness fulfilling an important role in the process. This passage emphasizes the manner in which mindfulness is activated at different stages of the practice: First, it appears as part of the practice of mindfulness and awareness to bodily comportment. It then participates in the purification of the obstructions, as part of the abandoning of sloth and torpor. Finally, in its most advanced form, it will be part of the description of the third and fourth jhānas.
Another fascinating, more complicated expression of the manner in which mindfulness drives ethical practice home to bring about samādhi experience comes in the Dantabhūmi-sutta (MN 125, “The Discourse on the Stages [of practice by the] Tamed”). Here, the Buddha uses a long simile on the taming of an elephant, who is caught in the forest and slowly led to become an obedient, royal animal through the patient efforts of his trainer. Similarly, the monk’s path of cultivation resembles the training of the beast. In describing the training of a monk, the text draws on the formulas of the gradual sequence, but is based more strongly on ones that were quoted and discussed in the last text to the accountant Moggallāna. Here, quite surprisingly, after the sequence that leads to the uprooting of the obstructions, the authors have the Buddha say that the student should cultivate sati-paṭṭhāna. In this case, the establishing of mindfulness is used explicitly in order to subdue the habits and thought patterns of household life (gehasitānañ c’eva sīlānaṃ gehasitānañ c’eva saṃkalppānaṃ abhinimmadanāya, MN III.136; VRI III.219), much like the trainer would try to crush the behavioral and mental patterns of the elephant that derive from his life in the forest. In a unique statement, the text then suggests that the four practices of sati-paṭṭhāna are to be employed in order to drive away thoughts that are related to the body, feelings, consciousness, and mental objects (kāye kāyānupassī viharāhi mā ca kāyupasaṃhitaṃ vitakkaṃ vitakkesi, MN III.136; VRI III.220). Strikingly, this leads directly to the second jhāna, which follows upon the quieting (vūpasama) of thoughts (vitakka) and related mental processes (vicāra).
Anālayo (
2006) has argued that the position advocated by the
Dantabhūmi-sutta is a mistake of oral transmission, while Kuan (
2008) has hinged parts of his compelling analysis of mindfulness in the early discourses on this text. Anālayo bases his arguments on the difference between the Pāli and Chinese versions, and on his more general emphasis on mistakes in oral transmission (Anālayo,
2022, Ch. 3). While it potentially could be true that there was such a “mistake” here, the more compelling explanation is that the position articulated by the authors was coherent in their eyes, and that they were reinforcing the connection that the tradition identified between
sati and
jhāna. The differences between the versions of these texts actually recommend that both versions rely on creative elaboration, a key theme in the historical development of the texts and the shaping of the textual record we possess (Shulman,
2024). Be that as it may, the ethical dimensions of mindfulness practice come out here in a powerful manner, no matter which version of the text one prefers to go by: mindfulness is seen as a way to further polish the moral mind and enhance its meditative powers, employed to uproot thoughts of sensual desire (
kāmupasaṃhitaṃ vitakkaṃ).
Interestingly, the ending of the
Kāyagatāsati-sutta (of the
Majjhima, discussed above) also echoes these same schemes by speaking of the ten benefits provided by mindfulness of the body: The three first are ethical components, including an ascetic capability to bear the hardships of practice, to bear unpleasant situations (
arati) and not be overpowered by pleasant ones, and to bear fear and dread (
bhayabheravasaho hoti). This last practice resonates with the mental stance of ethical maturation that one attains through the practice of
sīla, which allows deep meditation to develop, as is articulated in the seminal
Majjhima “Discourse on Fear and Dread” (
Bhayabherava-sutta, MN 4; Shulman,
2021, Ch. 6). The other seven benefits relate to advanced attainments in
samādhi, special powers (
iddhi) and wisdom that appear at the end of the sequence of the gradual path.
These texts join to suggest that mindfulness was designed to be employed in a variety of methods during advanced stages of the path in order to take ethical practice to new levels. An explicit connection between ethical practices and the establishing of mindfulness is made in a series of discourses in the Chapter devoted to
sati-paṭṭhāna in the
Connected Discourses, the
Sati-paṭṭhāna-saṃyutta (Chapter 3 in Book V of the
Saṃyutta-Nikāya). For example, we find the Venerable Bhadda asking Venerable Ānanda — “what is the goal of these wholesome ethical practices (
sīla) explained by the Lord?” (
…imāni kusalāni sīlāni kiṃatthiyāni vuttāni bhagavatā). The answer is straightforward — “these wholesome ethical practices explained by the Lord were explained by him for the very cultivation of the four foundations of mindfulness” (
yānimāni kusalāni sīlāni vuttāni bhagavatā, imāni kusalāni sīlāni yāvadeva catunnaṃ satipaṭṭhānānaṃ bhāvanāya vuttāni bhagavatā; discourse no. 21 in the collection – the
Sīla-sutta). Here I translate
kusalāni sīlāni as “wholesome ethical practices” in line with accepted translation of
kusala as
wholesome, taking
sīla to relate broadly to ethics or to commendable behavior
. Another common translation for
ksuala is
skillful (e.g., Harvey,
2000, pp. 42–43), which underscores the prudence and benefits of ethical activity. This text provides a strong statement —
kusala involves a positive moral quality of the healthy and wholesome mind, that here is said to have a determinative effect on the practice of mindfulness.
In discourse no. 5 in the collection (Akusla-sutta), the Buddha says that “the heap of unskillful ethical qualities” (akusala-rāsi) is equal to the five obstructions. The corresponding “heap of skillful ethical qualities” (kusala-rāsī) is equal to the four practices of establishing mindfulness. In this text, as in discourse no. 45, the Kusala-rāsi-sutta that reproduces the second part of the text, mindfulness is seen to be the same as ethical activity itself, a tool used to cleanse the mind of the most subtle attitudes that could be considered unwholesome.
Another confident expression of the close relation between mindfulness and ethics appears in a textual model that is repeated in numerous texts, in which the Buddha provides a condensed (saṃkhittena) instruction on a practice that a student may use to guide his secluded meditation. In this sequence, the Buddha instructs different monks — “you should cultivate the four applications of mindfulness based on ethics, established in ethics” (sīlaṃ nissāya sīle patiṭṭhāya cattāro satipaṭṭhāne bhāveyyāsi; SN V.143). This statement concludes the condensed instruction, which begins with the Buddha saying: “first, you must purify [the mind] in relation to positive moral qualities [i.e. wholesome ones]” (ādimeva visodhehi kusalesu dhammesu); “positive moral qualities” is then explained as “a well-purified ethical practice (or purified behavior) and a straight view” (ko cādi kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ? sīlañca suvisuddhaṃ diṭṭhi ca ujukā), a sequence that is repeated to three students in discourse nos. 3, 15, and 16 of the collection. Notice the conceptual element in the maintenance of a correct view that is paired with ethical action, and which together serve as a basis for the practice of sati-paṭṭhāna. In another text that is very similar to the latter (no. 47), the same formulation on the purification in relation to “positive mental qualities” is defined as abandoning negative activities of body, speech, and mind (kāya/vacī/mano-duccaritaṃ pahāya) and cultivating positive ones instead (kāya/vacī/mano-succaritaṃ bhāvessasi; SN V.188). This is a classic ethical formulation, which again provides the basis for the establishing of mindfulness. In discourse no. 46, the explanation that the monk receives for the purification in relation to positive mental states is “you must abide restrained in the restraint of the Pātimokkha [the monkish code], accomplished in the adoption of good conduct, seeing terror in the slightest fault; having adopted the rules of training – you should train in them” (pātimokkhasaṃvarasaṃvuto viharāhi ācāragocarasampanno amattesu vajjesu bhayadassavī samādāya sikkhesu sikkhāpadesu; SN V.187), a formula that is familiar from the framing of the practice in the Gaṇakamoggallāna-sutta, discussed above. Combined, these corresponding articulations point to the importance of grounding mindfulness practice in a developed moral consciousness.
An interesting formulation on the relation between mindfulness and ethical practice is found in the ninth book of the Aṅguttara-nikāya, the Buddha’s collection of Numbered Discourses, where we find a full section (vagga) of ten texts that present the four sati-paṭṭhānas as methods for establishing an ethical mind. Thus, in the first discourse (no. 63), it is suggested that the four foundations are “to be cultivated for the driving away of the five weaknesses of the training” (imesaṃ kho bhikkhave pañcannaṃ sikkhādubbalyānaṃ pahānāya cattāro satipaṭṭhānā bhāvetabbā; AN IV.457). These five weaknesses are defined in the text as the five most basic ethical faults discussed extensively in the textual tradition, of harming living beings, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, and intoxication. The rest of this section of the Aṅguttara consists of nine other discourses that employ the four foundations of mindfulness for a further purification of mind and perfection of its ethical quality, using other lists of Buddhist practice, such as the obstructions (nīvaraṇa), the objects of sensual pleasure (kāmaguṇa), etc.
These texts provide important articulations on the close relationship between mindfulness and ethics, which relate a strand of the tradition that seems to be assumed by that texts that are more concerned with meditative practice per se. In these texts, ethics and mindfulness appear as complementary, inter-related practices, which join to prepare the mind for deeper meditation and insight. On the one hand, ethics serves as a necessary preliminary practice to mindfulness. On the other hand, mindfulness continues ethical practice and applies it in more refined ways that are related to the practices of mental cultivation. Both help mature consciousness and deepen its quality, making it more conducive to religious transformation.
There is thus a direct continuity between ethics, successful meditation, and the development of understanding. As emphasized by Giuliano Giustarini (
2017), these practices overlap, so that they are not only inter-related but actually penetrate each other. For example, in the popular sequence of the “ten courses of action” (
dasakammapatha), we find ethical action of the body — one should not harm living beings, not steal, and abstain from sexual misconduct, next to ethical speech — the avoiding lying, slander, and harsh and idle speech, and joined with a positive mental stance that includes non-covetousness, non-hostility, and correct view. These ten elements are considered together as parts of the same whole. This means that ethical action and mental cultivation participate in the same process.
Before concluding, it is important to notice that ethical action and attitudes are situated within a broader religious context. Here, faith in the Buddha-Dharma-Saṅgha has a relaxing and supportive quality, which helps one be more attuned to what in Buddhism are seen as the deeper truths of life. “Faith,”
saddhā, inclines toward notions of
trust or
confidence (Saddhātissa,
1978), but evidently includes elements of
faith as well. As Obeyesekere has it — “Not only is the Buddha the center of Buddhist faith, but he is, par excellence, the hero of its mythology” (
1991, p. 231). Trust or faith in the Buddha is reassuring, and provides a sense of security that is considered important for mental development. Positive attitudes toward the Buddha further bring
pasāda (Skt.
prasāda), a sense of calm and blessing, a relaxation of mental anxiety that inspires well-being (Rotman,
2009; Pinkney,
2013). In fact, certain Buddhist texts present faith in the triple-gem as a corresponding option to ethical cultivation in order to produce a ripe mental state for advanced practice, as in the influential
Aṅguttara-nikāya 6.10. These values may not seem ethical in the modern, secularized sense, but so long as ethics seeks a healthy way of being human in society, while defining virtue and morality, these considerations apply.
Generosity (
dāna) is another value that is fundamental to the Buddhist pursuit of a better mind and consciousness. The paradigmatic ritual of generosity is the daily action of providing sustenance for Buddhist monks (Bowie,
1998; Harvey,
2000, pp. 61–65; Heim,
2004; Cassaniti,
2015, pp. 97–98). Giving directs the mind to an attitude of selflessness, which can be thought of as a condition for affluence. This act of giving is also one of gratitude toward the Buddha and the community of monks, who took up the hardships of spiritual practice for the welfare of society (Hallisey,
1988). The Buddha’s efforts not only show the way, but generated the community of monks that has become a field of merit, which allows people to plant their seeds of giving in fertile karmic ground. The
Saṅgha is the “the highest field of merit for the people of the world” (
anuttaraṃ puññakkhettaṃ lokassa), so that giving also has a positive karmatic effect, much like ethics.
Among the most popular scriptures in Theravāda societies are
paritta texts used for protection (Harvey,
1993; Shulman,
2019). Perhaps the most widely used of these are the
Discourse on Love (or
Loving-kindness, Metta-sutta,
Sutta-nipāta I.8) and the
Discourse on the Highest Blessing (
Mahāmaṅgala-sutta, Sutta-nipāta II.4). The first of these effectively teaches that the best way to keep oneself healthy and prosperous is to hold a mind of boundless care toward all living beings, of whatever conceivable kind, like a mother caring for her only son. The second discourse supplies a list of ethical practices, which emphasize the social, rather than the renunciate, ethic of Buddhism (Hallisey,
2015). These ideas again exemplify the deep commitment within Theravāda to the power of the ethical mind, reminding us not reduce our notions of ethics to what seems natural in our own society.