Recognizing Users of the Recognition Heuristic
Abstract
The recognition heuristic is hypothesized to be a frugal inference strategy assuming that inferences are based on the recognition cue alone. This assumption, however, has been questioned by existing research. At the same time most studies rely on the proportion of choices consistent with the heuristic as a measure of its use which may not be fully appropriate. In this study, we propose an index to identify true users of the heuristic contrasting them to decision makers who incorporate further knowledge beyond recognition. The properties and the applicability of the proposed index are investigated in the reanalyses of four published experiments and corroborated by a new study drawn up to rectify the shortcomings of the reanalyzed experiments. Applying the proposed index to explore the influence of knowledge we found that participants who were more knowledgeable made use of the information available to them and achieved the highest proportion of correct inferences.
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